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Abstract: 
 
Mark Phelan 
Figuration of the Folk: 
The Nature and Use of a Universal Linguistic Category 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. William Lycan) 
 
If Sally knows Sid to be a hard worker, she might make the point by asserting, "Sid is 
a hard worker." Or she might say, "Sid is a Sherman tank." We all recognize the first as 
an instance of literal language and the second as an instance of figurative language, 
specifically, a metaphor. This distinction is common even to people remote from us in 
space and time. But what does this distinction amount to?  
Theorists have often tried to explain the distinction in terms of different kinds of 
meaning or understanding. Davidson claims that metaphors simply mean what they 
literally mean, but they could have various distinctive effects upon us, and understanding 
a metaphor consists in being affected in these ways. Grice and Searle claim that literal 
meanings are somehow composed out of the meanings of the pronounced words, whereas 
metaphorical meanings are implicatures arising when it would not be rational for the 
speaker to mean her words literally in the context in which she uttered them. 
Contextualists, such as Sperber and Wilson, contend that insofar as there is a 
figurative/literal distinction at all, it consists in the presence of various interpretations for 
figurative utterances, no one of which is essential for understanding. I argue that attempts 
to explain the distinction between literal and figurative utterances in terms of distinctive 
kinds of meaning get the order of explanation backwards. Accounts of metaphorical 
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meaning and understanding fall out of a prior account of what it is to speak figuratively 
(in general), and metaphorically (in particular).  
By saying, "Sid is a Sherman Tank," Sally may express her belief that Sid is one who 
cannot be deterred from achieving his goals. She might also amuse her audience with the 
thought that Sid is an armored assault vehicle. Very roughly, the account I offer holds 
that if she intends to do both of those things, Sally speaks figuratively. More precisely, I 
contend that the distinction between figurative and literal utterances can only be 
explained through recourse to Austin's (1962) fundamental distinction between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Figurative utterances involve two 
propositional interpretations. One's aim with one of these interpretations is essentially 
'illocutionary'. One aims to make an assertion, or to ask a question, or to pronounce 
sentence, or to perform some other conventional or psychologically expressive act. But 
one's aim with the other interpretation is essentially only 'perlocutionary.' With the other 
interpretation, one aims to affect the psychology of one's hearer—perhaps to frighten her, 
or to shock her, or to cause her to be entertained. To understand a figurative utterance 
fully is to grasp both expressed contents, as well as a speaker's intentions in expressing 
these.  
With my account of figurative utterances in place, I can explain the differences 
between metaphors and other subclasses of figurative utterances using various resources, 
such as those of classic rhetoric theory. My view suggests a distinctive argumentative 
function for figuration. Speakers unconsciously use figurative utterances to produce 
subtle affective reactions in their audiences. These reactions sometimes lead addressees 
to attribute more credence to what is actually asserted, which suggests a new explanation 
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for a traditional claim about the pernicious effects of figurative language. My view offers 
a nuanced account of how we understand artistic metaphors, such as those appearing in 
poetry, as well as the more pedestrian metaphors appearing often in ordinary 
conversation. The order in which we grasp the illocuting and perlocuting contents 
reverses, depending on speakers‘ and hearers‘ distinctive goals in these distinct kinds of 
cases. My view also suggests a continuous account for certain non-verbal actions which 
are similar to figurative utterances.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Universality of Figurative Language 
 
The topic of this study is the universal linguistic distinction between figurative and 
literal language.  This could be construed as a folk distinction  (or a common-sense 
conceptual framework). Folk distinctions are familiar from the philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of science, cognitive science, and a variety of other fields of research, though 
they are a rare topic within the philosophy of language. In other fields, the notion of a 
folk theory has sometimes been equated with a naive, ultimately false theory. But not 
always. Churchland (1981) does not assume the falsity of what he considers the folk 
framework of propositional attitude psychology (though he argues for it). Recently, a 
surprisingly diverse group of cognitive scientists, psychologists, and philosophers have 
begun theorizing about the folk metaphysics of mind without any extended consideration 
of whether these ordinary perspectives are accurate or not.
1
 But even when folk theories 
in other fields have been assumed or argued to be false, they have rarely been considered 
pernicious on independent grounds. In the few instances in which common-sense 
linguistics has been explicitly discussed, however, a central theme has been the bad 
consequences of folk ideas about language. Jackendoff (web), for instance, emphasizes 
the role folk linguistics has played in discriminatory pedagogical practices and policies. 
And it has been pointed out that linguistic purism is a common accompaniment to racial 
                                                        
1 See, for instance, Bloom and Veres (1999), Robbins and Jack (2006), Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007), 
Knobe and Prinz (2008), Huebner, Bruno and Sarkissian (2010), and Arico (2010). 
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purism.
2
 Although these examples of folk theories are instructive, we may not want to 
equate the ordinary linguistic distinction between the figurative and the literal with a full 
blown folk theory. In any case and as I will discuss, it is an entirely ordinary linguistic 
distinction that arises everywhere there is language.   
In this work I will defend a particular account of the tacit theory people use to 
distinguish figurative utterances from literal utterances. What is more, I will argue that 
this theory tracks a real distinction amongst different kinds of utterances. And I will 
contend that this is an important and useful distinction to make. An understanding of the 
structure of figurative language will reveal similarities between verbal and non-verbal 
behavior. Attention to the features of figurative utterances can guard us from certain 
mistakes of reasoning. And there are other benefits of this investigation as well—or so I 
will argue.  
While theories of the folk distinction between literal and figurative language are 
certainly rare, theories of figurative language—or metaphor, in the broad use of that 
term—are plentiful. In the next four chapters of this dissertation I discuss four classes of 
these theories. In the next chapter (chapter two) I introduce the distinction between these 
four classes and introduce and discuss a non-cognitivist account of figurative language. 
In the third chapter I argue against a common assumption of those who discuss figurative 
language, that paraphrases of figurative utterances are inadequate. The denial of this 
assumption proves the nail in the coffin of non-cognitivist views, but it will also be 
important to the discussion to follow. In chapter four I discuss and ultimately reject 
implication views of figurative language. In the fifth chapter I discuss views which 
identify metaphorical meanings with sentence meanings and what I will call utterance 
                                                        
2 See Linguistic Purism in the Germanic Languages, Langer and Davies (2005).  
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meanings (which are not implications of sentences). Though I conclude that metaphorical 
meanings are utterance meanings, I argue against the reductive view of figurative 
language that is common to contextualist accounts of utterance meaning. In chapter six I 
introduce my account of figurative language, which consciously respects the folk status 
of figurative language. And, in the final chapter, I discuss some of the important 
implications and payoffs of my view. In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly survey 
some of the background assumption on which this dissertation is premised.  
1. There is an Ordinary Concept of Figurative Language 
Obviously, a key assumption of this thesis is that there exists a folk notion of 
figurative language. But do ordinary people really distinguish figurative utterances from 
literal utterances? Do they actually think of some sentences as figurative sentences? 
Clearly, the term ―figurative utterance‖ does not enjoy widespread, ordinary language 
application. But that does not defeat the assumption. The common term for figurative 
language is ―metaphorical language‖. People quite often speak of ―metaphorical 
language‖, and when they do, they mean to refer to a broad category of figurative 
language, not the narrow category of a specific figurative trope. Ordinary Americans are 
not picking out a specific figurative trope when they continually argue over whether 
Jesus‘ parables are literal or metaphorical. (Clearly they are not referring merely to Jesus‘ 
comparative statements.) In a recent New York Post interview, the co-host of Bravo‘s 
Top Chef, Padma Lakshmi, discussing her recent pregnancy and an associated delay in 
filming, claimed, ―My perspective has shifted, and I‘m not as hungry anymore because 
my priorities have changed.‖ Asked to clarify, Lakshmi made clear that she was speaking 
metaphorically of her professional ambition, stating, ―I‘m literally hungry. I‘m more 
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hungry than ever.‖ As I write this, a debate is raging in the political blogosphere over 
whether certain of Nevada Senate candidate Sharron Angle‘s statements about a violent 
struggle against the United States government are metaphorical or literal. Numerous other 
examples of such ordinary usage are ready to hand. But these are sufficient to show that 
ordinary Americans distinguish between literal and figurative language, and that they use 
the term ―metaphor‖ to do it. 
But does this show that the distinction is a folk distinction? Americans are among the 
most highly educated people on the planet. According to the United States Department of 
Education, 85% of adult Americans hold a high school diploma. The literacy rate for 
Americans over the age of 15 is 98%. Perhaps the tendency among Americans to identify 
certain utterances as figurative is due not to the existence of an ordinary concept but 
rather to our internalization of a culturally specific, theoretical term-of-art. We can 
answer this objection to the folk notion assumption by considering the tendency of people 
far removed from us in time and space to identify as figurative certain sentences or 
utterances that we today would also consider figurative. For example, within the category 
of metaphora, Aristotle (in his Poetics) places not only figurative classifications, which 
would satisfy the narrow conception of metaphors, but also, as Rapp (2010) points out, 
examples that, ―would fall under the headings of metonomy or synecdoche.‖ Of course, 
Aristotle‘s place of prominence in Western intellectual heritage renders him a less than 
ideal candidate to overcome the cultural particularism objection. We should put more 
weight on the Chinese literary tradition. In the ―Great Preface‖ to the Book of Songs, 
which reached its extant form by the first century C.E., a category corresponding to the 
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folk notion of figurative language is identified. Discussing the text, Stephen Owen writes 
of two key terms:  
Fu, ―exposition,‖ is any unfigured sequence. If in the fu mode a speaker describes a 
swiftly flowing stream, that stream is taken to be present in the scene, perhaps one 
that the speaker of the poem must cross. Fu encompasses direct description, narration, 
and explanation of what is on the speaker‘s mind. Pi, ―comparison,‖ means that the 
central images of the poem are simile or metaphor; the reader anticipates figuration 
(46). 
 
Writing in the 5
th
 century, several years after the ―Great Preface,‖ Liu Hsieh in his work 
of literary criticism Wen-hsin tiao-lung, or The Literary Mind and the Carving of 
Dragons, offered a tentative theory of pi: 
What do we really mean by pi? A description of things used to stand for ideas, and 
the use of figures of speech to intimate the nature of certain facts. Thus gold and 
pewter are used to stand for illustrious virtue, a jade tally signifies an outstanding 
man, a caterpillar means education, cicadas and grasshoppers denote howling and 
shouting, washing clothes symbolizes sadness of heart, and the rolling up of a mat is 
used as a figure for firmness or will: these illustrate the meaning of the pi. As to lines 
such as, ―Your hemp robe is like snow,‖ ―The two outside horses go as if they were 
dancing,‖ they all belong to the pi category (196). 
 
Pi, in Liu Hsieh‘s use, also denotes figurative language in general, not any particular 
trope, as is demonstrated by inclusion under the category of both simile: 
Delicately fashioned is my lord, 
As a thing of bronze, of white metal, 
As a scepter of jade, a disc of jade (47). 
 
And metaphor (in the narrow sense): 
 
My heart is not a mat; 
It cannot be folded away (71). 
 
The references of this section reveal that people of diverse backgrounds, removed 
from one another in space and time, have identified the figurative as a distinct category of 
language from literal description. But the works of remote periods that I have referred to 
are scholarly texts. Why should we accept then that in remote times and places ordinary 
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people also distinguished between figurative and literal language? Sadly, we do not have 
weblogs from the Han to scour for references to our distinction. But some evidence for 
the universality of a folk distinction can come from the fact that not only the scholars, but 
also the poets of ancient China seemed to have recognized this distinction. In one of the 
unattributed poems in the Book of Songs, which collects poems written primarily between 
800 and 600 BCE, we find the following verse: 
Shu is away in the hunting-fields, 
There is no one living in our lane. 
Of course there are people living in our lane; 
But they are not like Shu, 
So beautiful, so good (39). 
 
Here the poet herself identifies and explains what she means by her own figurative 
utterance, ―there is no one living in our lane.‖ The idea of a person here refers 
metaphorically to a very beautiful and good person, and that is what there is none of in 
the poet‘s lane.  
These quotes provide good initial evidence for the claim that there exists a culturally 
universal folk notion of the figurative, picked out in English by the word ―metaphor,‖ but 
broader than any single figurative trope. Of course, the case for this folk concept depends 
in part on whether an account of what the folk are tracking can be offered. It is my goal in 
this thesis to offer an account of the folk distinction. 
2. Ordinary Concept vs. Theorist‟s Concept 
In the previous section I offered evidence in favor of a folk notion of the figurative 
that is not equivalent to any single figurative trope. Figurative tropes such as similes, 
metonymies, and metaphors are a rhetoricians theoretical categories. In this section I 
want to defend another key assumption of the present text: that the folk notion of a 
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metaphor is not equivalent to the philosophers‘ and linguists‘ broad notion of figurative 
language as encompassing any utterance involving loose—or non-lexical—use of terms.  
According to this theoretical specification of figurative language, utterances such as 
the following all involve metaphorical use (of the italicized terms):
3
 
(1) The stock market collapsed in the 1920‘s. 
(2) I‘ve got to grab a cab. 
(3) He was upset, but he wasn‘t upset.4 (Uttered by Kato, of O.J. Simpson.)  
(4) They played a game of basketball. (When it was a three-on-three, half-court 
game.) 
(5) Put the noodles on the table. (When in the woods with only a big, flat rock 
nearby.)  
 
But ordinary people do not endorse this notion of figurative language as language 
involving loose use, as three pieces of evidence demonstrate.  
I. Intuitively, people would not generally regard the above utterances as figurative 
utterances. Do the interviewers at the New York Post call Padma Lakshmi out for 
claiming that her perspective has shifted? No, because, though loose, that does not fit 
the ordinary language conception of metaphor. Of course, sometimes one comes 
across people who are, in ordinary language contexts, sticklers for lexical use. These 
Ne‘er-do-well Extremist Reactionaries for the Dictionary, or NERDs, cast a false 
veneer of counterexample to the non-loose-use hypothesis. But if we look closely, I 
suspect we will find within each NERD a starved humanities pedant yearning to 
breathe free. If you really listen to a NERD, you will quickly discover that even he is 
                                                        
3 At least, they all do on one or another conception of semantic meaning. Griceans will maintain that 4 and 
5, in particular, are not loose, that they express propositional sentence meaning that it would not be rational 
for a speaker to express in any salient context, and that they thus lead the hearer to infer distinct speaker 
meaning. I will discuss different conceptions of semantic meaning in later chapters of the dissertation.  
 
4 If the utterance does not express a contradiction, at least one instance of ―upset‖ must be understood non-
lexically. 
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not consistent in his doctrinaire tendencies. He could not be. Loose use is thoroughly 
ubiquitous. 
II. Not only do intuitive assessments and ordinary-language case studies (such as the 
Padma Lakshmi example above) support the conclusion that the folk notion of 
figurative language is not the philosopher‘s notion of figurative language, 
experimental results from the laboratory also favor this conclusion. Researchers at the 
Arizona Experimental Philosophy Laboratory, for example, found that subjects, after 
being given an example of the figurative/literal distinction, rated utterances such as, 
―Einstein was an egghead,‖ as figuratively true, and utterances such as, ―George W. 
Bush is President of the United State,‖ as literally true. Importantly, although it 
involves loose use, the utterance, ―The stock market collapsed in the 1920‘s,‖ was 
generally judged to be literally true, suggesting that the folk concept of the figurative 
involves something other than loose use. 
III. Finally, we should accept that the folk linguistic notion of the metaphorical is not 
equivalent to the philosopher‘s notion of the metaphorical as linguistic loose use 
because the extension of the folk notion is not limited to the linguistic. A quick 
Google news search reveals that many ordinary uses of the construction ―is a 
metaphor‖ are applied not to sentences but to images, items, and events. On the first 
page of a search conducted on June 22
nd
, 2010, a drawing of a veil, the walking of a 
labyrinth, and the BP oil spill are all (along with various linguistic constructions) 
identified as metaphors. But veils, labyrinths, and oil spills are not instances of loose 
use—the technical category does not apply to non-linguistic items. Thus, the ordinary 
notion of a metaphor is not equivalent to loose use. (Ordinary language applications 
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of the concept ―metaphor‖ to the non-linguistic are important. Any account of the folk 
concept must explain these. I will attempt to do so in the seventh chapter of this 
dissertation.) 
The considerations of this section support the conclusion that the folk notion of a 
metaphor intersects but is not equivalent to the philosophers‘ and linguists‘ broad notion 
of figurative language as loose use. In arguing for this conclusion, I have relied on 
ordinary reports as to whether or not utterances are metaphorical. But are such ordinary 
reports to be trusted? In the next section I will explain how they are not always to be 
trusted, as well as the upshots of this conclusion for our present discussion. 
3. Performance vs. Competence (and the Adequacy of Linguistic Theories)  
On March 25
th
, 2010, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on military 
installments on Guam, Georgia Representative Hank Johnson quizzed U.S. Navy Pacific 
Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, about the size of the island territory. He then 
explained his questions, saying, ―My fear is that the whole island will become so overly 
populated that it will tip over and capsize.‖ Many people took Johnson to be voicing an 
actual fear that the island would sink. Video of his interrogation of the Admiral became 
something of an internet sensation, prompting Johnson to issue a statement claiming that, 
―The subtle humor of this obviously metaphorical reference to a ship capsizing illustrated 
my concern about the impact of the planned military buildup on this small tropical 
island.‖ The incident illustrates an important point: People routinely disagree about 
whether a particular utterance is literal or metaphorical. How then are we to proceed in 
our investigation of folk figuration? 
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The theory of figuration I intend to give is of an underlying psychological 
competence to recognize a distinction in communication and (derivatively) linguistic 
forms. Thus, I am in a similar position as Chomsky‘s (1965) linguist, who is using the 
data of linguistic performance to investigate a speaker-listener‘s tacit knowledge of the 
language. Like Chomsky‘s theory of generative grammar, my theory of figuration is: 
...concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogenous 
speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such 
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of 
attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge 
of the language in actual performance (3). 
 
As we shall ultimately see in chapter six, my theory of figuration attributes to the 
speaker-listener tacit psycho-linguistic knowledge; so a speaker-listener‘s competence 
with the figurative-linguistic distinction involves more than just her knowledge of 
language. It also involves her competency at interpreting other language users‘ 
psychological states and motives. My theory, then, is concerned primarily with an ideal 
speaker-listener who is unaffected by the factors Chomsky identifies as well as other 
psychological biases which impede the accurate attribution of psychological states to 
conspecifics. 
As Chomsky writes, theorizing about such tacit knowledge requires the theorist to 
draw, ―...a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer‘s knowledge 
of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations).‖ As 
we shall see later on, failure to keep the performance/competence distinction in mind has 
been an impetus in favor of eliminativist views of metaphor. But this distinction also 
presents a problem for any theorist of linguistic phenomena:  
The problem for the linguist...is to determine from the data of performance the 
underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the speaker-hearer and that he 
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puts to use in actual performance...Observed use of language or hypothesized 
dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of 
this mental reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics 
(4). 
 
If actual performance is subject to the problems discussed above, on what basis are we to 
determine whether or not a theory of figurative language is adequate? 
Here are three suggestions drawn from Chomsky (the first and the third may be 
considered criteria): 
I. A theory of figurative language (like a generative grammar), ―is descriptively 
adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the 
idealized native speaker‖ (24). It must, ―correspond to the linguistic intuition of the 
native speaker...in a substantial and significant class of crucial cases‖ (24). Further, 
though this criterion of adequacy does not presuppose perfect agreement between 
theory and intuition, I would add that a theory is further adequate to the extent that it 
offers a non ad hoc explanation of such disagreements as may arise. 
II.  Even in the case of an idealized language user, ―it may be necessary to guide and 
draw out the speaker‘s intuition in perhaps fairly subtle ways before we can 
determine what is the actual character of his knowledge of his language or of 
anything else‖ (24). In the case of figurative language, we may need to draw the 
language user‘s attention to features of context or to the speaker‘s psychological state, 
in addition to the subtle structural features that Chomsky discusses, in order to 
uncover his actual knowledge. As Chomsky points out, this lesson ―is as old as 
Plato‘s Meno‖ (24).   
III. Finally, Chomsky maintains that a linguistic theory is successful to the extent that it 
explains the child‘s acquisition of a descriptively adequate grammar from primary 
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linguistic data. Thus, a linguistic theory ―can be falsified (all to easily, in actual fact) 
by showing that it fails to provide a descriptively adequate grammar for primary 
linguistic data from some other language‖ (26). Applying this to a theory of figurative 
language, we get something like the following criterion: A theory of figurative 
language is adequate to the extent that it provides the resources to explain linguistic 
and cultural variation in metaphor use. 
4. Utterance, Sentence, Proposition 
It has often been noted that figurative language—and, indeed, whether a particular 
item is regarded as figurative or not—is context sensitive. Notoriously, confusions 
between the notions of ―sentence,‖ ―utterance,‖ and ―proposition‖ arise in discussions of 
contextually sensitive linguistic items. Thus, let me offer a minimal gloss of how I intend 
to use these terms: 
Utterance: An utterance is a linguistic particular produced by a ―speaker‖ at a particular 
time. Utterances can be produced verbally, graphically, or according to other methods of 
symbolization. An utterance is associated with at least one context (―at least one‖ to leave 
open the possibility that distinct contexts may be associated with distinct conversational 
participants). Utterances are always intentional in at least the following sense: A speaker 
intends to express at least one proposition with an utterance. A hearer interprets an 
utterance relative to an associated context, and, because such interpretation is non-
deductive and inferential, may understand an utterance to express a proposition other than 
that the speaker intends to express in speaking. A primary utterance proposition (or just a 
primary proposition) is a proposition which contributes to implicature calculation and is 
derivable from an utterance via lexical decoding, lexically mandated disambiguation and 
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indexical saturation, composition, and primary pragmatic processes (to be discussed more 
fully in latter chapters).  
Sentence: A sentence is a linguistic universal composed of words, which are linguistic 
universals individuated by their reference classes. Sentence instances are produced by 
speakers and are the linguistic forms of utterances. Sentences may, but need not, express 
propositions. For purposes of this dissertation, I will group well-formed sentences, ill-
formed sentences, incomplete sentences (that is, strings of words that lack a noun or verb 
phrase), and other possible strings of words (including individual words themselves) 
under the general category of sentences. This is likely to offend many philosophers, but is 
a matter of convenience. Well-formed sentences will be most important to what follows. 
Proposition: Whatever else they may be, for our purposes, it is enough to say that 
propositions are truth-evaluable and that some propositions are the contents of some 
thoughts, sentences, and utterances. Though we need not endorse it, the standard view, 
whereby propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth-values, accords with 
this dissertation. 
5. Why Figurative Language? 
The above constitutes my defense and/or statement of initial assumptions. Now let me 
offer a brief advertisement both of where we will go and what it will get us. The basics of 
my positive view are this: I contend that there exists a folk linguistic distinction between 
figurative and literal language, which I claim is rooted in an implicit, meta-cognitive 
understanding of the distinct uses to which speakers unconsciously put their utterances in 
conversational contexts. More precisely, I contend that the distinction between figurative 
and literal utterances can only be explained through recourse to Austin's (1962) 
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fundamental distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Figurative 
utterances involve two propositional contents. One's aim with one of these contents is 
essentially 'illocutionary'. One aims to make an assertion, or to ask a question, or to 
pronounce sentence, or to perform some other conventional or psychologically expressive 
act. But one's aim with the other content is essentially only 'perlocutionary.' With the 
other content, one aims to affect the psychology of one's hearer—perhaps to frighten her, 
or to shock her, or to cause her to be entertained.  
There are a number of upshots of this view. For one thing, it suggests a distinctive 
argumentative function for figuration. Though they may not realize it, speakers use 
figurative utterances to produce subtle affective reactions in their audiences. Such 
reactions sometimes lead addressees to attribute more credence to what is actually 
asserted. This is a positive consequence from the point of view of the arguer, but it can 
have negative results for the hearer, and for epistemic practice in general. My view thus 
also offers a distinctive grounding for the claim that metaphors are pernicious. They are 
pernicious not because they are loose, since, as I maintain, all language is use. Figurative 
language is pernicious (in so far as it is pernicious) for essentially the same reason that 
Plato recognized when he banned poetry from the republic. Figurative language is the 
poison pill with the candy coating. Aside from this consequence for reasoning, my view 
also offers a nuanced account of how we understand artistic metaphors, such as those 
appearing in poetry, as well as the more pedestrian metaphors appearing often in ordinary 
conversation. The order in which we grasp the illocuting and perlocuting contents 
reverses, depending on speakers‘ and hearers‘ distinctive goals in these distinct kinds of 
cases. Finally, though it has its home in linguistic theory, the view is more flexible than 
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other views of figuration, and can be modified to offer an account of figurative images 
and actions. 
6. Three Final Remarks 
  
In this chapter I have tried to specify my first principles and to interest my readers in 
the project at hand. However, three related idiosyncrasies of my style are worth 
mentioning, though they did not fit well in any of the previous sections. Here they are: 
I. I use the terms ―metaphor‖ and ―figurative utterance‖ interchangeably in most of 
what follows. There is a brief section in chapter 6 where this is not the case, but that 
section will be well flagged. There are several reasons why I do this: I am interested 
in something broader than the rhetorician‘s trope of metaphor, so ―figurative 
language,‖ but I am interested in a folk notion of figurative language that is picked 
out by ―metaphor‖; I am commenting on a variety of theories of metaphor or 
figurative language, each with its own pattern of usage and (generally tacit) 
specification of the target subject (as between figurative language in general or 
metaphorical trope); each of the following chapters is based at least in part on pre-
existing papers of mine, in each of these I was interested in figurative language in 
general, though in many I made different concessions to use.   
II. I interpret all of the theories I will discuss later as theories of figurative language in 
general, not of the trope. Often, scholars have not been clear as to whether or not they 
meant to be offering a theory of the trope or a theory of figurative language in 
general. But even if they alluded to one topic or the other, I have treated each theory 
as though it were a theory of figurative language in general. This is okay because in 
each case there is at least an analogue of the theory that could apply to figurative 
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language in general and I have never attacked a theory for failing to supply an 
account of the trope. 
III. I have also treated each theory as though it was a theory of a folk notion of figurative 
language. And I have attacked theories for failing to adequately explain that notion, in 
particular, for gross failure to map the intuitive distinction between literal and 
figurative utterances. This is perhaps the most suspect of my ―idiosyncrasies‖, but I 
think it is warranted. First of all, I don‘t recall any theorist (except for Recanati, 2004, 
and possibly some of the Relevance Theorists) being explicit on the point of whether 
or not he was intending to offer an account of the folk distinction. But almost all of 
the theorists appeal rather uncritically to our intuitive assessments of metaphors and 
metaphorical meanings. And each of the theories has the feel of a descriptive account. 
In any case, if my arguments against these theorists fail on this point, then I am happy 
for my arguments to be read as addressing analogous theories of the folk distinction. 
For in each case such a theory would have been available, so I should address it.     
Okay then, let us begin. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The Non-Cognitivist Perspective on Figurative Language 
 
Accounts of figurative language divide into two mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive groups based on how they respond to a single question: Does understanding a 
metaphorical utterance metaphorically consist in grasping a particular proposition distinct 
from whatever proposition is required to understand the metaphorical utterance literally? 
If one responds ‗no‘ to this question, one is a non-cognitivist about figurative language. If 
one responds ‗yes,‘ then one must decide between three other theories of figurative 
language. In that case, either one equates metaphorical meanings with sentence meanings, 
utterance meanings, or the implications of sentences or utterances. In this and the next 
chapter, I will argue in favor of an affirmative answer to the question.  
Before attempting an answer, however, we should clarify some of the concepts this 
question invokes. There is, first of all, the notion of a proposition. As I discussed in the 
first chapter, whatever else they may be, propositions are truth-evaluable and some 
propositions are the contents of some thoughts, sentences, and utterances. (What I will 
say in this dissertation is, again, consistent with the view of propositions as functions 
from possible worlds to truth-values.) To grasp a proposition is to have it as a content of 
thought. If one‘s understanding of an utterance consists in the grasping of a proposition, 
then, I presume, the relevant utterance causes one to have the relevant proposition as the 
content of thought via ordinary, psycho-linguistic processes, and one would not have 
understood the utterance (in the relevant way) if this were not the case. According to 
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most views of literal communication, understanding an utterance literally consists in 
grasping a particular proposition (or one of a particular set of propositions). The key 
question, then, is whether understanding an utterance figuratively also consists in the 
grasping of a particular proposition, distinct from whatever proposition is required to 
understand that utterance (or the sentence which is its linguistic form) literally.  
Grasping a proposition in thought has been identified with having a cognitive state. 
Then, following the usual terminology within the literature, we can call those who deny 
that understanding a metaphor consists in having a cognitive state with a specific 
propositional content distinct from that expressed by the metaphorical utterance 
understood literally, non-cognitivists. According to this specification, Donald Davidson 
(1978), Marga Reimer (2001), and Richard Rorty (1987), among others, are non-
cognitivists. Cognitivists, such as Max Black (1954), Paul Grice (1989), John Searle 
(1979a), and Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1995), are those who claim that 
understanding a metaphor consists in having a cognitive state with a propositional content 
distinct from that expressed by the metaphorical utterance understood literally.
5
  
We might further elucidate the two positions by way of an example. A cognitivist 
would claim that understanding the metaphor, ―Jonah is Napoleon Bonaparte,‖ consists at 
least in part in grasping a particular proposition distinct from that literally expressed by 
the utterance. Perhaps it consists in grasping the proposition that, ‗Jonah is a brilliant 
strategist who achieves his objectives efficiently.‘ On the other hand, while a non-
cognitivist might claim cognitive states are required in or antecedent to the process of 
                                                        
5 In the case of Relevance Theorists, such as Sperber and Wilson, the metaphorical and literal interpretation 
of an utterance are not synchronically available. In an instance of understanding, one grasps only the 
metaphorical interpretation. Nonetheless, we can understand this as distinct from what would ordinarily be 
classed a literal interpretation, derivable from the uttered sentence in distinct contexts.  
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understanding a figurative utterance, she would nonetheless deny that understanding an 
utterance figuratively consists in the having of a cognitive state with a specific content 
distinct from that expressed by the metaphor understood literally. Instead, a non-
cognitivist might hold that you come to understand the metaphor about Jonah when you 
come to ―see‖—in a way not equivalent to grasping some proposition—his relation to his 
goals as you ―see‖ Napoleon‘s conquest of Egypt. 
The non-cognitivist thesis has its classic defense in what is perhaps the most-read 
paper on metaphor, Davidson‘s ―What Metaphors Mean‖. Rorty elaborated the picture in, 
―Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor‖. But key arguments in favor of 
the view have faced serious criticism. Recently, the non-cognitivist position has been 
powerfully defended by Marga Reimer in ―Davidson on Metaphor.‖ In this chapter I will 
respond to Reimer‘s resuscitation of the key arguments in favor of non-cognitivism. I will 
argue, contra Reimer, that cognitivism about metaphor, the thesis that metaphorical 
utterances essentially express special cognitive contents, is true.  
1. Is Metaphor Non-Cognitive? 
 
The non-cognitivist denies that understanding a metaphor consists in grasping a 
cognitive content distinct from that expressed by the sentence (or utterance) understood 
literally. But what then can the non-cognitivist appeal to in explaining what is distinctive 
about understanding a figurative utterance? Or must the non-cognitivist simply equate 
understanding a figurative utterance figuratively with understanding a patently false 
literal utterance? Non-cognitivists do not equate understanding figurative utterances to 
understanding patently false literal utterances. Instead, they appeal to other, non-
cognitive mental processes to account for the distinctively figurative understanding of 
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language. Davidson, for instance, offers a causal/psychological account of the figurative: 
―A metaphor makes us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, 
between two or more things‖ (247, emphasis mine).  
If for the non-cognitivist understanding figurative language does not consist in 
propositional psychological states or processes, in what psychological states or processes 
does it consist? Davidson appeals to a non-propositional state akin to the perceptual state 
of seeing as: 
What we notice or see is not, in general, propositional in character. Of course it may 
be, and when it is, it usually may be stated in fairly plain words. But if I show you 
Wittgenstein‘s duck-rabbit, and I say, ‗It‘s a duck‘, then with luck you see it as a 
duck; if I say, ‗It‘s a rabbit‘, you see it as a rabbit. But no proposition expresses what 
I have led you to see. Perhaps you have come to realize that the drawing can be seen 
as a duck or as a rabbit. Seeing as is not seeing that. Metaphor makes us see one thing 
as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight. Since 
in most cases what the metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely, or even at all, 
recognition of some truth or fact, the attempt to give literal expression to the content 
of the metaphor is simply misguided (263).  
 
What we may safely conclude from quotes such as this is that Davidson (and other 
non-cognitivists) wants to characterize the essential features of non-cognitivist, 
metaphorical understanding non-propositionally. This does not entail that the features 
Davidson takes to be essential to the understanding of a metaphor are non-conceptual or 
purely phenomenal. Perhaps Davidson means to pick out a sense of ‗seeing as‘—
referring perhaps only to instances of aspect perception—which arguably depends on the 
deployment of concepts, but still falls short of ‗seeing that‘, construed strictly 
propositionally. In most of what follows I will thus construe the non-cognitivist position 
as a denial of propositional content to instances of metaphor understanding.
6
 I will treat 
as non-cognitive those mental events which are non-conceptual/phenomenal as well as 
                                                        
6 Though questions about the non-cognitive psychological features Nxxxxon-cognitivists take to be 
involved in metaphor understanding will again come up. 
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those which are conceptual/non-propositional. All the non-cognitivist cannot appeal to in 
defense of her position are psychological events involving propositional content. 
None of what I have so far written entails that the non-cognitivist position on 
metaphor forswears propositional cognitive results. According to the non-cognitivist, 
metaphors may quite generally result in fully propositional beliefs. It would not serve as a 
disproof of the theory if even novel metaphors systematically resulted in the same belief 
for the great majority of people. For example, by e. e. cummings‘ poetic metaphor, ―the 
Cambridge ladies who live in furnished souls/are unbeautiful and have comfortable 
minds,‖ every reader may be made to think that the Cambridge ladies are inculcated by 
the status quo and not aware of the atrocities of the day, and this would be no direct 
evidence of the falsity of the non-cognitivist position. The non-cognitivist point is simply 
that no reader need think any particular proposition in order to understand a metaphor. 
To return to the cummings‘ example, to be made to notice something about the 
Cambridge ladies is to understand the metaphor, and a similar statement is true of other 
metaphors. An analogy with perception may prove useful. Just as every (cognitively 
astute) perceiver may be made to entertain a certain propositional thought by a certain 
experience of a scene, every reader may be made to entertain a certain propositional 
thought because she is first made to notice some similarity by a certain metaphorical line 
of text. To the non-cognitivist, understanding of a metaphor is on par with the non-
cognitive processes of perception. Whatever cognitive features these non-cognitive 
processes give rise to, they are not necessary for the success of the processes.  
2. Arguments for Non-cognitivism 
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Should we accept that metaphor—and figurative language in general—does not 
essentially express a special cognitive content, a propositional content other than the 
literal content in which understanding the metaphor consists?
7
 Reimer offers a 
particularly clear statement of the major arguments in favor of non-cognitivism, as well 
as several arguments against the view. In this chapter, I will introduce and discuss each of 
those arguments.  
2.1 Dead Metaphor Arguments 
Non-cognitivists and cognitivists alike have thought the case of dead metaphors 
helped each of their causes.
8
 Reimer actually produces two different arguments in favor 
of non-cognitivism from the example of dead metaphors. The first is one she shares with 
Davidson, and is, like the paraphrase argument, presented as a modus tollens: 
If metaphors involved ―second meanings,‖ these would be the literal meanings 
acquired by metaphors upon their death. They are not. So, metaphors do not have 
second meanings (149). 
 
The argument is valid, so Reimer need only defend each of the premises. However, 
her defense of each premise is unsuccessful. I will restate each and show why it fails 
before I move on to Reimer‘s second argument from dead metaphor. 
To defend the first premise, Reimer envisions how an opponent of non-cognitivism 
might respond, ―…that only the purely cognitive aspect of a living metaphor will emerge 
as the literal meaning of the dead metaphor‖ (149-150). This assumes that there is a non-
cognitive aspect to a living metaphor, thus playing into the non-cognitivist‘s hands. It 
                                                        
7 As follows from what has already been said, it is open to the non-cognitivist to maintain, nonetheless, that 
only concept users (or thinkers) can understand metaphors. A non-cognitivist might maintain that one has 
to grasp the literal meaning of the metaphorical sentence in order to have the experience which is the 
essential feature in understanding a metaphor. 
 
8 On the cognitivist perspective, see Moran (1989, 1996), Reimer (1996), Lycan (2000). For the non-
cognitivist position, see the Reimer and Davidson currently under discussion. 
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posits a non-cognitive aspect of metaphor, but if those aspects are what is lost in the 
transition from living to dead metaphor, then the non-cognitive may claim that those non-
cognitive aspects, not the cognitive element, are the essential features in which 
understanding a metaphor metaphorically consists. But this is not the only response 
available to the cognitivist. Another plausible way in which the cognitivist might resist 
the first premise is by developing an account of the transition from living to dead 
metaphor according to which a living metaphor expresses a rich disjunction of 
propositional content (each disjunct of which is in principle cognitively available to a 
hearer, perhaps only in specific, associated contexts), which is gradually winnowed down 
to the expression of a single proposition. Thus the relation between the special cognitive 
content of a live metaphor and the content of its corpse would be the whole-part relation, 
rather than that of identity. A cognitivist can thus maintain that understanding a metaphor 
consists in grasping a proposition—one of a set of available metaphor meanings—and 
still reject the first premise of the Davidson-Reimer argument from dead metaphor.  
Of course, the cognitivist can maintain without slipping into non-cognitivism that 
there are non-cognitive aspects to certain metaphors, which are lost in the transition to 
dead metaphor. Then he can counter the Davidson-Reimer dead metaphor argument by 
offering a response Reimer considers on his behalf:  
…the literal meaning of the dead metaphor is indeed the ‗second meaning‘ of the 
living metaphor. What distinguishes the living metaphor from the dead is that the 
former has non-semantic (perhaps imagistic) components not possessed by the latter 
(150).  
 
Reimer thinks that if the cognitivist attempts this response, he will be giving up the game. 
She thinks that the objection implies: 
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…that there is an important difference in kind between the literal meaning that a 
metaphor acquires upon its death and the ―intimation‖ of a living metaphor (150). 
 
For Reimer, an ―intimation,‖ though similar to a meaning, is special in that it relates 
to the understanding of a metaphor and not to a literal sentence, and that the 
―…distinction is rooted in the fact that metaphors are not amenable to literal paraphrase.‖ 
If we impute intimation to metaphors, in the place of propositional metaphorical 
meanings (as so far described) we will beg the question against cognitivists who maintain 
that metaphors are amenable to literal paraphrase (a topic we will take up in the next 
chapter).
9
 I will thus interpret the notion of intimation more broadly as the thing which is 
grasped when one understands a metaphor—that in which understanding a metaphor 
consists. That thing may be strictly cognitive, strictly non-cognitive, or a little of both. 
Assume that, as Reimer alleges, the intimation of a live metaphor is different in kind 
from the literal meaning of a dead metaphor. And assume that the literal meaning of a 
dead metaphor is purely cognitive. Then, so far as the positions we have on the table go, 
the intimation of a live metaphor is either purely non-cognitive or partially non-cognitive 
and partially cognitive. Now the cognitivist about metaphor will obviously contend at this 
point that the intimation is partially cognitive and partially non-cognitive. What are lost 
in the transition from live to dead metaphor, the cognitivist will contend, are the non-
cognitive aspects of the intimation. But all that the cognitivist, who has agreed to the first 
premise of the Davidson-Reimer dead metaphor argument, has agreed to is that if 
metaphors involved special cognitive contents these would be the literal meanings 
acquired by metaphors upon their deaths. He has not agreed to the premise that if 
metaphors involved intimations these would be the literal meanings acquired by 
                                                        
9 If an intimation is meant to be purely non-cognitive, then the notion begs the question against both the 
literal and the figurative cognitivist. 
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metaphors upon their deaths. So the cognitivist can allege, contrary to the second premise 
of the dead-metaphor argument, that the cognitive contents metaphors acquire at their 
deaths are the special cognitive contents they had during life (though not the intimations) 
and thus avoid the argument for non-cognitivism from dead metaphor.  
In fact, the cognitivist need not concede even this much. Reimer equates the idea that, 
―…what distinguishes the living metaphor from the dead is that the former has non-
semantic (perhaps imagistic) components not possessed by the latter…‖ (150), with the 
idea that, ―…there is an important difference in kind between the literal meaning that a 
metaphor acquires upon its death and the ‗intimation‘ of a living metaphor‖ (150). But 
given the notion of intimation—the thing which is grasped when one understands a 
metaphor—that identification fails to follow. It is open to the cognitivist about metaphor 
to hold that there are non-semantic components present in a living metaphor that are lost 
in the transition to a dead metaphor and yet that these components are completely 
inessential in the grasping of a metaphor—that they are not a part of its intimation.  
So much for the Davidson-Reimer argument from dead metaphor for NCT. What 
about Reimer‘s own, new argument from non-cognitivism? Reimer writes: 
…consider those countless metaphors not destined to die. Why don‘t these metaphors 
die? The Non-cognitivist has a response: Such metaphors do not die because they 
cannot die; and they cannot die because they are not used to communicate anything 
propositional. They are thus constitutionally incapable of dying. Thus, while some 
metaphors (those destined to die) might well be used to communicate something 
partly propositional, the same cannot be claimed for all metaphors (153).  
 
The reasoning seems to be as follows: 
If a theory of metaphor is successful, it will be able to explain why some metaphors 
die whereas others keep on living. Davidson‘s causal theory is able to explain why 
some metaphors die whereas others keep living and the cognitivist is unable to 
explain why some metaphors die whereas others keep living. Thus, Davidson‘s is a 
successful theory of metaphor, cognitivist theories are not.  
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But I think the cognitivist‘s position is not so hopeless. The cognitivist about 
metaphor may imbed his explanation of why some metaphors die and others keep on 
living within the broad theory of convention. Perhaps dead metaphors are simply those 
which have a conventional use, and thus a semantic meaning, whereas living metaphors 
are not conventional and convey their cognitive contents pragmatically. The metaphors 
that die are those that enter common usage to such an extent that people begin to 
remember the contextualized meanings of their past uses, and they gradually attain a 
conventional meaning. What explains why others keep living is that fickle human 
linguistic-usage never allowed these to catch on.  
Having responded to Reimer‘s arguments from dead metaphors, let‘s turn out 
attention to the simile argument for non-cogntivism.  
2.2 The Simile Argument 
This argument rests on an analogy between metaphor and another figurative trope, 
simile. Since we are examining the notion of figurative language in general, it thus fails 
to fit entirely with our preconceived categories. Nonetheless, the argument is instructive 
as it raises the possibility that there is not a unified concept of figurative language. 
Reimer states the argument as a modus ponens: 
If similes don‘t have ―special cognitive contents,‖ then neither do metaphors. Similes 
don‘t have ―special cognitive contents,‖ so neither do metaphors (147). 
 
But it is also instructive to look at Davidson‘s intuition here: 
In general, critics do not suggest that a simile says one thing and means another—
they do not suppose it means anything but what lies on the surface of the words. It 
may make us think deep thoughts, just as a metaphor does; how come, then, no one 
appeals to the ―special cognitive content‖ of the simile? (260-61)10 
                                                        
10 Lycan (unpublished) finds the simile argument entirely unconvincing. But I think this is because he 
focuses on Davidson‘s version of it, not Reimer‘s. Davidson‘s argument seems to rest on the way critics 
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Reimer spends significant space defending the first premise of the simile argument. 
But, since I am primarily interested in the general category of figurative language, I am 
happy to accept this premise. Instead I will develop objections to the second premise of 
the argument, similes don‟t have “special cognitive contents”.  
Some arguments in favor of the conclusion that metaphors (considered here as a 
specific figurative trope) have special cognitive contents (which we will come to shortly) 
can be modified in favor of the conclusion that simile‘s do as well. A hearer may agree or 
disagree with the figurative content of a simile in a way not equivalent to agreeing or 
disagreeing with its literal content. Suppose we are reading a story in which context has 
determined that we are dealing with a character (Lucy) with a particularly sweet 
disposition who has just met an old friend she was very excited to see. We would find the 
simile, ‗Lucy was like a warm furnace to her friend,‘ more apt than the simile, ‗Lucy was 
like Rongbuk Glacier to her friend.‘ If everything is, as Davidson claims, ―…like 
everything, and in endless ways‖ (254), then it is hard to see why we should find one 
simile more apt than the other. Both are equally meaningful, so far as their non-special, 
literal meanings go. A non-cognitivist about simile might try to explain aptness by appeal 
to properties of the experiences one is made to have by each simile. But how would one 
formulate such a proposal? It cannot rest on the simple idea that one simile makes one 
                                                                                                                                                                     
talk. It can thus be explained away by explaining that critics have not had much occasion to say that similes 
have special cognitive contents, because, unlike with metaphors, the speaker generally means what the 
simile says (in addition to, perhaps, other things.) Reimer‘s argument, however, makes a claim about the 
existence of special simile contents themselves, and doesn‘t infer the existence of these contents from 
critical practice. It can be true of a metaphor (as a non-cognitivist about simile contends is true of most 
similes) that a speaker means it both literally and figuratively. A thoroughly disappointed hunter may use 
the metaphor, ‗a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,‘ both literally and figuratively to his friend who 
bagged a single pheasant. So the mere fact that a speaker means what he expresses by a figurative trope 
cannot decide the matter of whether that kind of trope has a special cognitive content or not, though it can 
explain why critics have found less occasion to speak of special simile contents than those purported to 
exist in the case of metaphor.  
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have an experience and the other does not. It‘s no more difficult to experience Lucy as 
resembling a warm furnace as to experience her as resembling Rongbuk Glacier—unless 
one‘s imagination is awed by the vastness of that Himalayan ice-sheet. In that case, let 
the second simile be, ‗Lucy was like a block of ice to her friend11.‘ 
Another argument for the special content of similes rests on the distinction we are 
inclined to draw between similes and mere comparisons. We want to say that Robert 
Burns‘ stanza, ―O, my luve‘s like a red, red rose/That‘s newly sprung in June/ O, my luve 
is like the melody/That‘s sweetly played in tune,‖ accomplishes something different than 
the sentence, ―the 3/8ths wrench is just like the ½ inch, but smaller.‖ Non-cognitivists 
may attempt to explain this difference by alleging that the former causes the hearer to 
have some non-cognitive experience whereas the latter does not. But they would require a 
plausible account of how this works, and here, I think, the cards are stacked against them. 
For, in the first place, it seems no easier to experience Burns‘ love as resembling a red, 
red rose than to experience a wrench that resembles the ½ inch wrench except for being 
smaller. And in the second place, why should having a certain experience, as of the ½ 
inch wrench but smaller, prove any less important or more theoretically otiose than 
having the experience as of Burns‘ love resembling a red, red rose? The wrench case 
seems one in which imagistic experience might prove particularly useful, as the addressee 
can now compare his imagistic experience to the wrenches in the tool chest to help select 
the appropriate one.  
                                                        
11 The non-cognitivist may assert in this case that the aptness of the one simile and ineptness of the other is 
explained by contextually indicated features. Context has determined that Lucy would be more like a 
furnace in this situation. Such a strategy might explain why we find some similes better than other, 
obviously incongruous ones in some situations, and I have here used diametrically opposed similes which 
might succumb to this strategy. Nonetheless there may be other pairs of similes for which context 
underdetermines which of the two is apt, and yet we find one more apt than the other. To stick close to our 
example case, we might suppose it more apt to say Lucy was like a warm furnace for her friend than to say 
Lucy was like a lighter for her friend, though both give of light and warmth.  
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This problem is compounded by a consideration I will develop more fully as a 
positive argument for figurative meanings in a few sections: the possibility that there is 
an experiential dearth for some similes. If the non-cognitivist about simile wants to 
explain the difference between similes and mere comparisons by appeal to experience, 
then he had better hope that all similes are accompanied by experiential, psychological 
effects. This is plausible with ―my love is like a red, red rose,‖ or with J. D. Salinger‘s 
character, Holden Caulfield‘s, description of a classmate, ―…as sensitive as a goddamn 
toilet seat,‖ but it seems less so with those similes which incorporate lofty ideas. What 
sorts of experiences could allow the average reader to have the ‗seeing as‘ the non-
cognitivist requires for understanding the sentence, ―living with my girlfriend is like 
living in a totalitarian regime,‖ as a simile? What kind of experience will the non-
cognitivist allege attends an understanding of the simile, ―Claire moved through her 
workday like an electron in a vacuum tube?‖ The cognitivist about simile faces no such 
burdens. When asked to explain the difference between a simile and a mere comparison, 
she simply asserts that the former has a special cognitive content, which the latter lacks.  
2.3 The Paraphrase Argument 
This argument stems from the widely accepted assumption that purported paraphrases 
of the non-literal contents of figurative utterances are always inadequate. Reimer restates 
Davidson‘s argument (Davidson, 260-263) in the form of a modus tollens: 
If a metaphor had a ―special cognitive content,‖ then it would be possible to give 
literal expression to this (putative) content; it is not possible to do this; so a metaphor 
has no special cognitive content (145). 
 
The argument is, as Reimer points out, deductively valid. The only defense it could 
require, then, is of its premises, which Reimer goes on to offer. As I mentioned, the 
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second premise is widely accepted—in fact, it is something of a dogma of metaphor. It 
has been taken as an important point to be explained by all theories of figurative 
language. It has been of such central importance to theorizing about figurative language 
that the next chapter will be devoted to an independent examination of the inadequacy of 
figurative utterance paraphrases. Here, I will simply discuss Reimer‘s defense of the first 
premise. 
Reimer begins her defense of the first premise—if a metaphor had a ―special 
cognitive content,‖ then it would be possible to give literal expression to this (putative) 
content—by considering an explicit challenge to it. The challenge, from Richard Moran, 
asks, ―Why construe ‗cognitive contents‘—or ‗propositions‘—as sentential, as the sorts 
of things that can invariably be given literal expression‖ (Reimer, 145)?12 Moran 
proposes that we drop the construal and accept Stalnaker‘s picture (1972), which 
identifies anything that represents the world as being a certain way (a picture, a map) as 
propositional. As Reimer writes, according to this proposal, ―…the putative fact that a 
metaphor cannot be given an adequate literal paraphrase would not entail that it lacks a 
special (propositional) ‗cognitive content‘‖ (146).  
Reimer thinks that to accept Stalnaker‘s conception of a proposition, as Moran 
recommends, threatens an important distinction. This is the (purported) distinction 
between what is grasped when one grasps the point of the paraphrase and what is grasped 
when one grasps the point of the poem‘s metaphorical first line. According to the 
Stalnaker proposal, Reimer alleges, whatever is grasped in the metaphorical instance will 
be identical in kind to what is grasped in the instance of the literal paraphrase. So Reimer 
                                                        
12 The question is voiced by Moran in his 1996, at 257-258. Moran‘s response was prefigured by Bergmann 
in his 1982, on 233. 
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thinks that Stalnaker‘s conception of a proposition, and with it Moran‘s reply to the 
paraphrase argument, should be rejected.  
I think this criticism of Moran‘s strategy fails. Let us assume, along with Reimer, that 
there is an important distinction between what one grasps when one grasps the 
metaphorical line and what one grasps when one grasps the literal paraphrase. (As we 
shall see later, I think this is not, in fact, the case—though I maintain that there is an 
important distinction between the literal and the figurative.) Though in accepting 
Stalnaker‘s conception of ―cognitive content‖ or ―proposition‖ we would be placing these 
two things within the same big tent, that tent can house factions. It is not as though under 
Stalnaker‘s conception there can be no differences between propositional maps and 
propositional sentences. The difference just is that the latter and not the former are 
expressible in literal language. So I do not think that by accepting Moran‘s strategy 
towards Davidson‘s paraphrase argument we threaten to undermine any important 
distinction between the figurative and the literal. We can construe both as propositional 
but as different propositional sorts. 
The cognitivist is not threatened by the paraphrase argument because there is 
insufficient reason to accept its first premise. Nonetheless, the second premise, regarding 
the purported inadequacy of metaphor paraphrases, is an important point to consider in its 
own right, as I will do in the next chapter. In the remainder of this chapter I will consider 
arguments for cognitivism, which Reimer discusses and rejects. I will argue that each of 
these arguments can meet Reimer‘s challenges, and that these in fact constitute good 
reasons to accept cognitivism about figurative language.  
3. Arguments for Cognitivism 
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We have now considered the three main arguments in favor of non-cognitivism, 
which Reimer (2001) discusses. In each case we have found some faults in the reasoning 
which resulted in a failure to establish non-cognitivism, the thesis that figurative 
language understanding consists in grasping a distinctive propositional content (a content 
other than that grasped in a literal understanding of the sentence or utterance). The 
cognitivist, however, must show us not only that arguments for non-cognitivism fail, but 
also that there are good arguments for cognitivism, the claim that metaphors essentially 
express special cognitive contents in which understanding these figurative utterances 
consists. I now consider some arguments which, while not individually deductively 
conclusive, do when taken together lend strong support to cognitivism.
13
 
3.1 Understanding Metaphors 
One oft cited reason for accepting cognitivism stems from the apparent capacity of a 
hearer to understand or misunderstand a metaphor.
14
 Lycan, for example, writes that: 
…if Davidson is right, one can never misinterpret a metaphor. If in response to 
Romeo‘s utterance [of ―Juliet is the sun‖], some eavesdropper had chirped, ―I get 
it!—Juliet depresses him because she‘s so stupid and she smells horrible,‖ on the 
Causal Theory this would not have been an incorrect account of Romeo‘s 
metaphorical utterance, but only evidence that the eavesdropper‘s mental architecture 
was causally different from Romeo‘s and from ours (2000, 212). 
 
The argument from understanding metaphor thus alleges that, if non-cognitivism is 
correct, there is no room for a notion of understanding or misunderstanding a metaphor.
15
 
                                                        
13 From the discussion to follow I have omitted certain arguments for cognitivism about which I felt I had 
nothing new and interesting to say. These include often cited arguments such as the previously mentioned 
one from dead metaphors as well as less generally cited arguments such as Richard Moran‘s charge that 
experience is a poor picture for what metaphor accomplishes (1989). Good overviews of many arguments 
for cognitivism are available in Camp and Reimer (***,) Lycan (2000, unpublished,) and Moran (1997.)  
 
14 Cited in Moran (1996) on 260, Lycan (2000) on 212, and Camp and Reimer (forthcoming) on 17.  
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But we clearly think we understand and misunderstand metaphors. Therefore, 
cognitivism must be correct.  
In ―Davidson on Metaphor,‖ however, Reimer offers a plausible response to 
arguments from understanding on behalf of the non-cognitivist. She carves out a non-
cognitivist account of metaphor misunderstanding that conforms to our desire to, for 
example, claim Romeo‘s eavesdropper is wrong. Reimer admits that our tendency to say, 
in cases such as the eavesdropper, that hearers can misinterpret a metaphor, suggests, 
―…that there is something that can be understood or misunderstood‖ (151). But she 
contends that: 
…there is no reason to suppose that this ―something‖ is the special ―cognitive 
content‖ of the metaphor. For what might be understood or misunderstood is arguably 
the point of the metaphor—what the metaphor maker wants the interpreter to notice, 
to see (151). 
 
So the non-cognitivist might contend that what Lycan‘s eavesdropper says is 
evidence of something more than just different mental architecture. The eavesdropper‘s 
statement—like the earnest statement from someone staring at the Pacific Ocean that 
there‘s not a drop of water in sight—might be evidence of a failure to have an appropriate 
non-cognitive experience, eventuating in appropriate, associated beliefs. The 
eavesdropper fails to see the point of the metaphor, and thus fails to form the beliefs 
associated with it.   
The non-cognitivist can explain our capacity to misunderstand or misinterpret a 
metaphor. But there are other arguments for cognitivism. 
3.2 Disagreeing with Metaphors 
                                                                                                                                                                     
15 This, of course, abstracts away from the capacity for a hearer to fail to cognitively grasp the literal 
meaning of the metaphorical sentence, which could be a criteria for understanding a non-cognitivist 
condition for understanding a metaphor. 
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In addition to our capacity to understand or misunderstand metaphors, we can agree 
or disagree with metaphors. Reimer points out that Donne‘s metaphorical statement that, 
―no man is an island,‖ was contradicted by Matthew Arnold, when he wrote that, ―…in 
this sea of life enisled,…/We mortal millions live alone‖ (152). And Lycan (ms) adds that 
the sentiment Donne metaphorically expressed was directly (and metaphorically) rejected 
by Hugh Grant‘s character, Will, in ―About a Boy,‖ when he said, ―I am bloody Ibiza!‖ 
(3) The argument for cognitivism from agreeing with metaphors thus contends that we 
could only agree or disagree with a metaphor if it expressed a special propositional 
content. We can agree or disagree with a metaphor, defenders of cognitivism allege, so a 
metaphor expresses a special cognitive content. 
Our capacity to agree or disagree with a metaphor is a less tractable problem for non-
cognitivists than was our capacity to understand or misunderstand a metaphor. First of 
all, notice that our disagreement with a metaphor takes the form of disputation about the 
truth of the metaphorical utterance.
16
 Disagreeing with a speaker‘s metaphor is, then, an 
instance of epistemic criticism, and accordingly involves our cognitive capacities. When 
one criticizes a speaker for uttering a metaphorical statement, one criticizes the speaker 
for holding some belief, which one deems false. Reimer concedes this, but nonetheless 
disputes the first premise of the argument for cognitivism from agreeing with metaphors 
by contending that the truth-conditional proposition one deems false in one‘s rejection of 
a metaphorical statement is not expressed by the metaphorical statement itself—it is not 
the point of the metaphor. Rather it is only a proposition which it is obvious the metaphor 
                                                        
16 The purported special content of the metaphor, that is, not the literal content of the sentence—for hearers 
often agree with metaphors that taken literally are obviously false. 
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speaker believes from his statement of this metaphor. Regarding Arnold‘s metaphorical 
statement, she writes: 
Arnold (in contrast to Donne) no doubt wanted to draw attention to man‘s alienation 
from his fellow man. And, in drawing attention to this state of affairs, Arnold may 
well have succeeded in conveying (to his audience) that he himself believed that we 
are alienated from one another. But…it would be a mistake to take this as implying 
that the metaphor itself—or even its author—―means‖ that this is so (152). 
 
But if we accept Reimer‘s rejection of the first premise of this argument for 
cognitivism from agreeing with metaphors, then we are left with a very anomalous 
account of agreement and disagreement when it comes to metaphor. For one thing, a 
speaker may succeed in conveying that he believes any number of things by a statement. 
By my statement that ―Alexa saw Tom steal the cantaloupe,‖ I may convey a belief that 
Alexa is trustworthy. But if Alexa is not trustworthy it would nonetheless be incorrect to 
disagree with my statement if, in this instance, she is telling the truth. It would be 
incorrect because that wasn‘t what I meant by the statement, it was merely something 
implied. Why does a similar situation not apply to figurative language? If, as Reimer 
suggests, the point of Arnold‘s statement isn‘t that we are alienated, then why is our 
situation in disagreeing with his metaphor so different from every other (non-
metaphorical) situation in which we disagree with someone‘s statement?  
Additionally, if one may legitimately agree or disagree with something because of the 
thoughts it merely conveys, then why are agreement and disagreement not more 
widespread? Based on his painting, Guernica, one may reasonably conclude that Picasso 
felt that the bombing of Basque villages during the Spanish Revolution was barbaric. It 
seems that this is a belief Picasso successfully conveyed in that work of art. But why, 
then, does it ring so unnatural to say that one agrees with Guernica? Orson Welles 
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succeeded in conveying with Citizen Kane his belief that money and success do not 
guarantee happiness, and yet no one says they agree with Citizen Kane, regardless of how 
quick many would be to assent to that sentiment. If it is acceptable to agree with 
something because of the ideas it merely implies, then why do we not agree with things 
other than metaphors which merely imply, and do not express, ideas?  
The non-cognitivist challenge to the first premise of the argument from disagreement 
with metaphors fails. And with that premise in place, the argument goes through. The 
argument from agreeing with metaphors thus lends support to cognitivism and raises 
serious questions for the non-cognitivist. Issues close to this topic will be brought up 
again in 3.4. But first I will develop another family of arguments which will also benefit 
from the discussion to unfold there.  
3.3 Gap Arguments 
By discussing this family of arguments I mean to sharpen a widely noticed problem 
with non-cognitivism into a class of arguments for cognitivism.
17
 The problem becomes 
apparent when we consider the cognitive exercise of argumentation. Let us assume, as we 
typically do, that argumentative force is conveyed cognitively. By this I mean that, for an 
example, when Reimer attempts to convince us of non-cognitivism with the paraphrase 
argument, she attempts to make us judge that if a metaphor had a “special cognitive 
content,” then it would be possible to give literal expression to this (putative) content, 
and that it is not possible to do this, and she expects us to come to judge, via our 
acceptance of modus tollens and these premises, that a metaphor has no special cognitive 
content.  
                                                        
17 Noticed, for instance, by Moran, briefly, in his 1996 (260); and by Lycan, also briefly, in his 2000 (212).  
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Now Reimer attempts to make us judge each of the premises of her argument to be 
the case through a literal use of the English language. But the argument for cognitivism 
from the argumentative gap points out that some argumentative texts contain no literal, 
but only metaphorical, linguistic resources to deliver the premises we must judge to be 
the case in order to reach the theorist‘s desired conclusion. If a particular proposition is 
not deployed at a particular point in the argument, the sought conclusion will not be 
justifiably reached. Yet, for many arguments, no literal statement of the requisite 
proposition is made at the appropriate place in a statement of the argument. Rather a 
figurative utterance alone is supplied, which, if understood literally, would provide a 
wildly inappropriate proposition, one which could not serve to justifiably deliver the 
sought conclusion. For example, a philosopher might contend that if tying one‘s shoes is 
reasonably regarded as a complex behavior, then it must be conceivably decomposable 
into certain sub-functions. She might then claim that it makes sense to conceive of tying 
one‘s shoes as being accomplished by a team of little men who live in one‘s head, not by 
a single little man.
18
 And she might thereby conclude that tying one‘s shoes is 
decomposable into certain sub-functions. It‘s debatable whether the conclusion of this 
argument is justifiably reached. However, this would not be even debatable if the second 
premise of this argument were not understood figuratively. Cognitivists need make no 
additional assumptions in order to explain the potentially effective nature of this and 
other arguments that involve metaphors. They can contend that the truth-evaluable, 
linguistically expressible proposition in which understanding the metaphor consists is the 
relevant premise in this potentially effective argument. Thus, cognitivism allows for a 
                                                        
18 Fodor (1968) uses this metaphor for different, though related, argumentative ends. 
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parsimonious explanation of how metaphors are deployed in arguments and lets us avoid 
gaps in argumentative reasoning. 
Gap arguments do not only apply to argumentative texts. There are other gap 
arguments, which we can discover by noticing the special roles—in close conjunction 
with generally supposed cognitive elements—metaphors play in a variety of texts. 
Though metaphors may be used to supply important premises in arguments, they also 
seem to be used to convey essential ideas in other contexts. Within philosophy it would 
be myopic to assert that metaphors are not commonplace, though they do not always 
contribute directly to arguments. Regarding philosophy of mind, Elisabeth Camp, in 
―Metaphor and That Certain ‗Je ne sais quoi,‘‖ has already suggested an important 
metaphorical sense of ‗the mind is a computer‘ (16). We may add to this Descartes‘ 
characterization of the special relation between thinking and extended substance in his 
Sixth Meditation as ‗not like a sailor to a ship‘. Ryle criticized the idea that the mind and 
the body were separate by calling it, ―the dogma of the ghost in the machine‖ (18). In 
epistemology we have, ‗the web of belief;‘ in metaphysics, the idea of universals as ‗the 
one running through the many.‘ The practice of couching important ideas in metaphorical 
terms spreads beyond philosophy as well. In cognitive science, for one example, debates 
about modularity sometimes take the form of debates over whether ‗the mind is a Swiss 
army knife or a filing cabinet.‘  
If we take our observations further afield, to literature, we see that metaphors are 
often mixed with non-metaphorical statements. In Cormac McCarthy‘s, Blood Meridian, 
for example, in the midst of a critically important scene consisting largely of non-
metaphorical descriptive sentences, the following metaphorically rich dialogue occurs: 
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A man‘s at odds to know his mind cause his mind is aught he has to know it with. He 
can know his heart, but he don‘t want to. Rightly so. Best not to look in there. It ain‘t 
the heart of a creature that is bound in the way that God has set for it. You can find 
meanness in the least of creatures, but when God made man the devil was at his 
elbow. A creature that can do anything. Make a machine. And a machine to make the 
machine. And evil that can run itself a thousand years, no need to tend it (19).  
 
If we think story-telling is a cognitive exercise with a natural progression, how does 
metaphor break with the cognitivism while still contributing to the progression?  
The problem propagates if we admit, as Lycan has urged (2000, 209),
19
 that 
metaphors appear everywhere. If we also accept that language is primarily a cognitive 
exercise, we then have the argument from the conversational gap. As some sentences 
divide into metaphorical and literal portions, we also have the argument from the 
incomplete sentence.  
Each gap argument derives from a linguistic exercise which is typically thought to be 
cognitive and to progress to some cognitive goal. It points out that metaphors seem to 
bridge some gap that would otherwise impede the progression to the goal. And it alleges 
that if we think of the exercise as cognitive generally, then the most straightforward way 
to explain the gap-bridging effect of some metaphors is to suppose that they have some 
cognitive effects. Of course, it is still open to the non-cognitivist to assert that the 
cognitive effects which play these important roles are merely ancillary to the point of the 
metaphor, which is purely non-cognitive. On the one hand, this proposal faces criticisms 
about its abnormality similar to those developed in 3.2. On the other, it is subject to a 
more general criticism, as is the non-cognitivist‘s proposal regarding agreeing and 
disagreeing with metaphors. This criticism will be developed in the next section. 
3.4 Formulating Non-cognitivism and the Problem of the Experiential Dearth 
                                                        
19 And Lakoff and Johnson, 1980. 
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Throughout this chapter I have treated the non-cognitivist position as a denial of 
special propositional contents to metaphors, but I have said very little about the positive 
account of what understanding a metaphor amounts to for a non-cognitivist. From our 
previous, limited discussion we know that the features involved in an instance of 
metaphor understanding are, for a non-cognitivist, psychological, though not 
propositional. I concessively suggested that the non-cognitivist might appeal not only to 
phenomenal/non-conceptual features to explain metaphor understanding, but also to 
conceptual/non-propositional features. In this section, however, I want to raise questions 
about the non-cognitivist‘s capacity, given these features, to make sense of metaphor 
understanding without invoking propositional content.  
Both Reimer and Davidson conceive of understanding a metaphor as consisting in 
noticing a similarity between two things. Thus the non-cognitive account invokes the 
similarity relation and so involves two relata. Given that the similarity is a noticed one, 
each relatum and the similarity between them must be represented in the mind of the 
subject who understands the metaphor. So in formulating her account of metaphor 
understanding, the non-cognitivist must appeal to mental representations. Given the 
features her account of metaphor understanding admits, the non-cognitivist can cash out 
the noticing as involving only conceptual/non-propositional representations, only 
phenomenal/non-conceptual representations, or conceptual/non-propositional and 
phenomenal/non-conceptual representation.  
Suppose that the non-cognitivist suggests that the features involved in understanding 
a metaphor are only conceptual/non-propositional features, and that phenomenal features 
are not involved at all. The non-cognitivist that denies phenomenal aspects to an account 
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of metaphor understanding can presumably cash out the noticed similarity merely in 
terms of a similarity among categories. For example, such a non-cognitivist might 
contend that someone who understands the metaphor, ‗the sun is lucky,‘ notices some 
resemblance between the category of things including the sun and only the sun and the 
category of lucky things. But if this noticing is to consist in purely conceptual/non-
phenomenal psychological features, then it seems that the noticing consists in a 
propositional content. The representation in which the noticing consists will be complex, 
consisting of more than one conceptual representation. What‘s more, the representation 
will have a truth value. (If, as Davidson suggests, everything resembles everything, the 
truth value of the special content in which understanding a metaphor consists for a non-
cognitivist will always be true.) Given these characteristics of the mental representation 
which the understanding of a metaphor consists in for a non-cognitivist who wishes to 
eschew non-conceptual/phenomenal features, the representation will not differ at all from 
a propositional representation. The non-cognitivist who incorporates only 
conceptual/non-phenomenal features in an account of metaphor understanding would 
thus reject the central tenet of non-cognitivistism, that a metaphor accomplishes what it 
accomplishes without employing special propositional contents.  
But if the non-cognitivist cannot, without invoking propositions, make sense of the 
noticed similarity using merely conceptual, psychological elements, then she must appeal 
to phenomenal/non-conceptual features. This looks like an improvement for the non-
cognitivist. The thesis can now avoid propositions by suggesting that noticing a similarity 
consists in noticing that one concept applies to some mental image or that some mental 
image is like another in certain relevant respects. It is at this point that the argument for 
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cognitivism from the experiential dearth arises. We have already briefly encountered the 
argument from the experiential dearth during our discussion of the simile argument for 
non-cognitivism (2.2). There I suggested that the distinction between an apt and inapt 
simile could be explained by a cognitivist, who would admit special cognitive contents 
for similes, and that the difficulty for a non-cognitivist to offer an explanation was 
compounded, if such a theorist attempted to enlist the aid of experiential features 
involved in grasping the metaphor, by the possibility that some similes seem to lie 
beyond the realm of experience. A similar criticism is available to the cognitivist in the 
case of figurative language in general. 
With metaphors the issue can be identified in the example of the non-cognitivist‘s 
proposed explanation of our capacity to agree and disagree with metaphors. In 3.2, I 
raised some difficulties for that proposal, which alleges that agreement with metaphors is 
not agreement with special cognitive contents essentially expressed by the metaphor, but 
rather with cognitive contents merely implied by non-cognitive features, the having of 
which is the essential element of metaphor comprehension. But let us suppose that the 
problems I raised there can be successfully met by the non-cognitivist and that the notion 
of agreement with contents merely implied by the experiential point of the metaphor can 
be made sense of. Then the problem of the experiential dearth arises. For if our capacity 
to agree with a metaphor depends on our capacity to grasp certain contents implied by a 
partially phenomenal experience, then, for any generally accepted or disputed metaphor, 
if people do not generally have the requisite phenomenal experience we will be left with 
no explanation of how people generally agree or disagree with the metaphor. The non-
cognitivist must maintain that for every metaphor with which most people can agree or 
43 
 
disagree, most people have a phenomenal experience adequate to imply contents with 
which they can agree or disagree. The problem also arises in connection with gap 
arguments. There the non-cognitivist‘s claim is that for every metaphor which bears 
weight in some cognitive activity, people generally have a phenomenal experience 
adequate to imply the content which actually bears the cognitive weight. The argument 
from the experiential dearth alleges that what people are made to experience is not 
common enough or not specific enough to ensure that the particular contents which play a 
role in the cognitive exercise are implied. 
Some metaphors are certainly related to phenomenal experiences general enough that 
most people have had them. Experiences with lemons and lemonade are common enough 
in our society that a theorist may plausibly maintain that anyone who understands the 
metaphor, ―when life gives you lemons, make lemonade,‖ is made to phenomenally 
experience life in the relevant way by the metaphor. Likewise, when someone disagrees 
with the metaphor, ‗Western Philosophy is a footnote to Plato,‖ by asserting that ―Plato is 
the preface to Western Philosophy,‖ we assume that people may be made to recall like 
enough experiences with footnotes and prefaces such that very similar special cognitive 
contents are often implied. People may be agreeing or disagreeing with something that is 
merely implied by the common phenomenal experience—a cognitive content that can be 
fairly well captured by the paraphrase that Western Philosophy merely makes explicit the 
issues already brought forth in Plato‟s dialogues. But with other metaphors it seems far 
less likely that many people could be made to have phenomenal experiences alike enough 
to imply the ideas which are explicitly disagreed with, which bear weight in the ways the 
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cognitive exercises of which they are a part demand, or which they generally capture in a 
paraphrase.  
Consider, for example, the metaphor Tolstoy uses to describe the romantic 
relationship of the title character and his wife, Praskovya Fyodorovna, in ―The Death of 
Ivan Ilyich‖: 
All they had left were the rare periods of amorousness that came over them, but these 
did not last long. They were merely little islands at which the couple anchored for a 
while before setting out again on a sea of veiled hostility, which took the form of 
estrangement from one another (59). 
 
One could, and many likely would, deny that this was an adequate description of the 
romantic relationship of one and one‘s significant other. The cognitivist maintains that 
the thing one would be saying is false, the thing one could paraphrase if asked, and the 
thing to which one takes offence in these instances is a special cognitive content. Reimer 
will say there is a special content too, and that this is what one says is false when one 
disagrees with this description of one‘s relationship. But she will say this content is 
merely implied by the point of the metaphor. To understand the metaphor, the non-
cognitivist we are now considering,
20
 contends that it is sufficient that one have a certain 
phenomenal experience, an experience, in this case, of one‘s physical encounters with 
one‘s partner as little islands in a sea of veiled hostility. But what could it be like to 
experience a sea of veiled hostility? Certainly there may be many things individuals each 
experience as a sea of veiled hostility. Perhaps some have an experience as of a solution 
of sludge-like hate bubbling beneath a thin veneer of water, while others experience the 
                                                        
20 From personal correspondence, I know that Reimer is such a non-cognitivist. But the fact also comes out 
in her article on Davidson‘s view. In her statement of the paraphrase argument, for example, Reimer writes 
that what is missing from a paraphrase is, ―…something that might be supplied by a number of images…‖ 
(147). In characterizing the difference between a living and a dead metaphor, she writes that a living 
metaphor, ―…is associated with imagery of some sort—imagery that is constitutionally incapable of literal 
paraphrase…‖ (150).  
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audience at a Yo La Tengo concert.
21
 The argument from the experiential dearth suggests 
that these will not all be alike enough to imply the cognitive content (or the range of 
cognitive contents) we take to be a false account of our love life. If these experiences are 
not alike enough, then we have a special content we generally agree or disagree with 
without an experience general enough to imply the content with which we are 
disagreeing.  
The success of the argument from the experiential dearth rests on the formulation of 
cases—such as, ‗writing my book was giving birth to a child‘ (voiced, perhaps, by a male 
author,) and, ‗atomic representations are the rock on which the church of mental content 
is built‘—in which a large number of people are able to agree or disagree with a 
figurative utterance, but it is unlikely that they are made to have sufficiently similar 
phenomenal experiences or similar phenomenal experiences sufficient to imply the 
content with which they take themselves to be agreeing or disagreeing. The cognitivist 
need not maintain that experiential features are not common results of metaphors. She 
merely contends that these experiences are too diverse or incomplete to constitute a 
plausible route to the contents which are generally apprehended.
22
  
Once again, the argument for cognitivism from the experiential dearth is not 
conclusive, but together with the previous arguments it serves to constitute an argument 
to the best explanation for cognitivism. If we reject arguments in favor of non-
cognitivism, these arguments should be sufficient reason to accept cognitivism. 
4. Conclusion 
                                                        
21 Thanks to Eric Mandelbaum for this colorful suggestion. 
 
22 What does the cognitivist suggest is common and complete enough to constitute a plausible route to the 
generally apprehended contents? One answer is that given by Josef Stern (2001): cognitive character 
(deriving from the metaphor taken in isolation from its literary context) and the literary context in which 
the metaphor is imbedded. 
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Sometimes defenders of the non-cognitivist line on metaphor write as though they are 
merely defending the position that non-propositional elements, along with propositional 
cognitive elements, help to constitute the point of a metaphor. I have not been concerned 
to argue against that claim here. It has been my goal in this chapter to critique a recent 
resuscitation of a classic position on metaphor, the non-cognitivist position that none of 
the features essential to metaphorical understanding are cognitive.  My arguments have, I 
trust, rendered that position less tenable than Reimer‘s recent defense might have made it 
appear. In the next chapter I will argue against what may be taken to be the greatest piece 
of evidence in favor of non-cognitivism: the purported inadequacy of figurative utterance 
paraphrases. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3: 
 
The Inadequacy of Paraphrase is the Dogma of Metaphor 
How would you paraphrase the metaphor, ―Music is the universal language?‖ Does it 
suggest that music is understood by everyone, or just almost everyone? Maybe it ―means‖ 
that enough speakers of music reside amongst each group to facilitate its use as a conduit 
across cultural barriers. Does it invoke resemblances between musical and linguistic 
meter, or between melody and intonation? A moment‘s reflection suggests that, to fully 
understand even such a relatively simple metaphor, one might need to work through 
numerous such obvious resemblances. However, analogous questions arise when we 
reflect on how we would paraphrase similar literal utterances, such as, ―French is the 
language of Quebec?‖ Does it convey that everyone in Quebec understands French, or 
just almost everyone? Does it impart a certain official standing to the language?  
In the last chapter, I discussed arguments in favor of non-cognitivism. As I 
mentioned, non-cognitivists have claimed that the difficulty of paraphrasing metaphors 
suggests and is explained by the absence of ―metaphorical meanings.‖ One cannot write a 
sentence that means the same thing as a metaphor metaphorically means if a metaphor 
lacks metaphorical meaning.
23
 As we shall see the inadequacy of figurative paraphrase 
has been a touchstone in debates over figurative language. Non-cognitivists have rallied 
around it and cognitivists have seen fit to explain it. In this chapter, I will critically 
                                                        
23 This is emphatically not a technical point about the appropriate bounds of the concept of ―meaning‖. As I 
will discuss later, I am using ―metaphorical meaning‖ in an intuitive way here. I mean to be picking out a 
common sense notion of ‗meaning‘ that is not equivalent to sentence meaning. 
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examine the claim. I contend that the inadequacy of metaphor paraphrases should bear on 
debates over figurative language meaning only insofar as the purported inadequacy is a 
comparative one. We should not draw specific conclusions about metaphors from the 
general inadequacy of paraphrases. I then attempt to show by experimental means that 
paraphrases of metaphors and literal utterances are equally inadequate.
24
  
Though centered in the theory of metaphor, the present discussion of paraphrasability 
is likely to be of relatively broad interest. I defend the relevance of experimental evidence 
to at least one philosophical topic (metaphorical meaning). And reflection on the present 
assessment of paraphrases of figurative and literal utterances is also likely to have 
implications beyond the theory of metaphor, for the theory of meaning and philosophy of 
language generally. I will briefly consider some such implications at the end of this 
chapter. 
1. Introducing the „Inadequacy Assumption‟ 
 
It is often assumed that paraphrases of metaphorical utterances are inadequate. 
Among the theorists who have endorsed this ‗Inadequacy Assumption‘ (IA), in one form 
or another, are Max Black (1954), Donald Davidson (1978), John Searle (1979a), Merrie 
Bergmann (1982), Richard Moran (1989), Marga Reimer (2001), and Samuel Guttenplan 
(2005). In this section I will attempt to explain why IA matters. That explanation turns on 
a distinction between two general types of views about metaphor and the different 
considerations that favor each view over the other.  
As discussed in the last chapter, there are several reasons to prefer cognitivist 
accounts of metaphor. In the first place, we often seem to disagree about the truth or 
                                                        
24 As I made clear in chapter one, I am construing ―metaphor‖ broadly, to include intuitively clear instances 
of figurative utterances, such as similes and figurative metonymies.  
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falsity of metaphorical utterances when the literal truth or falsity of the utterance is 
beyond dispute. You call Roscoe, the bouncer at our favorite bar, a pit bulldog. I counter, 
―You lie. He‘s a pussycat!‖ Or, for another example, consider that epistemologists 
disagree as to whether the justificatory structure of belief is a web or a building. 
Cognitivism is well placed to make sense of such disputes as to the truth or falsity of the 
non-literal meaning of a metaphor: These are disputes over the truth-evaluable contents in 
which metaphor understanding consists.
25
  
Another reason to prefer cognitivism has to do with the role of metaphors in cognitive 
exercises. For exercises involving the manipulation of propositional contents, such as 
constructing and following an argument, the propositional content employed at any stage 
matters. If a particular proposition is not deployed at a particular point in the argument, 
the sought conclusion will not be justifiably reached. Yet, for many arguments, no literal 
statement of the requisite proposition is made at the appropriate place in a statement of 
the argument. Rather a figurative utterance alone is supplied, which, if understood 
literally, would provide a wildly inappropriate proposition, one which could not serve to 
justifiably deliver the sought conclusion. Cognitivists need make no additional 
assumptions in order to explain the potentially effective nature of arguments that involve 
metaphors. They can contend that the truth-evaluable, linguistically expressible 
proposition in which understanding the figurative utterance consists is the relevant 
premise in this potentially effective argument. 
                                                        
25 Reimer (2001) has suggested that the proposition one deems false when one disagrees with a 
metaphorical statement is simply a proposition that the maker of the metaphorical utterance accepts, one 
which it is made obvious she accepts by her making that very metaphorical statement. But Reimer has to 
explain why the Spanish Nationalist finds it so unnatural to say he disagrees with Guernica, though that 
painting makes it obvious that Picasso accepts that the bombing of the Basque village was a terrible thing. 
Why, if we can agree or disagree with something because of the ideas it merely implies, do we not agree 
with things other than metaphors, which merely imply, and do not essentially express, ideas? 
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In fact, the previous consideration suggests another reason to prefer cognitivism about 
metaphors: the theory is better integrated with theories about surrounding matters than is 
non-cognitivism. Not only constructing and understanding arguments, but expressing and 
comprehending linguistic phenomena in general are explained in terms of grasping truth-
evaluable content. A theory which conceives of metaphor understanding as consisting in 
the grasping of propositional contents is better integrated with these theories of related 
linguistic phenomena than is a theory that suggests understanding a metaphor consists in 
non-cognitive seeing-as. 
Although these reasons tell in favor of a cognitivist account of metaphor, some 
philosophers have held that such a theory also comes with certain explanatory burdens. 
Many of these burdens were discussed and dispatched in the last chapter. What remains is 
the purported requirement for any cognitivist theory to explain the inadequacy of 
metaphorical paraphrases. Non-cognitivists appear to have the upper hand in explaining 
this purported inadequacy: Truth-evaluable, linguistic expressions that are meant to 
convey metaphorical significance fail because that significance is not essentially truth-
evaluable. Some non-cognitivists have built an argument against cognitivism from this 
purported inadequacy (see Davidson 1978, Reimer 2001). They have argued that if 
metaphors had propositional, non-literal meanings which we grasped in understanding 
these metaphorically, then we would be able to paraphrase those meanings.
26
 We are not 
able to paraphrase such purported meanings, these non-cognitivists have claimed—
though we may perhaps gesture vaguely, or articulate some limited set of things the 
metaphor has made us notice. They have concluded that metaphors do not have 
                                                        
26 It has also been suggested that we would be able to offer adequate literal paraphrases of these 
metaphorical contents. I will address that stronger claim in the next section.  
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propositional meanings other than their literal meanings. That is, they have concluded 
that non-cognitivism is correct. So one reason IA is important is that it figures in a 
prominent argument for non-cognitivism about metaphor. As I discussed briefly in the 
introduction to this chapter, I think there are other reasons why IA  is an important topic 
of research. I will touch on some of these briefly in the last section of this chapter. But 
my main aim is to defend cognitivist accounts of metaphorical meaning against non-
cognitivist arguments from IA, by showing that the case for IA is flawed, and that we 
have good reason to suppose that paraphrases of metaphors are not (in the relevant way) 
inadequate.
27
  
Within the theory of figurative language IA is primarily important because of the role 
it plays in the just discussed argument for non-cognitivism. But support for IA is 
surprisingly not unique to non-cognitivists. Cognitivists, too, have accepted the 
assumption, and felt it was something that required an explanation. What specifically 
have theorists of both camps meant by the inadequacy claim? And why have they 
endorsed it? A discussion of the former will occupy the next section. The latter will be 
the focus of the section after next. 
2. The Inadequacy Assumption Specified 
Like the question about metaphor understanding discussed in the last chapter, IA calls 
for specification. Two questions are of central importance: What is a paraphrase? And 
what is it for one to be adequate? I think a fairly intuitive notion of paraphrase has been 
assumed by proponents of IA, though it is not fully elucidated by the common adage, ‗a 
paraphrase says the same thing a different way‘ (see, for example, Camp, 2006). How 
                                                        
27 Non-cognitivists have sometimes argued from the absence of metaphorical paraphrases, not from the 
inadequacy of metaphorical paraphrases. But the absence claim is stronger. If metaphors admit of 
paraphrases that are not (in the relevant way) inadequate, then ipso facto they admit of paraphrases.  
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similar is similar enough for two linguistic expressions (e.g. sentence instances or 
utterances) to count as saying the same thing? I take it that they need not have identical 
content for the one to count as a paraphrase of the other; they simply need to say much 
the same thing.
28
 Identity of content could only obtain between an expression, itself, and 
other expressions involving substituted synonymous terms. But we accept as paraphrases 
expressions which do not arguably contain only synonymous terms. Furthermore, as 
Quine (1951) argued, the assumed possibility of synonymy may itself be nothing more 
than an indefensible dogma. Thus, while a fully adequate paraphrase may be one which 
says exactly the same thing as its target, many paraphrases—perhaps all actual ones—are 
not fully adequate.  
Another issue that is likely to arise when we entertain the possibility of assessing the 
adequacy of figurative utterance paraphrases is what can be the target of a paraphrase. If 
paraphrases were construed stringently as sentences with sentence meanings very similar 
to those of other target sentences, it would make little sense to speak of a paraphrase of a 
metaphor, since a metaphor‘s metaphorical content is presumably not sentence meaning. 
The discussion of utterance meanings, from the last chapter, tells against such a construal. 
But there are additional reasons for supposing that, in assessing the inadequacy 
assumption, theorists have not been imposing this stringent conception of paraphrase. 
Indeed, the conclusion that paraphrases are inadequate is supposed to lead us to draw 
conclusions regarding the nature of metaphorical meanings—conclusions about what we 
were attempting to capture with our purportedly inadequate paraphrases of metaphors. 
                                                        
28 Again, as discussed above, I assume that propositions are the truth-evaluable contents of some thoughts, 
sentences and utterances. Thus, I cash identity of content for two utterances or sentences as identity of the 
propositions they have as their contents. Two utterances, for example, say the same thing if they have the 
same propositional contents. As to whether propositions are best conceived as mind-dependent or 
independent—thus, as to whether type or token identity is required—as well as to other issues regarding 
propositions, I will remain non-committal.  
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The argumentative role of IA thus requires that we not rule out as a matter of definition 
the possibility of paraphrasing something other than a sentence. What we are trying to 
capture with a paraphrase of a metaphor is a truth-evaluable content which is the intuitive 
meaning of the metaphorical utterance. Our success or failure at capturing such a thing is 
supposed to reveal whether such a thing exists.  
Though not generally explicit about it, many philosophers who endorse IA may also 
assume that a paraphrase must be fully literal. One motivation for this literality constraint 
may come from a desire to construe paraphrases strictly (where this is distinct from the 
―stringent‖ construal of the last paragraph)—as sentences with sentence meanings very 
similar to the meanings of particular target utterances. However, some theorists, such as 
Recanati (2004), have argued that literal meaning is not necessarily sentence meaning. 
Others, such as Stern (2000) have argued that metaphorical meaning is sentence meaning. 
If either party is right, then this motivation for the literality constraint is undermined. 
Furthermore, it is clear that when we assess the adequacy of a paraphrase in the manner 
in which proponents of IA ask us to (which I will discuss in the next section), we are not 
simply assessing the meaning of the metaphorical utterance, we are assessing the 
similarity between that metaphorical meaning and the meaning of the purported 
paraphrase as we intuitively understand it. But few conceptions construe sentence 
meanings expansively, as the meanings intuitively understood by hearers. Theorists as 
diverse as Searle (1978), Bach (1994), Sperber and Wilson (1995) and Recanati (2004) 
have raised objections to such expansive conceptions of sentence meaning. So it is not 
clear that in assessing IA we should adopt a strict construal of paraphrase, and it is far 
from certain that the literality constraint could achieve such a construal anyway. 
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Therefore, I reject the literality constraint on paraphrases, and I will not endorse the strict 
construal of paraphrases.
29
 I construe paraphrases non-committally, simply as utterances 
that capture target utterance meanings.  
Finally, given our specific purposes in assessing IA, we must also maintain that two 
utterances that merely vary from one another in terms of the syntax of the uttered 
sentences cannot count as paraphrases of one another. If they did, the question of whether 
or not it is more difficult to paraphrase a figurative or a literal utterance would admit of 
an obvious answer: neither. To see this, consider that we can capture what is significant 
about the metaphor, ‗God is my witness,‘ by writing, ‗my witness is God,‘ in salient 
contexts of utterance. This is no more or less difficult than it is to capture what is 
significant about, ‗Hank is my witness,‘ by writing, ‗my witness is Hank‘. So, let‘s 
characterize a paraphrase as an utterance (fully literal or not) that mostly captures the 
intuitive point of another utterance, where the uttered sentence is not merely a syntactic 
variant of the other uttered sentence.  
I turn now to the question of what it is for a paraphrase to be adequate. Fortunately, cognitivists and 
non-cognitivists have been rather explicit about what they mean when they say metaphor paraphrases are 
inadequate—as we can see by reading their statements on the topic. For instance, of metaphor/paraphrase 
pairs, such as ‗Richard is a gorilla‘/‗Richard is fierce, nasty, and prone to violence‘, cognitivists such as 
Searle (1979a) write, ―Notice that in each case we feel that the paraphrase is somehow inadequate, that 
something is lost‖ (82). Black (1954), likewise, endorses this inadequacy interpretation, writing that in a 
paraphrase: 
…the implications, previously left for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a 
nice feeling for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented 
                                                        
29 Some may think that a non-circularity requirement constitutes an additional reason for the literality 
assumption. But no one would regard a literal paraphrase of a literal utterance as circular. Given the 
emergence of positions which construe literal and metaphorical meanings as of a kind, this circularity 
requirement for metaphorical utterances is suspect. 
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explicitly as though having equal weight. The literal paraphrase inevitably says too 
much—and with the wrong emphasis (46). 
 
In a similar vein, non-cognitivists such as Davidson (1978) claim that, ―when we try to 
say what a metaphor ‗means‘, we soon realize there is no end to what we want to 
mention‖ (263). Reimer (2001) alleges that, ―even literal paraphrases of those metaphors 
arguably used to make assertions—metaphors like ‗No man is an island‘ or ‗Every dog 
has its day‘—invariably fail to capture something essential to any metaphor that is not 
completely dead‖ (147). Clearly, many prominent philosophers who have written on the 
topic of metaphorical meaning agree that, even if a metaphor and its purported paraphrase 
have somewhat overlapping content, the latter often leaves out some essential idea or 
expresses some content very different from the content of the target metaphor, and can 
therefore not be considered an adequate paraphrase.  
The inadequacy assumption that has been central to debates concerning figurative 
language meaning and understanding is the claim that, although a figurative utterance and 
its purported paraphrase may have somewhat overlapping content, the paraphrasing 
utterance generally expresses content that leaves out some important idea present in, or 
adds in an important idea absent from, the content of the target figurative utterance. 
Because of this, purported paraphrases of metaphors inadequately paraphrase their target 
metaphors. At the beginning of the next section, I will argue that philosophers concerned 
with metaphorical meaning are committed to one important modification of IA: They 
must construe IA as a comparative claim. I will then examine previous philosophical 
assessments of IA. 
3. Existing Assessments of the Inadequacy Assumption 
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According to IA, purported paraphrases of figurative utterances are often too different 
from the target utterances to constitute adequate paraphrases. How should we evaluate 
IA? Typically, philosophers have invited their readers to assess the adequacy of choice 
figurative utterance/paraphrase pairs, then, after suggesting particular ideas the 
paraphrases leave out or add in, they have concluded that IA is correct. But several 
chronic problems plague existing philosophical assessments of IA. In this section I 
discuss three such problems that threaten the success of any attempted assessment of IA. 
My experimental evidence against IA, presented in the next section, avoids the difficulties 
I‘ll outline here.  
Each of the problems I will discuss relates to a certain re-conceptualization of IA. 
This re-conceptualization is non-optional to those who endorse IA and maintain its 
relevance to discussions of figurative utterance meaning. If it is to bear any weight in 
debates concerning metaphorical meaning, IA must be understood as the comparative 
claim that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate compared to paraphrases of other 
(specifically, literal) utterances—not as the claim that paraphrases of metaphors are 
inadequate (full stop). If the absolute claim were what some theorists meant by IA, it 
would not be of much interest to the metaphor debate. So what if metaphors are difficult 
to paraphrase? Perhaps (as the study I will describe in the next section suggests) all 
utterances are difficult to paraphrase. In that case, the difficulty presumably has to do 
with paraphrase itself and is not of central importance to an account of figurative 
language. To put this point another way, if we do not know the baseline of paraphrase 
adequacy, how can we know that paraphrases of metaphors are inadequate? Inadequacy 
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presupposes a standard of adequacy. If paraphrases are generally inadequate, the 
inadequacy of paraphrases of figurative utterances does not warrant a special explanation.  
In response to this argument for the comparative nature of IA, Reimer suggests that 
non-cognitivists may be assuming that understanding literal utterances consists in having 
cognitive states. So even if literal utterance paraphrases are inadequate, literal non-
cognitivism could not explain that fact. On the other hand, the inadequacy of figurative 
utterance paraphrases may be explained by the non-cognitive nature of figurative 
utterances (personal communication). It is widely held that understanding literal 
utterances consists in having cognitive states, so Reimer‘s is a salient way to deny the 
comparative version of IA. Nonetheless, to conclude that the two inadequacies admit of 
different explanations constitutes an extravagant flouting of parsimony! If paraphrases of 
figurative and literal utterances are equally inadequate, we should first investigate a 
single explanation to do with paraphrase in general before positing one explanation for 
figurative utterances and another where literal utterances are concerned.  
With the recognition of IA‘s comparative nature comes the first problem I will discuss 
for previous assessments. Often in philosophical assessments of IA evidence for the 
inadequacy of paraphrasing figurative utterances is presented independently of evidence 
for the ease of paraphrasing other utterances. Reimer (2001), for example, points out the 
failings of a number of paraphrases of metaphors without arguing that literal utterances 
are easy to paraphrase. Such one-sided arguments fail to establish IA. For though many 
theorists who engage in such arguments may take the ease of literal paraphrase for 
granted, it is far from obvious that literal utterances are in fact easy to paraphrase—at 
least, it is not obvious that they are easy to paraphrase in the same way metaphors are 
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purportedly difficult to paraphrase. Existing assessments of IA present us with figurative 
utterances removed from related contexts.
30
 If they show us anything it is that figurative 
utterances are difficult to paraphrase independent of context. But Searle (1978), Travis 
(1989), and Recanati (2004), among others, do a good job of pointing out just how hard it 
is to specify what exactly literal utterances mean independent of a related context. Thus 
it is a substantive point whether literal utterances are easy to paraphrase in the way 
proponents of IA typically attempt to show metaphorical utterances difficult to 
paraphrase—that is, independent of a related context. Evidence for IA must demonstrate 
both sides of the comparative claim; it must demonstrate that paraphrases of figurative 
utterances are inadequate in the same way that paraphrases of literal utterances are 
adequate.   
The second problem also relates to the comparative nature of IA. In arguing for IA 
(and in discussions of figurative language more generally), some theorists rely on 
obscure, complex, or artistic metaphors to the exclusion of the full array of metaphorical 
speech. Cooper (1986) argues in favor of using metaphors such as, ―Eliot‘s ‗I will show 
you fear in a handful of dust‘, Hofmannstahl‘s [sic] ‗dovecot‘ metaphor, and Nietzsche‘s 
‗Truth is a woman‘‖ (70), as the primary touchstones for a theory of metaphor. In her 
argument for IA, Reimer asks us to consider Auden‘s line, ‗The hourglass whispers to the 
lion‘s paw‘ (146). On the other hand, the most salient philosophical examples of literal 
utterances are all patently simple: ‗The table is covered with books,‘ ‗The cat is on the 
mat,‘ ‗Snow is white‘! When a philosopher uses an abstruse metaphor in putting forward 
IA, and fails to argue the relative ease of literal paraphrase, she invites her audience to 
compare the adequacy of paraphrases for the metaphorical example with the adequacy of 
                                                        
30 See Davidson (1978), Searle (1979a), and Reimer (2001), for example.  
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paraphrases for whatever literal utterances the audience finds salient. The contrast cases 
that naturally come to philosophical minds are cases of simple literal utterances. Next to 
those literal utterances, the target figurative utterances may well seem difficult to 
paraphrase. Less common is the case where a philosopher blatantly compares the task of 
paraphrasing a difficult metaphor with that of paraphrasing a simple literal utterance. But 
in either case the effect is the same: an illegitimate assessment of IA. Considerations of 
the comparative complexity of the utterances (even implicitly) contrasted is essential to a 
successful assessment of IA.  
Of course, utterances may vary in complexity across a number of distinct dimensions. 
I will argue that we need not guard against incongruous complexity across some of these. 
First, an utterance may be more syntactically complex than another if the sentence that is 
its linguistic form contains more syntactic constituents. So, ‗Sally went to the bridge 
before she went to the beach,‘ is more syntactically complex than, ‗Sally went to the 
bridge.‘ Secondly, an utterance may be more lexically complex than another. The lexical 
meaning of a term is its standard public or idiolectic meaning. A term is more lexically 
complex insofar as its lexical meaning decomposes into more (or more complex) 
concepts. One utterance will be more lexically complex than another (even of equal 
syntactic complexity) insofar as the words that constituent the sentence that is its 
linguistic form have more aggregate lexical complexity. If one holds that each word‘s 
lexical meaning is simple—never a composite of other concepts—one will hold that no 
utterance is more lexically complex than another without also being more syntactically 
complex. But one might also hold that utterances identical in syntactic complexity can 
vary in lexical complexity. For instance, one would contend that, ‗A bachelor is a 
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mammal,‘ is more lexically complex than, ‗A man is a mammal,‘ if one held that the 
lexical meaning of ‗man‘ is simple, whereas the lexical meaning of ‗bachelor‘ is 
complex.  
In addition to syntactic and lexical complexity, utterances may vary in complexity 
along other dimensions. For instance, understanding an utterance may require us to 
understand an uttered term in a non-standard (non-lexicalized) way. As Recanati (2004) 
writes, ―If we take it as axiomatic that only sounds can be heard, then, in ‗I hear the 
piano‘, either the sense of ‗hear‘ or that of ‗the piano‘ must be modulated for the sentence 
to make sense‖ (138). Although ‗I hear the piano,‘ may be no more lexically nor 
syntactically complex than ‗Man is a mammal,‘ understanding the former may require us 
to modulate the lexically encoded meaning of some term, whereas no additional process 
of modulation may be required to understand the latter. In that case, ‗I hear the piano,‘ is 
more procedurally complex than, ‗man is a mammal.‘ The more modulation of terms an 
utterance requires, the more procedurally complex it is. Furthermore, the modulated 
meaning arrived at in an instance of understanding some utterance may itself involve 
simple or complex concepts. So, even though each of two utterances may not be more 
syntactically, lexically, or procedurally complex than the other, one might have greater 
derived complexity than the other, if the concepts its modulated meaning consists in have 
more aggregate complexity.   
I take it as a non-controversial upshot of the comparative nature of IA that a 
legitimate assessment should compare metaphors and literal utterances of similar 
syntactic and lexical complexity. In this respect, previous assessments have failed. But it 
may be that metaphors are quite generally more procedurally complex than literal 
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utterances.
31
 Establishing a general difference in procedural complexity would reveal an 
interesting contrast between metaphors and literal utterances—and is not as entirely 
unlikely as establishing a general difference between the two in lexical or syntactic 
complexity. We should thus not exclude this possibility from the outset. The lesson I 
draw from the second problem with previous assessments of IA is the following: In 
assessing the relative adequacy of figurative utterance paraphrases we must compare 
literal and figurative utterances of similar syntactic and lexical complexity. 
The third problem with many existing assessments of IA has to do with the 
philosophical method of analysis itself. Typically, in arguing for IA, a theorist will cite a 
sample metaphor and ask us to reflect on all the ideas it might be taken to express. 
―How,‖ it is asked, ―could a single paraphrase capture all of that?‖ Here theorists often 
take themselves to be appealing to the purported ‗open-endedness‘ of metaphor 
interpretation. The relation between paraphrase adequacy and the open-endedness of 
metaphorical meanings is not obvious (see Cooper, 70-71). Many of the ideas theorists 
identify as being expressed by a metaphor may best be construed as implications of the 
metaphor‘s meaning, rather than as constituents of that meaning (in which case they are 
not ideas a successful paraphrase need capture). In other instances, these ideas may 
legitimately be construed as competing interpretations of a metaphor (considered 
independently of context). But as previously mentioned, philosophical analyses of literal 
utterances reveal similar (context-independent) indeterminacies of interpretation. As 
Camp (2006) writes, ―much ordinary talk — let alone literary writing — is loose and/or 
                                                        
31 Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 1, the technical notion of ―metaphor‖ from philosophy and linguistics 
equates the metaphorical with the procedurally complex. But I am concerned here (as philosophers have 
been in the past) with using data about paraphrasability to draw conclusions about a non-technical notion of 
metaphor—a folk-linguistic concept. It may nonetheless turn out that this folk notion of metaphor 
encompasses only utterances that require modulation.  
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evocative in just this way, despite being literal‖ (7). For a simple example, take a literal 
comparison between two things: ‗a chimpanzee is like an orangutan.‘ This utterance is 
perfectly literal, yet loose and open to a variety of interpretations. How are the two 
similar? Is it that they are both apes, or mammals, or hair-covered? Is it that they have 
mass?
32
 In any case, dwelling on metaphors as philosophical analyses of IA ask us to is 
likely to distort our perception of their open-endedness. As Bergmann (1982) has noted, 
―Dwell on a metaphor long enough, even a relatively uninteresting one, and numerous 
and various interpretations come to mind‖ (231). Adequate evidence for (or against) IA 
should involve equal consideration of literal and metaphorical utterances (and 
paraphrases of those utterances). If it does not, the result may be biased by unequal 
consideration. 
In the next section I discuss an experiment designed to assess the comparative 
adequacy of paraphrases of figurative utterances that avoids the problems just introduced. 
As with previous philosophical investigations, I do not impose specific criteria of 
adequacy for paraphrase assessment. Different accounts of the criteria of paraphrase 
adequacy might be given. But it is tough to imagine how we could judge the adequacy of 
purported criteria if not by appeal to pre-theoretic assessments of paraphrase adequacy. 
Indeed, as Chomsky (1965) has noted, ―there is no reason to expect that reliable 
operational criteria for the deeper and more important theoretical notions of linguistics 
(such as ―grammaticalness‖ and ―paraphrase‖) will ever be forthcoming‖ (19). Thus, I 
side with those who have previously assessed IA in holding that we need not determine 
what specific criteria are correct in order to ascertain if IA is true or not. Together we 
                                                        
32 If comparisons are thought not to be the best examples, given the potential semantic context-sensitivity 
of ―like,‖ consider any other example from the contextualism?xxxx literature: ―Steel isn‘t strong enough,‖ 
(strong enough for what?); ―Peter is finished,‖ (finished with what?); etc. 
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presume that speakers of English are qualified to assess whether an English paraphrase of 
an English utterance is adequate, independent of specific, operational criteria of 
assessment.  
4. Are Paraphrases of Metaphors Inadequate? 
To legitimately demonstrate IA, one would need to show that paraphrases of 
figurative utterances are inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal utterances when 
the target utterances are of similar syntactic and lexical complexity, and to do this by 
subjecting each kind of utterance/paraphrase pair to similar scrutiny. Previous 
philosophical analyses have failed to do this. Experimental analysis might fairly 
adjudicate the IA debate. Due to the nature of experimental research, participants would 
give roughly equal consideration to metaphors and literal utterances. One conducting 
such a survey could include literal and figurative utterances of similar complexity, and 
design studies and prompts intended to examine the same kind of inadequacy. I designed 
a study intended to meet these desiderata. 
To guard against researcher bias, I did not—as certain philosophers have done when 
asserting IA
33—generate my own paraphrases for metaphorical and literal utterances. 
Rather, in an initial phase of my study, I had University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
undergraduates (N=14) generate paraphrases for particular target utterances. Each 
participant was asked, for each of four utterances, ―to write another utterance of your own 
which means the same thing.‖ The target utterances made up four pairs of one literal and 
                                                        
33 See, for example, Searle (1979a), Reimer (2001). 
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one metaphorical utterance of similar grammatical structure, lexical complexity, and 
theme:
34
 
Theme: Metaphor: Literal Utterance: 
Language Music is the universal language. French is the language of Quebec. 
Advice Never give your heart away. Always count your change. 
Copilots God is my copilot. Bill Thompson is my copilot. 
Cars My other car is a Boeing 747. My other car is a Hyundai Elantra. 
 
After participants generated lists of paraphrases for target sentences, the best 
paraphrase for each target was selected. To again avoid researcher bias, UNC 
undergraduates (N=56) were asked to choose the paraphrase ―…which you think most 
nearly means the same thing as…‖ the target utterance, and write its letter in the blank. 
Each participant was asked to select the best paraphrase for four of the eight target 
utterances above. For each utterance, four paraphrases generated in phase one of the 
study were possible choices as the best paraphrase.
35
 Conditions were randomized and no 
ordering-effects emerged. For each utterance, a ‗best paraphrase‘ was selected on the 
basis of participants‘ answers: 
 
 
                                                        
34 In this, as in other phases of the studies I discuss, no participant was assigned more than one utterance 
from any single metaphor/literal pair.  
 
35 The paraphrases were culled on the basis of plausibility as a successful paraphrase and similarity to other 
potential paraphrases chosen for inclusion in phase two. For example, the potential paraphrases, ―I know it 
doesn‘t look like I am stylish or rich, but I do own some stylish, fancy-looking things like my Hyundai 
Elantra,‖ and ―In Quebec, they speak French,‖ were rejected for these reasons, respectively. One may 
worry that such culling reintroduces the problem of researcher bias. But this worry needs to be weighed 
against a concern for survey fatigue. Furthermore, it is intuitively very unlikely that many participants 
would have selected implausible paraphrases such as that mentioned above, and including paraphrase 
analogues threatened to split the vote between equally good, similar paraphrases.  
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Theme: Target Utterance: Best Paraphrase (% selecting): 
Language Music is the universal language. Music connects people across 
language and cultural barriers. (77%) 
Language French is the language of 
Quebec. 
The people of Quebec primarily 
speak French. (50%) 
Advice Never give your heart away. Do not ever fall too deeply in love. 
(62%) 
Advice Always count your change. Make it a habit to check that you‘ve 
received correct change. (55%) 
Copilots God is my copilot. God is helping me to get where I 
want to go. (47%) 
Copilots Bill Thompson is my copilot. I have a copilot named Bill 
Thompson. (58%) 
Cars My other car is a Boeing 747. 
 
I also have a Boeing 747. (43%) 
Cars My other car is a Hyundai 
Elantra. 
In addition to this car, I have a 
Hyundai Elantra. (42%) 
 
In the third phase of the study participants evaluated the adequacy of the best 
paraphrases. In the interest of finding any significant difference that might exist between 
assessments of paraphrases, it was important to have larger numbers of participants in 
this final phase. Thus, I trimmed the four pairs to be analyzed to two pairs. The pairs 
selected were those in which the best paraphrases generated the largest total percentage 
of votes. On this basis, the ‗Language‘ and ‗Advice‘ metaphor/literal utterance pairs were 
selected.  
In order to test paraphrase adequacy, I presented each undergraduate (N=108) with 
two utterances and their best paraphrases.
36
 Participants were asked several questions 
                                                        
36 Assignment to conditions was randomized. Roughly one third of participants received two metaphors and 
their paraphrases, while another third received two literal utterances and their paraphrases, and the last third 
received a metaphor and a literal utterance, together with their paraphrases. The study was conducted in 
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about each utterance and its paraphrase (target utterances were labeled A; paraphrases 
were labeled B): 
1. How similar is the meaning of B to A? (This was judged on a scale from 1 to 7, with 
1 representing, ‗not at all similar,‘ and 7 representing, ‗exactly the same‘.)  
2. Does either utterance leave some idea out that the other includes? (This was a forced, 
yes/no choice.)  
3. If so, which utterance, and what does it leave out? 
How did participants evaluate the paraphrases? Was the inadequacy assumption borne 
out? As this chapter‘s title suggests, participants did not judge paraphrases of metaphors 
to be less adequate than paraphrases of literal utterances. Statistically speaking, the mean-
similarity scores for the utterance pairs mentioned above were not significantly 
different:
37
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was also no statistically significant difference between participants‘ assessments of 
whether or not paraphrases of metaphorical or literal utterances in general left anything 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this way to see if evaluating one kind of utterance first affected the evaluation of the other. This was not the 
case.  
 
37 A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare similarity assessments for paraphrases 
of literal and metaphorical utterances in general, but these were not significantly different: F (1, 212) = 
.018, p = .892. Assessments of paraphrases for individual pairs were also compared, using independent 
sample T-tests. But in neither pair were the paraphrases of metaphorical or literal utterances significantly 
more similar: Language, t (105) = 1.382, p = .17; Advice, t (105) = -.778, p = .439. (One survey was 
discarded from these and the immediately following analyses because it was incomplete.)  
Metaphorical Literal 
 
Language 
 
Advice 
 
5.07 
 
4.73 
 
4.23 
 
4.44 
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out, nor between such assessments regarding paraphrases of the metaphorical or literal 
utterance in the Advice pair.
38
 However, significantly fewer participants felt that the 
paraphrase of the metaphorical utterance left something out in the language pair.
39
 So the 
paraphrase of the metaphorical utterance in this pair was thought to be more adequate. 
The percentages of people who felt something was left out were as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So far as these examples are concerned, the best paraphrases of metaphors and literal 
utterances seem to be equally inadequate. If anything, this study suggests that metaphors 
may be slightly more paraphrasable, for the most adequate paraphrase was judged to be 
of a metaphorical utterance, and the paraphrase of this utterance was significantly less 
often judged to have left anything out.
40
   
                                                        
38 In general: X2 (1, N = 214) = 2.629, p = .105; Advice pair: X2 (1, N = 107) < .001, p = .996 
 
39 X2 (1, N = 107) = 5.201, p = .023 
 
40 The structure of this study had two primary sources: consideration of previous experimental work on 
utterance interpretation and a strong desire to avoid researcher bias. In previous experimental work (Yoon, 
1994; Geurts, 2002), researchers asked subjects whether specific ‗donkey sentences‘ correctly described 
different reported or pictured situations. Considered independently, this approach is preferable to the one 
taken by Gibbs and Moise (1997), who asked subjects what they thought was said by particular sentences. 
As Recanati (2004) points out, the latter approach presupposes, ―the ability to report what is said‖ (14). 
However, given my desire to avoid researcher bias, it struck me that the best approach to assessing 
participant‘s intuitions about utterance meaning was not to adopt one of these methods independent of the 
other, but to instead devise a hybrid model. My model avoids researcher bias by allowing participants to 
generate and select the best paraphrases. But it also avoids putting heavy weight on participants‘ abilities to 
report what is said. The phase in which participants select from generated paraphrases constitutes an 
Literal Metaphorical 
 
Language 
 
Advice 
 
65.5% 
 
84.6% 
 
82.3% 
 
82.2% 
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One might object that this evidence is too slight to constitute a refutation of IA. But 
previous philosophical discussions of IA turned on only a few examples. So if a limited 
sample class is a problem for my argument, it is a problem for my opponents‘ arguments 
as well. Nonetheless, to bolster my case against IA, I repeated essentially the same test, 
but modified it to allow for more data. Instead of asking participants in the third phase 
three questions about each utterance/paraphrase pair, I asked only one: How similar is the 
meaning of A to B? This allowed me to fit six pairs of utterances onto each survey, 
greatly increasing the data generated. And since participants were more likely to say 
some idea was left out when they felt a paraphrase and its target utterance had dissimilar 
meanings, asking only the similarity of meaning question still suggests how answers to 
the leaving-out question would turn out for various utterances and their paraphrases.  
In phase one of the test, paraphrases were generated for twelve pairs of figurative and 
literal utterances of similar syntactic and lexical complexity, and theme. After phase two, 
these were whittled down to eight pairs of utterances, on the basis of the lack, in one 
utterance or another, of a clear ‗best paraphrase‘. 140 UNC undergraduates participated 
in the third phase of the study. Each participant was randomly assigned six utterances and 
their paraphrases. Participants were randomly assigned two, three, or four of each kind of 
utterance (i.e., metaphorical/literal). Two pairs of utterances were cycled in, so that all 
eight utterances were ranked. Two of the surveys were incomplete, and so were not 
included in the analysis. This left 138 surveys, or 828 separate rankings of closeness of 
meaning for 16 utterances (eight metaphorical, eight literal) and their paraphrases.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
independent check on inept reports. And, in the final phase, as in the work by Yoons and Geurts, 
participants judge the similarity of utterance meanings. 
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Comparing the average ‗similarity of meaning‘ ranking for each figurative utterance 
and its paraphrase to the ranking for the analogous literal utterance and its paraphrase, we 
get the following results (mean similarity ratings on the right): 
TARGET UTTERANCE: PARAPHRASE: AVG: 
Some jobs are prisons.
41
 Some jobs are tedious and personally 
confining. 
 
  3.59 
Some jobs are promotions. Some jobs are a reward for doing 
well in previous jobs. 
 
 
  4.63 
Power is in the hands of the king. The king is in charge.  
  4.86 
A sword is in the hands of the 
king. 
The king presently holds a sword.  
  5.17 
Many people never live for fear of 
dying. 
A lot of individuals don‘t live life to 
the fullest for fear of dying. 
 
  5.07 
Many people never fly for fear of 
dying. 
Many people choose not to fly 
because they‘re afraid of dying on an 
airplane. 
 
  5.28 
A good friend is worth more than 
an excellent stock portfolio. 
Friendship is more valuable than 
wealth. 
 
  4.79 
A good savings account is worth 
more than an excellent stock 
portfolio. 
Having money in the bank is safer 
than maybe having more money later. 
 
  3.63 
Some wives are worse than rashes. Some wives cause more pain and 
suffering than rashes. 
  
  4.93 
Some wives are worse than 
girlfriends. 
 
 
 
Sometimes having a wife is worse 
than having a girlfriend. 
 
  3.79 
                                                        
41 This example is modified from a timing study by Glucksberg et al (1997).  
M 
 
 
 
L 
M 
 
 
L 
M 
 
 
 
L 
M 
 
 
 
L 
M 
 
 
 
L 
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Capitalism is the religion of our 
country. 
Most people in our country live 
according to, or endorse, capitalist 
principles. 
 
  3.62 
Christianity is the religion of our 
country. 
The United States practices mostly 
Christianity. 
 
  3.54 
He divorced himself from the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
He left and has nothing more to do 
with the ACLU. 
 
  5.14 
He revoked his membership in the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
He used to be a member of the 
ACLU, but withdrew his 
membership. 
 
  5.89 
Butchering is the business of a 
Russian foot soldier. 
A Russian soldier‘s job is to kill 
things. 
 
  4.18 
Butchering is the business of a 
meat packing plant. 
Butchering is part of the industry of 
meat packing plants. 
 
  4.54 
 
So it seems that sometimes paraphrases of metaphors are more adequate; and sometimes 
paraphrases of literal utterances are. However, no clear trend towards the comparative 
adequacy of paraphrases of literal utterances emerged.  
In addition to comparing the results for different pairs of literal and figurative 
utterances, we can compare the paraphrase adequacy for literal and figurative utterances 
in general. To this end, a ‗metaphorical score‘ and a ‗literal score‘ was generated for each 
participant, by averaging his or her rankings of the similarity of meaning between each 
metaphorical utterance and its paraphrase, on the one hand, and each literal utterance and 
its paraphrase, on the other. I then averaged these metaphorical and literal scores across 
all participants. There was no significant difference between the mean ‗metaphorical 
score‘ (4.45) and the mean ‗literal score‘ (4.54).42  
                                                        
42 t(137)=.84, p=.40 
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My assessments avoid the previously discussed problems of other assessments. And 
they suggest that paraphrases of metaphors are not inadequate compared to paraphrases 
of literal utterances. If there are not other problems unique to my experimental 
assessments, then these present a reason to conclude that cognitivism about metaphor 
faces no pressure from the claim of inadequacy. Together with the theory‘s other 
strengths, we would have good reason to concede that some version of the view is 
probably correct. I cannot show there are no shortcomings of my assessments which 
previous assessments avoid. It is clearly the burden of the proponent of IA to show if 
there are some. Nonetheless, I will defend my assessments against some of the more 
obvious potential challenges in the next section. 
5.  Objections Considered 
One might object to my experimental analyses by making the strong claim that 
theoretically sophisticated judgments are the only ones relevant to assessments of 
paraphrase adequacy. But what theoretical sophistication is purportedly at issue? Two of 
the more obvious suggestions are seriously problematic. Sophistication with the theory of 
metaphor cannot be what is at issue, since, as previously mentioned, IA plays a major role 
in establishing figurative utterance theory. To require a sophisticated theory of figurative 
language as a qualification for assessing IA would rob the assumption of significance. 
One might instead suggest that sophistication with the distinction between what is meant 
by a sentence and what is meant by a speaker is at issue—for how can participants 
accurately judge the similarity of sentence meanings without knowing what constitutes 
sentence meaning, as opposed to what a speaker might mean in uttering a particular 
sentence? But the discussion of section two reveals that this suggestion is also misguided. 
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In assessing paraphrase adequacy we are assessing how well an utterance captures the 
metaphorical meaning of another utterance, not necessarily how similar are the meanings 
of two sentences. It is tough to see what particular theoretical sophistication might matter 
to assessments of paraphrase adequacy. It is perhaps tougher to see how theoretical 
sophistication could possibly make the difference between relevant and irrelevant 
assessments of paraphrase adequacy. The obvious criteria for whether an assessment is 
relevant is whether that assessment is competent, and assessments might be competently 
made without the benefit of theory or incompetently made with it. Furthermore, as I will 
presently discuss, there is good evidence to suggest the assessments made by participants 
in my studies are competent.  
Paraphrase assessments are relevant to IA insofar as they are issued by attentive, 
astute, and otherwise competent judges. Are my ordinary participants competent judges? 
Participants‘ answers to the third question in the rating phase of the first study suggest 
that they are. Participants‘ assessments of what was left out were generally thoughtful 
and on target. For example, a number of people pointed out that, ‗never give your heart 
away,‘ seemed to constitute a total ban, while ‗do not ever fall too deeply in love,‘ 
seemed only a restriction of degree. And ‗French is the language of Quebec,‘ was often 
thought to be a less than perfect match for, ‗The people of Quebec primarily speak 
French,‘ both because the latter includes a restriction of generality, while the former says 
nothing about the universality of the language, and because the former carries a certain 
‗officialness‘, which is not replicated in the latter. Apart from any specific reason to 
doubt the competency of my subjects in judging a good paraphrase then, their answers to 
the question regarding what was left out seem to support it. Furthermore, the conclusion 
73 
 
suggested by my studies is not that paraphrases of metaphors are adequate, it is that 
paraphrases of metaphors are not inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal 
utterances. Or, more accurately, it is that paraphrases in general are equally inadequate. If 
my participants held that paraphrases of figurative and literal utterances were universally 
wonderful, it might be reasonable to suppose that they had missed differences between 
target utterances and their paraphrases. Instead, participants judged both sets of 
paraphrases to be lacking, and their answers to the third question suggest they were 
cognizant of real differences between targets and paraphrases.  
Instead of contending that my participants are bad judges of the adequacy of 
paraphrases, a proponent of IA might contend that they are bad paraphrasers. Someone 
who was more highly skilled at the nuanced use of language than a public university 
undergraduate might be a better paraphraser, and the paraphrases generated by a better 
paraphraser might reveal the purported inadequacy. This is possible, of course, but to 
have any relevance here, a proponent of IA would have to make the further claim that 
professional philosophers are such better paraphrasers. Otherwise this would not be a 
way in which my assessment is deficient compared to previous purely philosophical 
assessments. Why might one suppose that philosophers are better paraphrasers than 
undergraduates? Clearly many professional philosophers write and read much more than 
most undergraduates. They are also professionally trained at assessing certain aspects of 
language (though arguably not those essential to the skill of paraphrase). This greater 
experience with language might make one more sensitive to similarities and differences 
of meaning, and to that degree able to generate better paraphrases. But it must also be 
conceded that professional philosophers are very much more accustomed to dealing with 
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literal language than they are to dealing with figurative utterances. This acuity with literal 
language, rather than a unique inadequacy in metaphor paraphrases, could explain why 
literal utterances strike philosophers as comparatively amenable to paraphrase. If we 
wanted the universally best paraphrasers, we should perhaps look to English or literature 
departments.  
One might accept that ordinary, pretheoretic intuitions about paraphrases are relevant 
to IA, and that, in fact, paraphrases of the figurative and literal utterances that constitute 
the target utterances of my study are equally inadequate, but point out that there are more 
complex utterances and contend that the results received here would not be replicated if 
the study were conducted using such utterances. It might be the case, for example, that it 
is harder to paraphrase a relatively simple literal utterance than a more complex literal 
utterance precisely because the idea expressed by the simple utterance is so simple! How 
many ways are there of saying, ‗snow is white,‘ after all? But with metaphors, simple 
lexical meanings do not equal simple metaphorical meanings. A relatively simple 
utterance might have juicy metaphorical significance—significance which admits of a 
variety of linguistic expressions. When we come to utterances that express more complex 
ideas, the objection runs, we will see the adequacy gap emerge between paraphrases of 
literal and figurative utterances. And this is a reason why existing assessments are to be 
preferred—in those assessments theorists examine more complex utterances, where the 
inadequacy gap is likely to emerge.  
According to this purported deficiency in my method of assessment, the simplicity of 
the target literal utterances explains why the paraphrases of those utterances were 
inadequate, but it does not explain why paraphrases of figurative utterances were 
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inadequate. But in that case there must be some different explanation for why 
participants‘ judged figurative utterance paraphrases inadequate to the degree that they 
did. But the degree to which participants judged paraphrases of figurative utterances 
inadequate was just the degree to which they judged paraphrases of literal utterances 
inadequate. Clearly it is more parsimonious to suppose that statistically identical 
assessments of adequacy admit of the same explanation than to suppose that they admit 
of completely different explanations.  
Alternatively, one may object to my experimental assessment of paraphrase adequacy 
by suggesting that the metaphors I consider are fairly familiar, and thus more amenable to 
paraphrase than more novel metaphors would be. But are more familiar metaphors easier 
to paraphrase, as this objection suggests? We can gain some insight into this question by 
examining the inadequacy of paraphrases for various individual metaphors considered in 
my studies. Perhaps none of those I consider are amongst the most novel metaphors; but 
certain of these are clearly more novel than others. By comparing the adequacy of 
paraphrases of the more novel metaphors to the adequacy of the more familiar ones, we 
can gain some insight into whether familiarity breeds paraphrasability, as the present 
objection suggests. The utterances, ‗Never give your heart away,‘ and, ‗Power is in the 
hands of the king,‖ are intuitively much more familiar than the utterances, ‗Many people 
never live for fear of dying,‘ and, ‗Some wives are worse than rashes.‘43 Yet paraphrases 
of the latter pair of utterances were judged better than paraphrases of the former pair. 
                                                        
43 These intuitions regarding familiarity were born out by a Google search of the online corpus. I attempted 
to search for minimal figurative strings included in these utterances, so as not to overlook any similar, 
though not identical, figurative expressions. A search of ―give your heart away‖ returned about 38,000 hits, 
whereas ―power is in the hands‖ returned about 386,000 hits, the most of any clearly figurative string from 
the studies. On the other hand, ―people never live‖ returned about 7,250 hits—but some of these were 
literal constructions, such as, ―Did the Founding Fathers intend that poor people never live past their 40‘s?‖ 
Likewise, ―wives are worse than,‖ returned about 2,440 hits, but, again, some of these—such as, ―some 
[men] feel their wives are worse than they are‖—were clearly literal. 
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This suggests that comparatively familiar utterances do not admit of more adequate 
paraphrases.  
One might persist that paraphrases of truly novel metaphors—metaphors such as the 
aforementioned, ‗I will show you fear in a handful of dust,‘ or, ‗Truth is a woman,‘ for 
example—would be inadequate compared to paraphrases of correspondent literal 
utterances. This is not something existing analyses attempt to show, so it is not a 
deficiency my analysis suffers from and existing analyses do not. Furthermore, it is not 
obvious to me that, ‗I will show you dust mites in a handful of dust,‘ or, ‗Truth is what 
obtains,‘ would be more adequately paraphrasable. But I concede that my experiments do 
not fully resolve the issue of comparative paraphrasability. What I have done in the 
present experiments is to try and resolve some of the problems in existing analyses of IA. 
Those analyses support judgments about paraphrasability on the basis of context-
independent consideration of utterances and their paraphrases. I have preserved this 
context independence in the present study, and this study suggests that even simple and 
familiar figurative and literal utterances are not adequately paraphrasable independent of 
context. I have offered reasons for thinking that this mutual inadequacy would not 
disappear if the utterances were simply more complex or less familiar. But I suspect that 
paraphrasability, like processing time, might improve were we to embed utterances in 
related contexts.
44
 Nor does this discussion rule out the possibility that embedded literal 
utterances are more paraphrasable than embedded metaphorical ones. But I do not 
suspect, nor is there a clear reason to suppose, that this is the case. 
6. Conclusion  
                                                        
44 See Ortony et al (1978). Camp (2006) provides a useful summary of work from psychology and 
cognitive science on metaphor. See also, Glucksberg (2001). 
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The assumption that communication-relevant, propositional meaning is derivable and 
assessable independent of context has been a common-place in the philosophy of 
language. As I have just pointed out, it is one that the present studies and previous 
assessments trade on. But this assumption has (as discussed above) been challenged. Let 
the empirically-revealed inadequacy of figurative and literal utterance paraphrases 
proffered and considered independent of context remind us of the important role context 
plays in the derivation of communication-relevant propositions, even for literal 
utterances. Continued research into the role of context in such derivation is essential. A 
complementary, methodological implication is also warranted by these considerations: To 
draw solid conclusions about general theses concerning linguistic phenomena such as 
paraphrasability and meaning, we need to consider sentences within explicit contexts of 
utterance, as well as independent of these. In future experimental work I hope to examine 
simple and complex utterances embedded in related contexts in order to draw less 
restricted conclusions concerning paraphrase.  
In any case, we can now dismiss the paraphrase argument in favor of non-
cognitivism. Above I tentatively argued that the best evidence concerning the matter—the 
evidence considered in this chapter—reveals that paraphrases of figurative utterances are 
not inadequate compared to paraphrases of literal utterances. Subsequent potential 
challenges have not impugned this conclusion, though they have led us to emphasize the 
restricted nature of this evidence. At this point, we have better reason to conclude that 
cognitivist accounts of metaphor are not threatened by the non-cognitivist‘s argument 
from the inadequacy of paraphrase than to accept the alternative. Given the other 
explanatory benefits of cognitivism, we are also now in a position to accept that some 
78 
 
version of cognitivism is correct.
45
 Finally, we might hope that, after considering the 
argument of this chapter, theorists of figurative language would refrain from appeals to 
the obviousness of IA in the future. For now it appears that is merely the dogma of 
metaphor. While not all dogmas are ill founded, this one appears to be. 
 
                                                        
45 In particular, the results of this chapter—which suggest no significant difference between the adequacy 
of figurative and literal utterance paraphrases—are particularly salutary to cognitive accounts of a 
deflationary variety, which deny a real distinction between the figurative and the literal. I will consider 
such accounts in chapter 5 and conclude, ultimately, that these are unsatisfying for different reasons. 
  
 
Chapter 4: 
Implication Views of Figurative Meaning 
In the last two chapters I argued that understanding a metaphor consists in having 
cognitive states with propositional contents distinct from those expressed by the 
metaphorical utterance understood literally. In other words, we concluded that there are 
propositional—that is, truth-evaluable—metaphorical meanings.  
Naturally, concluding that metaphorical meanings are propositional raises other 
questions. One such question divides cognitivists about metaphor into further camps: At 
what level of communication are propositional, metaphorical meanings expressed? We 
might identify three potential vehicles of propositional communication: sentences, 
utterances, and implications (broadly construed to include, for example, entailments, 
presuppositions, and conversational implicatures, among others). 
I will discuss views that locate metaphorical meanings at the sentence and utterance 
levels in the next chapter. Here I will focus on views that identify metaphorical meanings 
as implications of sentences or utterances. In this chapter, my aim is to argue against 
implication views (IVs) by way of arguing against their best developed instances. Such 
arguments cannot, of course, prove absolutely decisive against implication views in 
general. But then again the notion of implication is notoriously vexed, depending in part 
on one‘s views on inference and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. I will not take on 
the burden of arguing against all logically possible implication views, but hope that my 
arguments against the actually articulated implication views will convince my audience 
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that such views are unpromising, particularly if a sufficiently unproblematic, distinct 
view of metaphorical meanings can be found.  
1. Implications 
Often the hearer of an utterance is justified in inferring propositional information that 
is not the meaning of the sentence expressed by the speaker, nor a primary proposition 
the speaker intends to convey with his utterance, nor what the hearer understands to be a 
primary proposition conveyed by the utterance. A sentence meaning is composed from 
the semantics of its constituent words (disambiguated and indexically saturated) in their 
syntactic relations to one another. Utterance meanings are primary propositions meant by 
speakers or grasped by hearers. They often go beyond sentence meanings in requiring 
primary pragmatic enrichment—specifically, the inferential, context-sensitive processes 
of addition and adjustment are required by hearers to derive utterance meanings (insofar 
as these differ from sentence meanings).
46
 But a hearer is often also licensed to infer still 
further propositional content from an utterance in context. In such cases, utterances imply 
further propositional information—such further propositional information constitutes the 
class of implications 
Implications come in several varieties distinguishable according to how one is 
licensed to infer the relevant proposition. I will offer a partial tour. Let p be the sentence 
or utterance meaning that serves (along with relevant background information) as the 
inference base for q, the implication. In the case of entailment, one is licensed to infer q 
because if p is true then q must be true. Ella is president and Sal is Prime Minister, 
entails Ella is president. In the case of presupposition, one is licensed to infer q because, 
                                                        
46 The conversational apparatus I am alluding to here will be discussed in more detail in the next several 
chapters.  
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p—the (necessarily) truth-evaluable proposition—would lack truth value (so, not exist as 
a proposition) if q were false. To put things differently, the relevant sentence or utterance 
would be meaningless if q were false. The most famous example of a presupposed 
proposition is, the present King of France exists, which is presupposed by, ―The present 
king of France is bald‖.47 Two other classes of implications are licensed, not because of 
logical relations they bear to the propositions expressed by sentences and utterances, but 
rather because it would not be rational for the speaker to say what she says unless she 
believes the implicated proposition. In the case of conventional and conversational 
implicatures, on the assumption that the speaker is abiding by the cooperative principle, 
the hearer is licensed to infer that the speaker believes q because she expresses p. A 
hearer can infer a conventional implicature on the basis of what the speaker says itself, 
independent of important contributions from context. Russ is a Republican Congressman, 
but he‟s not a closeted homosexual, conventionally implicates, most Republican 
Congressmen are closeted homosexuals. A conversational implicature, on the other hand, 
can be inferred from what the speaker says on the basis of context. If we‘re discussing 
what movie to go see and you say, ―The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants is supposed to 
be good,‖ I can infer, that you‟re suggesting we see The Sisterhood of the Traveling 
Pants. Conventional implicatures are sometimes claimed to be inferred fairly 
automatically, without the explicit reasoning Grice thought was indicative of 
                                                        
47 The existence of presupposition is controversial. For some history of the debate, see Strawson (1950), 
Kartunnen (1973), and Lycan (1984: Chapter 4). 
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conversational implicatures.
48
 Conversational implicatures are also thought to be 
cancellable. Conventional implicatures are not.  
Many implication accounts of metaphorical meanings have focused on the class of 
conversational implicatures, as that notion is articulated by Grice (1989). These views 
will constitute my target in the next section. 
2. Gricean Implicature Views of Metaphorical Meanings 
Many cognitivists about metaphor have equated metaphorical meanings with 
conversational implicatures as understood according to Grice‘s (1989) seminal 
framework. I will call these Gricean Implicature Views (GIVs). GIVs hold that 
metaphorical meanings are truth-evaluable, conversational implicatures. Such 
implicatures are generated in order to make someone‘s utterance consistent with the 
cooperative principle. As Grice writes: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that (1) he is 
presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative 
Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in 
order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) 
consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the 
hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to 
work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required (30-
31). 
 
When someone who is supposed not to be opting out of the communication exchange 
utters a sentence, and the meaning of the sentence or the primary proposition expressed 
by the utterance is obviously false, uninformative, or otherwise seems to violate one of 
Grice‘s maxims of communication (or the Cooperative Principle itself), then the 
supposition that he believes the implicated proposition is required to make his speaking 
                                                        
48 See Lycan (2000: Chapter 13); but also see Saul (2002), who discusses the need to regard even the 
reasoning involved in the derivation of conversational implicatures as not actual reasoning, but a rational 
reconstruction of possible routes to an implicature. 
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as he does consistent with the supposition that he is not opting out of the communication 
exchange. In such an instance, the implicated proposition constitutes a conversational 
implicature. Metaphorical meanings are one class of conversational implicatures 
according to the GIV.  
Although literal utterance and sentence meanings and metaphorical meanings are both 
propositional according to GIVs, these views also draw a natural distinction between 
metaphorical meanings and the other two sorts of linguistic meanings. Literal meanings, 
they claim, are composed from the meanings of actually pronounced words, adjusted (so 
far as necessary) according to primary pragmatic processes that do not involve deductive 
calculation from truth-evaluable propositions, while metaphorical meanings are 
inferentially grounded—deduced from literal sentence meanings and background 
knowledge, including maxims of communication and features of the conversational 
context.  
GIVs find support in the fact that the literal meaning of many a metaphorical 
utterance is wildly false or plainly obvious—thereby violating Grices maxims of quantity 
and quality. One says, ―Waiting for the printer is twenty to life!‖ Well, clearly it is not. 
Assuming one is not opting out of the communication exchange, it‘s natural to suppose 
that one means to imply something else by one‘s utterance. We all seem to have the same 
intuitive understanding of what‘s implied here, though we may offer distinct 
interpretations of it.
49
 ―Manhattan is an island,‖ is plainly obvious to the Manhattanite 
who says it and the one who hears it. Assuming the utterance makes a contribution, one 
                                                        
49 Ordinary language users (and some philosophers, such as Searle, 1977) might contend that something 
like, ―Waiting for the printer is tedious and of indeterminate length,‖ is implied by the utterance. Some, 
such as perhaps Aristotle, suggested that what is meant here is best captured by a literal comparison, 
―Waiting for this printer is like twenty-to-life.‖ Fogelin (1988) would offer a figurative simile, ―Waiting for 
this printer is like twenty-to-life,‖ so, not dissolving the problem of figurative meaning, but reducing the 
problems of metaphor and simile to a single problem of figuration.   
84 
 
assumes the speaker means to imply that Manhattan is a place of emotional isolation, 
perhaps, or that Manhattan is significantly different from the rest of the country, or 
something else, depending on context.  
But while the sentence or utterance meanings of many metaphors are obviously false, 
uninformative, or otherwise raise flags so far as the Cooperative Principle is concerned, 
not all do. What is essential to a GIV view is that, for any metaphor, a literal 
understanding of the utterance fails, on its own, to satisfy certain principles of 
communication setting us off in search of a metaphorical meaning—an implication—that 
puts the utterance right, relative to those principles. But there are metaphorical speech 
acts for which the sentence or utterance meaning itself, independent of posited 
implicatures, conforms to Grice‘s maxims of conversation. Consider the following story, 
based on part of The Blue Cliff Record, a fundamental text for Zen Kōan study, compiled 
in 1125 AD:
50
 
The head monk, known for his mystical, affectless remarks, met the Zen master, 
Tokusan, when he came to the meditation hall with his mat. Tokusan held his mat 
before him in a ceremonial fashion. But, when the head monk turned to pick up his 
ceremonial whisk, Tokusan shouted, ―None, none!‖ and, flourishing his sleeves, went 
out. He turned his back on the meditation hall, put on his straw sandals and left. Later 
that evening, Isan asked the head monk, ―Where is the newcomer who was here a 
while ago?‖ The head monk responded flatly, ―He soon turned his back on the 
Dharma hall, put on his straw sandals and went away. One day he will build a grass 
hut upon a lonely peak and scold the buddhas and abuse the patriarchs.‖ 
 
In this story, the head monk may mean, and Isan may understand the monk to mean, both 
of his uttered sentences figuratively. Let‘s consider the first clause of the head monk‘s 
utterance, ―He soon turned his back on the Dharma hall.‖ Isan may understand what the 
head monk intended him to metaphorically understand, which we could (at least roughly) 
signify with, Tokusan chose to ignore organized spirituality. But the utterance—
                                                        
50 See http://perso.ens-lyon.fr/eric.boix/Koan/Hekiganroku/index.html. 
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understood literally—is true. Tokusan did turn his back on the Dharma hall, put on his 
straw sandals, and go away. The head monk knows this. Isan has no reason to believe it is 
not actually the case. So the literal meaning neither violates nor appears to violate a 
maxim of quality. The literal interpretation of this utterance would also be informative, 
since Isan does not know where Tokusan actually went, or that he left, and it does not 
seem too informative—so maxims of quantity are not violated. Given Isan‘s question, 
which we can suppose was intended literally, the literal interpretation of the head monk‘s 
utterance would also have been relevant, so it would not violate a maxim of relation. Nor 
was the head monk‘s utterance unduly prolix, ambiguous or obscure. The head monk‘s 
utterance, we may suppose, did not include a special emphasis or cue—so the literal 
utterance has no issues, so far as the maxims of manner are concerned. A literal 
understanding of the head monk‘s utterance does not appear to violate any conversational 
maxim, yet it is still meant and Isan is still inclined to take it metaphorically. Similar 
comments could be made about the remainder of the head monk‘s remarks. These are 
metaphorical utterances that one cannot accommodate without abandoning the central 
feature of the GIV, that literally understood metaphorical utterances are implicatures 
arising from a desire to maintain an utterance‘s consistency with the Cooperative 
Principle and Grice‘s conversational maxims.   
Of course, one might contend that it‘s just natural, makes the most sense, or is most 
salient, given background information, to eschew the literal meaning of the utterance and 
take the head monk metaphorically, as meaning that Tokusan chose to ignore organized 
spirituality. Searle (1977) endorses just such a move when he writes, ―when reading 
Romantic poets, we are on the lookout for metaphors, and some people we know are 
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simply more prone to metaphorical utterances than others‖ (105). Searle thinks that most 
metaphors violate Grice‘s maxims, but he admits that not all of them do. I believe this 
emendation is warranted, but it raises fundamental problems for understanding 
metaphorical meanings as Gricean conversational implicatures. It is of the essence of 
such implicatures that they are occasioned when the literal meaning of the sentence is 
false, uninformative, or otherwise strains Grice‘s maxims of communication.51 Searle‘s 
emendation makes his view more plausible, but it also removes it from the strict category 
of Gricean Implicature Accounts. Nonetheless, I will raise independent issues for Searle‘s 
implication account in the next section.  
3. Searle‟s Implication Account of Metaphorical Meanings: 
According to Searle‘s view, which I will non-commitally refer to as a general 
Implication View (IV), metaphorical meanings are speaker meanings generated by 
performance of the relevant speech act in its context. My central challenge to Searle‘s 
account is the following: Even if it is true, it does not constitute an answer to the central 
question of this dissertation. Searle‘s view fails to explain how figurative utterances are 
distinct from literal utterances (or, at least, how people distinguish them). It does not 
identify the feature or group of features in virtue of which an utterance is figurative (in 
the folk-linguistic sense) rather than literal. This problem will be central to the next few 
chapters, so it will help to have a specific name for it. I will call it: 
 The Differentiation Problem: The problem from which a theory of figurative 
language suffers when it fails to identify features in virtue of which a speech act, 
utterance, sentence or other linguistic item is figurative rather than literal.  
 
                                                        
51 See also Davis (1998), who develops a devastating attack on the Gricean view in general, not as it 
specifically relates to figurative language. 
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As an instance of the problem consider GIVs again, specified as those theories that 
identify metaphors as instances of communication in which a conversational implicature 
is inferentially grounded in literal sentence or utterance meaning, maxims of 
communication, and context. Such views fail to distinguish metaphors from non-
figurative instances of communication, since non-figurative instances of implicature 
calculation rely on the same resources GIVs identify. Suppose, for example, that Tess 
says, ―The chest of drawers has come,‖ in response to Tim‘s question , ―Has the bedroom 
set arrived?‖ Taken by itself, her response is not sufficiently informative by Grice‘s 
standards. As a result, it gives rise to the inference that, of the bedroom set they ordered, 
only the chest of drawers has come. But this is the same explanation GIVs offer of a 
metaphorical speech act such as an assertion of ―Al-Zarqawi is an animal.‖ If we 
understand this speech act to assert simply the content that is determined compositionally 
from the meanings of the words pronounced, we will regard it as uninformative. Thus we 
infer the intended implicature that al-Zarqawi is a brute, incapable of human emotion. 
GIVs offer no theoretical distinction between these two instances of communication and 
so succumb to the differentiation problem. 
Generally speaking, GIVs do not directly address the differentiation problem; so they 
don‘t try to identify distinctive features of metaphorical, as opposed to literal, speech 
acts. But particular implicature views have included features that purport to allow for a 
metaphorical/literal distinction. Searle (1979), for example, locates the distinction in what 
the hearer needs in order to understand each kind of utterance: 
In order to understand the [literal] utterance, the hearer does not require any extra 
knowledge beyond his knowledge of the rules of language, his awareness of the 
conditions of utterance, and a set of shared background assumptions…In order to 
understand the metaphorical utterance, the hearer requires something more than [this]. 
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He must have some other principles, or some other factual information, or some 
combination of principles and information that enables him to figure out that when 
the speaker says, ―S is P,‖ he means ―S is R‖ (84-85). 
 
In fact, Searle thinks that the hearer needs a combination of additional principles and 
information to figure out metaphorical meanings.  
Searle divides the task of understanding a figurative utterance into three distinct 
stages. First, we see that we need to give a figurative interpretation to the utterance. 
Second, we look for features the two things being compared have in common (S and P) to 
generate potential figurative meanings. Third, we narrow down the possible meanings to 
the likely one, often on the basis of contextual information. I will consider each of these 
stages of interpretation to see whether any suggests a process distinctive of figurative 
language interpretation—and conclude that none does. 
The first principle clearly fails to identify anything distinctive of figurative language, 
since Searle is with the GIV theorists in maintaining that the primary way by which one 
recognizes that an utterance requires a figurative interpretation is a way in which one 
recognizes that speaker meaning differs from sentence meaning in literal instances of 
communication. He writes: 
Strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the metaphorical meaning of a word, 
expression, or sentence, we are talking about what a speaker might utter it to mean, in 
a way that departs from what the word, expression, or sentence actually means (77). 
 
But the primary principle he identifies whereby one concludes that a metaphorical 
speaker meaning is required—―Where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for 
an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning‖ (105)—clearly embraces 
instances in which a hearer would conclude that a speaker is conversationally implicating 
a particular proposition, but would not normally consider the speech act figurative. Such 
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instances include Tess‘s utterance about the chest of drawers above.52 Therefore, this 
criteria is not sufficient to distinguish figurative from literal utterances. What‘s more, it‘s 
not even necessary that all metaphorical utterances, when taken literally, be defective, as 
the example involving Tokusan above demonstrates. So let‘s move on to the more 
important second phase of Searle‘s account. 
 In the second phase, one identifies potential figurative speaker meanings. Here eight 
principles for computing potential metaphorical meanings from literal sentences are 
identified. Searle‘s evidence for each seems to derive from the fact that it captures a 
relation between P (a term‘s standard meaning) and R (its meaning in context) in easily 
envisioned instances in which the metaphorical meaning of an utterance, ―The S is P,‖ is 
the S is R. To see this, consider the second of Searle‘s principles (reconstructed from 
discussion on 107-8): Things that are P are contingently, but saliently or well known to 
be, R. Pigs are not always or by definition filthy, gluttonous, and sloppy (think of a pet 
potbelly pig). Nonetheless, since the most salient examples of pigs are farm animals, the 
relation obtains between P and R in the easily envisioned instance Searle mentions, that 
in which the utterance of, ―Sam is a pig…will be taken to mean…Sam is filthy, 
gluttonous, and sloppy, etc.‖ (107). So, this principle could well be involved in figuring 
out the meaning of such a metaphor.  
The problem is that such evidence also supports the conclusion that this principle is 
involved in understanding literal utterances, where the literal meaning of an utterance of 
the sentence, ―The S is P,‖ is the S is R. Consider an example from Searle‘s own, ―Literal 
Meaning‖ (1978): 
                                                        
52 Searle writes, ―The defects which cue the hearer may be obvious falsehood, semantic nonsense, 
violations of the rules of speech acts, or violations of conversational principles of communication‖ (105). 
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…as we are strapped in the seats of our space ship in outer space we see a series of 
cat-mat pairs floating past our window. Oddly, they come in only two attitudes. From 
our point of view they are either…[with the cat above the mat or with the mat above 
the cat.]… ―Which is it now?‖, I ask. ―The cat is on the mat,‖ you answer. Have you 
not said exactly and literally what you meant (123)? 
 
I agree that in this case you have said exactly and literally what you meant. But what 
is it you have said? It is not that the cat is gravitationally oriented above the mat, but 
rather something to the effect that the cat is visually oriented above the mat. But how is it 
that I am able to figure out that this is what you mean? Searle contends that the meaning 
in such cases (which he takes to be typical) is determined, ―against a background of 
assumptions‖ (131). But what particular assumptions does he have in mind? As in the 
case of the metaphor about pigs, things that are ‗on‘ other things are not by definition 
visually oriented above those things (I can hang upside down and still see that the cat is 
on the mat, even though the cat is not visually oriented above the mat, from my point of 
view). But they are saliently or well known to be so oriented. So it seems that the way I 
figured out the literal truth conditions of what you said about the cat and the mat may 
have been—as Searle claims for metaphors—by means of the relevant principle.53 My 
point is that there is evidence for assigning a role to this principle of Searle‘s in literal 
utterance interpretation that is as compelling as the evidence he cites for assigning it a 
role in metaphorical interpretation, and no reason for denying it such a role. Hence 
there‘s no reason to suppose that it underwrites a distinction between figurative and 
literal speech acts.  
                                                        
53There‘s a more direct route to the sentence or utterance meaning in this case, through my own experience 
of the cat, visually oriented above the mat, and some assumptions that you must be having the same 
experience. But to block this path, we would just have to render me blind. Assuming I still knew we were 
in outer space, I would still take the purported meaning as the literal meaning, and could well employ the 
relevant principle in working it out. 
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This point generalizes to each of the first five principles Searle identifies as, 
―principles according to which the utterance of P can call to mind the meaning R in ways 
that are peculiar to metaphor‖ (107). I‘ll offer a counter example to the definitiveness of 
each of these remaining five in turn: 
1. ―Things which are P are by definition R. Usually, if the metaphor works, R will be 
one of the salient defining characteristics of P‖ (107). 
Mr. Jones, secretary to the President at Globotronmegacorp, is being interrogated by 
an investigator, who‘s trying to determine whether, Mr. Peters, President of the 
corporation, is an abusive employer. The investigator is pushing Jones about his 
impressions of Peters as a boss. Jones is equivocating. Frustrated, the investigator 
says, ―Look, Jones, we‘re collecting statements from all of Peter‘s employees. You‘re 
his secretary.‖ Clearly the investigator means to remind Jones that he is one of 
Peters‘ employees. By saying, ―You‘re his secretary,‖ the investigator means, you‟re 
his employee, and he conveys this in virtue of the fact that being an employee is one 
of the salient defining characteristics of being a secretary. However, no one would 
class this as a figurative utterance.  
3. (Principle 2 was discussed in detail above.) ―Things which are P are often said or 
believed to be R, even though hearer and speaker may know that R is false of P” 
(108). 
Vinnie and Valerie, two botanists, are at the grocery store with Vern, Valerie‘s 
uneducated uncle. They are working to fill a shopping list that specifies (among other 
things) the following produce: carrots, celery, cucumbers, spinach, tomatoes, and 
several varieties of peppers. Vinnie says to Valerie and Vern, ―Go get the 
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vegetables.‖ In their intersubjective, scientific idiolect, Vinnie and Valerie may never 
take ―vegetable‖ to refer to any technical fruit, such as cucumbers, tomatoes, and 
peppers. Nonetheless, both know that ―vegetable‖ is often (and particularly by Vern) 
said and believed to include such items. So, Valerie may interpret Vinnie to mean by, 
―Go get the vegetables,‖ go get the edible, savory plants, though this is not what 
vegetable means to Valerie and Vinnie. Nonetheless neither, nor anyone else, would 
ordinarily regard this as a figurative utterance. 
4. ―Things which are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they believed to be 
R; nonetheless, it is a fact about our sensibility, whether culturally or naturally 
determined, that we just do perceive a connection, so that P is associated in our mind 
with R properties‖ (108). 
Nel and Nancy are two neurologists trying to treat a brain disorder in their patient, 
Paul.  Nel tells Nancy about the man‘s condition, saying, ―His main problem is the 
persistent pain in his leg.‖ Now, Nel and Nancy both understand that pains are not 
really located in legs, nor are pains like things in legs, so, clearly, Nel and Nancy 
don‘t believe pains to be in legs. Nonetheless, Nel and Nancy, for whatever 
cultural/natural reason both associate Paul‘s experiencing his leg painfully with things 
located in legs. Thus, Nancy understands Nel to mean, His main problem is that he 
persistently experiences his leg painfully, when she says, ―His main problem is the 
persistent pain in his leg.‖ This is intuitively not a figurative utterance. 
5. ―P things are not like R things, and are not believed to be like R things; nonetheless 
the condition of being P is like the condition of being R‖ (109). 
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To illustrate this principle, Searle uses the example of someone who has just received 
a promotion. It would be metaphorical to say of this person (let us call him John), 
―John is an aristocrat.‖ However, it is not clear that this is a good example to illustrate 
Searle‘s principle, or even that such an example—an example of some P that is not 
like R, but for which the condition of being P is like the condition of being R—is 
possible. If the condition of being an aristocrat is like the condition of being 
promoted, then an aristocrat is like one who has just been promoted, at least insofar as 
his situation is similar to that of one who has just been promoted. If Searle wants to 
maintain that sometimes P is not like R, even though P is like R in just those respects 
that being P is like being R, then he must think there are other respects in which P is 
not like R that do not correspond to ways in which being P is not like being R. But 
what differences are there between being an aristocrat and being one who has just 
gotten a promotion that are not differences between the condition of being an 
aristocrat and the condition of having just been promoted? I can think of none. But 
recall: Searle‘s principles are meant to be ways in which we associate the term P with 
the concept R. Perhaps then he does not need an example for which, strictly, P is not 
like R though the condition of being P is like the condition of being R. He needs only 
an example whereby we work out R from P by thinking of the ways in which being P 
is like being R, not the ways in which P is like R. That seems more tractable, and 
makes Searle‘s example more applicable. But it also makes the principle easier to 
counterexample. Suppose we are driving on the interstate when I suddenly announce, 
while putting on my blinker and merging with the exit ramp, ―We‘ve got to stop here. 
My gas tank is empty.‖ Then it would be reasonable for you to interpret me as 
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meaning, My gas tank is almost empty. And, insofar as you needed to work out what I 
mean, you would presumably work it out by reflecting, not on the similarities 
between an empty tank and an almost empty tank, but rather on the similarities 
between the condition of having an empty tank and the condition of having an almost 
empty tank, the most salient similarity between the two consisting in their both being 
instances in which more gas is needed. Nonetheless, though my utterance may be 
loose it is intuitively non-figurative.  
Searle‘s sixth ―principle‖ does not require a counter-example, because, as I‘ll explain, it 
actually fails to have the proper form of a principle according to which the utterance of P 
can call to mind the meaning R. It is:  
6. ―There are cases where P and R are the same or similar in meaning, but where one, 
usually P, is restricted in its application, and does not literally [i.e. actually] apply to 
S‖ (109). 
But this just captures a fact about some sentences where P is used to mean R and 
could not even potentially be used for working out the meaning S is R from ―S is P,‖ 
in either literal or figurative instances of conversation. Searle‘s examples are all ones 
where either S is R would be equivalent to S is P (as in, ―The souffle is addled‖) or 
else ones where what is meant by ―S is P‖ would be worked out according to one of 
the other principles he mentions (such as by principle 4, in the case of, ―His brain is 
addled‖). 
Searle‘s seventh and eighth principles also require special treatment. Principle seven 
provides, ―a way of applying principles 1-6 to simple cases which are not of the form ‗S 
is P‘ but relational metaphors, and metaphors of other syntactical forms such as those 
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involving verbs and predicate adjectives‖ (109). In fact, Searle only considers the case of 
relational metaphors such as, ―Sam devours books,‖ or, ―The ship ploughs the sea.‖ In 
such cases, Searle claims that: 
...the hearer‘s job is to find a relation (or property) that is similar to or otherwise 
associated with, the relation or property literally expressed by the metaphorical 
expression P [e.g. ‗devours‘ or ‗ploughs‘]; and the principles function to enable him 
to select that relation or property by given him a respect in which the P-relation [e.g. 
S devouring S, or S ploughing S] and the R-relation might be similar or otherwise 
associated (110). 
 
Since actual and (this instance of) metaphorical ploughing are related to one another 
definitionally, in that, ―ploughing is by definition partly a matter of moving an object to 
either side of a pointed object while the object moves forward‖ (110), in this case 
principle one gives the hearer the respect in which the R-relation is selected. (Though, 
according to Searle, it does not supply everything the hearer understands the R-relation to 
include; the R-relation includes other properties not shared by the P-relation.) But the 
same modification of principle one has application in intuitively non-figurative instances 
of communication. In Japan, chopsticks, since they are the only traditional dining utensil, 
have a variety of uses, including separating food items using a scissor-like motion. 
Suppose Alexa has just moved to the country and sees Tomoki separate a daifuku
54
 into 
two pieces in this manner. Alexa might say, ―Tomoki cut the daifuku with his 
chopsticks,‖ meaning to express with ―cut‖ an idea that is definitionally related to cutting 
with scissors, in that it involves separating something in to two or more pieces, but is also 
somewhat different. Nonetheless this strikes me as a perfectly literal description of what 
Tomoki did. Searle does not show that this principle can successfully modify all 
previously principles to formulate principles whereby people might reach metaphorical 
                                                        
54 A kind of sweet made of mochi filled with red bean paste. The words ―dai fuku‖ translate to ―great 
fortune‖. 
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meanings for instances of all grammatical forms of figurative language. Nor will I show 
that each potential modification could also be used to deliver a speaker meaning in 
related instances of literal communication. In each case, I trust it could be done. 
Finally, let us briefly consider Searle‘s eighth principle, which points out that people 
could also view metonymy and synecdoche as special cases of metaphor that each specify 
a distinctive principle whereby one comes to interpret an expression ―P‖ to mean R. In 
the case of metonymy, the purported principle is, things that are P are contiguous or 
otherwise intimately associated with things that are R. So, Gertie may figuratively alert 
Monica to their teenage daughters‘ arrival by saying metonymically, ―The phone is home 
from school.‖ But if a stranded motorist asks me, in an urban setting, where a gas station 
is, I can respond in an intuitively literal way by saying, ―that there‘s one on the other side 
of this building,‖ meaning to implicate that there is one in a place contiguous to the other 
side of this building. This is a literal instance of communication, though one in which the 
speaker meaning is worked out according to the principle of metonymy. Synecdoche 
encompasses several related relationships, but we can focus on one of these relationships 
and suppose that Searle‘s principle for this trope would be something like the following: 
in the case of synecdoche, one comes to interpret an utterance of ―P‖ to mean R in virtue 
of the fact that P is a part of R. But if President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton are 
speaking on the phone, she can respond literally to his request to let him know the minute 
the plane lands, by saying, ―The landing gear just touched ground.‖ He understands that 
she means, the plane landed, because the landing gear is part of the plane. This is a literal 
instance of communication. 
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I trust that the previous discussion adequately demonstrates that the principles Searle 
isolates for his second stage of metaphor processing will actually not serve to distinguish 
figurative from literal speech acts. So let us turn finally to stage three. Here, Searle 
contends, there are certain principles for figuring out which interpretation of, S is R, best 
suits the context once we have generated potential values for R. Searle states only one of 
these principles explicitly: Go back to the S term and see which of the many candidates 
for the values of R are likely or even possible properties of S (106). But this principle 
cannot underwrite a distinction between metaphorical implications and literal sentence 
meanings, since this principle is also used in figuring out certain literal sentence 
meanings. Suppose you asked what Dave does for a living, and I replied, ―Dave is the 
President of the corporation.‖ If you knew Dave to be my neighbor in the isolated town in 
which Globotronmegacorp (and no other corporation) is headquartered, you would be 
able to determine the reference of the indexical term, ―the corporation‖. You would grasp 
my literal sentence meaning, that Dave is the President of Globotronmegacorp. This is 
literal sentence meaning even if you determine the reference of the indexical by going 
back to the S term (‗Dave‘) and determining which of the many values of R (‗Wal-Mart,‘ 
‗Pepsico,‘ ‗Globotronmegacorp,‘) are likely properties of S, given your knowledge of 
Dave. Thus Searle‘s stage three principle also fails to distinguish figurative from literal 
utterances. 
None of the principles or information Searle identifies can underwrite a plausible 
distinction between figurative and literal instances of communication. I have not taken a 
stance as to whether or not the principles Searle identifies are principles relevant to 
grasping metaphorical meanings, indeed I am inclined to think that some principles very 
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like these are sometimes relevant. But, unlike Searle, I maintain that the meanings 
thereby grasped are not figurative utterance meanings in virtue of being grasped by 
means of these principles. 
4. Why Use Figurative Language?  
 I think the previous discussion is sufficient to raise serious doubts about Implication 
Views (IV) of metaphorical meaning.
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 If another account of figurative language 
understanding does not face similar serious issues—as I will argue my own view does 
not—then I think we should abandon IVs in favor of that view. Nonetheless, I will briefly 
discuss another shortcoming of the IV, mainly by way of contrasting the Implication 
Account of Figurative Language with that of Indirect Speech and as a way of raising an 
issue that I think my own view needs to address in the chapters to follow.  
Another theoretical shortcoming of the IV is its failure to include a specific account of 
why we use metaphorical language. If, as Grice supposed, requirements to be relevant 
and perspicuous follow from the cooperative aims of communication, why in the case of 
metaphor do we make our conversational partners take the circuitous route that the IV 
contends we make them take to reach the informative, metaphorical message? In the case 
of indirect speech, for which Searle (1975) also offers an IV account, there is a readily 
available general (though perhaps not universal) account for why we make our 
conversational partners go through the trouble: It is more polite to do so. In other words, 
it makes our conversational partners think better of us. So, we do not make them go 
through the trouble as a bit of altruism—as though they‘ll get something out of it. Rather, 
                                                        
55 And there are other challenges for IA as well. As Camp (2009) summarizes, metaphorical meanings do 
not pattern with other implicatures. Bezuidenhout (2001) points out that we can report what is said by the 
speaker of a metaphor by way of a paraphrase of the metaphorical meaning of his utterance. Hills (1997) 
and Bezuidenhout (ibid) illustrate that we can explicitly respond to the figurative content of a metaphorical 
utterance. And Leezenberg (2001) recognizes that many metaphorical meanings are not cancelable.  
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our aims are self-serving. If Jim commands his partner to pick up dinner, not by 
commanding directly but by asking, ―Can you pick up dinner?‖ what he says is more 
polite in at least two respects: 
Firstly, X does not presume to know about Y‘s abilities, as he would if he issued an 
imperative sentence; and, secondly, the form gives—or at least appears to give—Y the 
option of refusing, since a yes-no question allows no as a possible answer. Hence, 
compliance can be made to appear a free act rather than obeying a command (48).  
  
But though the extravagances of indirect speech may in general be warranted by 
constraints of civility, instances of metaphorical communication seem too motley a crew 
to admit of an in-general explanation. For example, a proponent of IV may attempt to 
respond that in the case of metaphor we generally put our audience through the trouble of 
deriving implicated meanings in order to entertain them—to have them consciously 
ponder the inappropriate, but amusing, beautiful, or shocking literal meanings of our 
utterance. But if this is right, then for most utterances IV theorists would class as 
figurative, our aim of consciously entertaining our audience is unrealized. Reflect on the 
many metaphors that appear frequently in formal discussion and casual conversation.
56
 In 
many such cases, the converser does not pause to appreciate the inappropriate, though 
potentially entertaining, literal meaning. Instead, the metaphorical meaning—which is 
true and informative—is generally quickly derived and the conversation moves along. 
This is only a brief consideration, raised here because of Searle‘s on laudable attempt 
at answering a similar ―why‖ question for indirect speech. I do not think a general answer 
to the ―why‖ question in the case of figurative language will be forthcoming. But I will 
                                                        
56 Low, Littlemore and Koester (2008, Applied Linguistics) found that lexical items were used 
metaphorically 10-13 percent of the time in three UK lectures. Low (in press. Metaphor and positioning in 
academic book reviews. In Zanotto, M., Cameron, L. &; Cavalcanti, M. (eds) Confronting Metaphor in 
Use. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.) found that lexical items were used metaphorically 9-15 percent of the 
time in ten social science book reviews in academic journals.   
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sketch some explanations for some uses of metaphor in the seventh, and final, chapter of 
this dissertation.  
5. Conclusion: 
Once we have accepted cognitivism and moved away from the view that metaphorical 
meanings are expressed by implications of literally understood sentences or utterances, 
two options remain. Either metaphorical meanings are expressed by sentences—a 
Sentence Meaning View (SV)—or they are expressed by utterances—an Utterance 
Meaning View (UV). In the next chapter, I will discuss these two views. I will conclude 
that figurative meanings must be utterance meanings. However, those who have 
embraced an utterance meaning view have often (though not invariably) concluded that 
there is no significant linguistic category of figurative language. This eliminativism about 
the figurative is not only inconsistent with the evidence of a culturally universal, folk 
linguistic concept discussed in the first chapter, I believe it also results mainly from a 
failure of creativity and commitment to the traditional view that the class of the figurative 
must be defined by recourse to a special kind of meaning. This, I will argue in chapter 6, 
is not the case.  
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5: 
Sentence Meanings Vs. Utterance Meanings 
At this point in our investigation into the folk distinction between figurative and 
literal language, we have ruled out non-cognitive accounts of metaphor understanding 
and seen that the best articulated implication views of metaphorical meaning are 
problematic. In this chapter, we will consider the possibility of equating metaphorical 
meanings with sentence meanings (the sentence meaning view, or SV), before settling on 
the utterance meaning view (UV) of metaphor. Finally, we will examine several accounts 
of the distinction between figurative and literal language developed by proponents of 
metaphorical utterance meanings.  
1. Three Conceptions of Sentence Meaning  
The notion of sentence meaning is vexed. So, to begin our consideration of whether 
metaphorical meanings could be sentence meanings, it will help to elucidate a few 
different general conceptions of sentence meanings. In their article, ―Semantics, 
Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content,‖ Jeffrey King and Jason Stanley (2005) 
nicely distinguish three conceptions of what I am calling sentence meaning, each 
differentiated in terms of the role it specifies for context in determining sentence 
meaning. According to one of these conceptions of sentence meaning (drawn from the 
work of Richard Montague), which I will call the Context Independent Conception (CIC), 
King and Stanley write that, ―semantic properties [sentence meanings] are only properties 
of expression types; any property that an expression type has only relative to a context (or 
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any property expressed only by expression tokens) is not semantic‖ (137). For example, 
according to the CIC, traditional indexicals such as ―I‖ and ―tomorrow‖ do not contribute 
their referents to sentence meanings (though they may contribute a Kaplanian character, 
which is context-independent).  
Two other accounts of sentence meaning discussed by King and Stanley are more 
permissive in that context can play some role in determining sentence meaning according 
to each of these conceptions. One of these conceptions, which I will call the Non-
intentional Context Conception (NCC), is based on distinctions drawn in John Perry 
(2001). It emphasizes that we can distinguish the context sensitivity of expressions (and, 
thereby, their role in semantic content) in terms of the particular sort of contextual 
features which help determine their reference in instances of use. The NCC 
fundamentally distinguishes two kinds of contextual features: contextual features relating 
to the intentional states of speakers (intentional contextual features) and all other 
contextual features (non-intentional contextual features). Thus we can distinguish 
intentional contextual terms and non-intentional contextual terms by way of the kind of 
contextual features which determine their reference in use. Of course, this view maintains 
that there are also non-contextual terms, which make the same semantic contribution in 
each instance of use. According to the NCC, sentence meaning is fully determined by the 
lexical semantic contributions of a sentence‘s constituent non-contextual terms, the 
context-relative semantic contributions of a sentence‘s constituent non-intentional 
contextual terms, and the syntactic relations those bear to one another. As King and 
Stanley point out, this view is still fairly conservative since, aside from a very few 
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expressions such as, perhaps, ‗I‘ and ‗tomorrow‘, most context sensitive expressions are 
intentional context sensitive expressions. 
The third conception of sentence meaning distinguishes contextual features that 
contribute to semantic content not in terms of the nature of those features themselves, but 
rather in terms of the expressions the reference of which such features determine. As 
King and Stanley (2005) write, according to this view: 
Non-linguistic facts about the context of use are relevant for fixing the referential 
content of some lexical items, such as pronouns and unpronounced free variables. But 
the nature of the lexical item dictates what non-linguistic factors are relevant, and 
constrains the nature of its referential content in a context (139). 
 
On this view, context only contributes to the determination of an expression insofar as the 
expression is or contains as part of its eternal meaning (or character) a lexical item that 
specifies the need to consult context to determine reference. Therefore, I will call this 
view the Lexically-constrained Context Conception of sentence meaning (LCC). The 
LCC holds that sentence meaning is fully determined by the lexical semantic 
contributions of a sentence‘s constituent non-contextual expressions, the lexically 
constrained, context-relative semantic contributions of a sentence‘s constituent contextual 
terms, and the syntactic relations those bear to one another. Because the lexical meanings 
of numerous expressions arguably dictate how and what contextual factors are relevant to 
determining reference in use, the LCC allows for the possibility that many communicated 
propositional contents (which are not implicatures) are sentence meanings.
57
  
With these three views of sentence meaning on the table, let us return to our target 
question: Are metaphorical meanings sentence meanings? First consider CIC. This 
                                                        
57 Jason Stanley (2002, 2004, 2005), among others, has been attempting to steadily expand the domain of 
lexically specified context sensitivity. Though his efforts have been met with much resistance.  
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conception of sentence meaning entirely excludes context sensitivity from semantic 
content, and therefore fails to accommodate metaphorical meaning as semantic content. 
For, as we will see by way of example (whether necessary or not), figurative meaning is a 
contextual feature. Suppose S is the sentence, ―Truth is a woman.‖ What is the 
metaphorical meaning of S? Of course, there is the compositional meaning of S. The 
sentence independent of context determines truth conditions and is, in the actual world at 
least, evaluable as false. But in context we would ordinarily attribute figurative meaning 
to an utterance of S that may, in the actual world, be true. Suppose, for example, that S 
were uttered by a practically minded scientist, whose discoveries have often found 
industrial application. In that case, one would understand an utterance of S to mean 
something like, truth is something that can give rise to (as a woman can give birth to) 
new industrial methods and resources. What‘s more, this would be understood as the 
figurative meaning of S in such a context and this figurative meaning is arguably true of 
the actual world. But suppose S were uttered, not by the aforementioned scientist, but by 
someone dubious of philosophical method, as it actually seems to have been uttered by 
Nietszche in the introduction to Beyond Good and Evil. In that context, one might 
understand an utterance of S to mean something like, truth is something (like a woman) 
that philosophers are generally not very good at getting. In that case, this would be 
understood as the figurative meaning of S—a figurative meaning that is also true of the 
actual world. Clearly, then, the figurative meaning of utterances of S are context 
sensitive. So, on CIC, figurative meaning cannot be sentence meaning. 
These considerations also rule out the thesis that metaphorical meanings are semantic 
meanings according to the NCC account of sentence meaning. According to that view, 
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only contextual features other than a speaker‘s intentional states contribute to sentence 
meaning. But, in these two cases, figurative meaning is determined explicitly by 
reference to speakers‘ intentional states. We would not understand what Nietzsche means 
by this figurative utterance unless we understood something about his perspective on 
philosophical method—perspective Nietzsche has to spell out in the next few lines of 
Beyond Good and Evil. 
These considerations leave us with one viable account whereby figurative meaning 
may be understood as semantic meaning: LCC, according to which features of their 
Kaplanian characters determine which expressions are context sensitive. Should we 
accept, according to this view, that metaphorical meanings are sentence meanings? Well, 
that depends on whether or not the contextual features which determine an expressions‘ 
metaphorical reference are constrained by the metaphorical expression‘s eternal 
meanings, a topic I will now take up. 
2. LCC and Metaphorical Sentence Meanings 
Much recent discussion in philosophy of language has focused on the topic of the 
boundaries of sentence meaning. As Josef Stern (2009) points out, contextualists, who are 
generally, proponents of CIC or NCC (but think sentence components must be 
pragmatically adjusted to supply the propositional contents that are relevant to 
communication)—such as Bezuidenhout (2001), Carston and Wilson (2006), Sperber and 
Wilson (1995, 2006), and Recanati (2001, 2004)—have in this context specifically taken 
up the topic of figurative language, while proponents of LCC have mostly chosen to, 
―…simply file metaphor away in the waste-basket of pragmatics…‖ without serious 
discussion (2). However Stern (1985, 1991, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2009), a proponent of a 
106 
 
version of LCC, has over the past twenty years been developing a sentence meaning 
account of metaphorical meanings, which analogizes metaphors to demonstratives. Of 
particular relevance here is Stern‘s assertion that certain tests of lexical constraint on 
context sensitivity support the conclusion that the context sensitivity of metaphors is 
lexically constrained, and thus, if one also accepts LCC, the conclusion that metaphorical 
meanings are—like a large class of non-metaphorical, communicatively significant, non-
implications—sentence meanings. I will briefly introduce the two tests Stern (2009) 
discusses. 
A variety of tests have been proposed for semantic context sensitivity. The ones Stern 
discusses are drawn from Cappelen and Lepore (2005), who embrace a version of LCC, 
but think that the domain of expressions that exhibit lexically constrained context 
sensitivity are very few (and thus that relatively few sentence meanings are context 
sensitive). Cappelen and Lepore offer three necessary and sufficient tests of semantic 
context sensitivity. Although Cappellen and Lepore do not directly discuss metaphors, 
Stern considers two of their tests and argues that these support a sentence meaning 
account of metaphorical meanings. The two tests Stern considers are the Inter-Contextual 
Disquotational Indirect Report Blocking (ICDIRB) Test and the Collective Description 
Blocking (CDB) Test. I will consider each of these in turn. 
Stern accurately and concisely defines Cappelen and Lepore‘s notion of an Inter-
Contextual Disquotational Indirect Report as follows: 
Take an utterance u of a sentence S by speaker A in context C. An Inter-Contextual 
Disquotational Indirect Report of u is an utterance u‟ in a context C‘ (where C‘ ≠ C 
[in relevant respects]) of ‗A said that S‘(8). 
According to Cappelen and Lepore, an expression is semantically context sensitive only 
if it blocks Inter-Contextual Disquotational Indirect Reports—where a report is ‗blocked‘ 
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if, though formally accurate, the sentence in the relevantly distinct context expresses 
different semantic content (as revealed, for example, by differences in truth value). Or, as 
Cappelen and Lepore write: 
...if e [an expression, i.e. a word or sentence] is context sensitive and Rupert uses e in 
context C, and Lepore uses it in context C', and the relevant contextual features 
change, then it will be just an accident if their uses of e end up with the same 
semantic value (89).  
 
Take, for example, an utterance of the sentence, ―Jessica went to the mall yesterday.‖ If 
Jenny says truthfully on June 4
th, ―Jessica went to the mall yesterday,‖ and John reports 
this in a relevantly different context (say, two days later), then John‘s formally accurate 
report of Jenny‘s truthful utterance is false. Clearly the locus of this inter-contextual 
disquotational trouble is the expression, ‗yesterday,‘ since, if we substitute an appropriate 
stand in for this expression (‗on the third of June, 2010‘), we find that Inter-Contextual 
Disquotational Indirect Reports accurately report what was said. So, ‗yesterday‘ blocks 
the relevant reports and therefore, according to the ICDIRB test, exhibits semantic 
context sensitivity. 
If one embraces lexicalized constraints on sentence meaning, as Cappelen and Lepore 
do, this is a test one might accept for how to identify particular, sentence meaning 
constitutive, context sensitive expressions. But, according to Stern (2009), at least some 
metaphors arguably pass this test, as he attempts to show by way of an example involving 
Nixon. If in the midst of the Watergate hearings, Tip O‘Neill says, ―Nixon is a fish,‖ in a 
context, ―in which it is commonly presupposed that fish are slippery, slimy, and hard to 
catch‖ (9), then the figurative meaning of Tip‘s expression will be understood as, Nixon 
is hard to catch. But if an Alaskan fisherman, who understands fish to be, ―easy to catch 
with a little patience and bait‖ (10), hears Tip‘s statement and later reports it to a 
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concerned fisher-friend, then, according to Stern, the figurative meaning of the sentence 
is, Nixon is easy to catch with a little patience and bait. But, Stern writes: 
Tip did not say that. Thus expressions interpreted metaphorically also block inter-
contextual disquotational indirect reports because they too shift semantic contents 
between relevantly different contexts of utterance (10). 
 
 We have seen how metaphorical expressions arguably pass one of Cappelen and 
Lepore‘s tests for contextually-sensitive, lexically constrained expressions. Let us turn 
now to a second of their tests: the Collective Description Blocking (CDB) Test. Cappelen 
and Lepore claim that: 
If a verb phrase v is context sensitive, then on the basis of merely knowing that there 
are two contexts of utterance in which ‗A v-s‘ and ‗B v-s‘ are true respectively, we 
cannot automatically infer that there is a context in which ‗v‘ can be used to describe 
what A and B have both done (99). [Cappelen and Lepore point out that parallel 
claims hold for other expressions that are not verb phrases.] 
Accordingly, we can devise a test for context sensitivity. If we know there is a true 
utterance of, ―Ned is a banker,‖ and another true utterance of, ―Ted is a banker,‖ then we 
can automatically infer that there is a context in which ―Ned and Ted are both bankers‖ is 
true. So, ‗is a banker,‘ is not a context sensitive verb phrase. However, if we know there 
is a true utterance of, ―Laura is my sister,‖ and another true utterance of, ―Maura is my 
sister,‖ we cannot automatically infer that there is a context in which there is a true 
utterance of ―Laura and Maura are my sisters.‖ So, ‗is my sister,‘ is a context sensitive 
verb phrase. But, Stern claims, metaphors also pass this test for semantic context 
sensitivity. Suppose I have a fat friend Fred and a slovenly friend Red. Then, even if we 
know there is a true utterance of, ―Fred is a pig,‖ and another true utterance of, ―Red is a 
pig,‖ we cannot clearly automatically infer that there is a true utterance of ―Fred and Red 
are pigs‖.   
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What should we conclude from Stern‘s discussion? First of all, I do not think it is 
entirely clear that metaphorical expressions do pass each of these two tests. It is pretty 
obvious that Stern misapplies Cappelen and Lepore‘s proposed test. Notice, that test is 
supposed to examine whether different, ―uses of e end up with the same semantic value‖ 
(89). Thus, the test focuses on sentence meaning, but Stern uses a difference in speaker 
meaning—writing, ―Tip did not say that‖—to conclude that the metaphorical sentence 
shifts semantic content between the two contexts. So, Stern misapplies the test. For what 
it‘s worth, my intuition is that the Alaskan fisherman‘s use of e does have the same 
semantic value as Tip‘s (though, given his theoretical commitments, I wouldn‘t be 
surprised if Stern‘s ―intuition‖ about the semantics of this expression in the two contexts 
differed). Similarly, it‘s important to note that the relevant base of knowledge on which 
the second test rests is one in which we know, ―that there are two contexts of utterance in 
which ‗A v-s‘ and ‗B v-s‘ [that is, the sentences] are true respectively.‖ But to assume 
that we know that in the case of ―Fred is a pig‖ and ―Red is a pig‖ is to beg the question 
against those who would deny metaphorical sentence meanings! So, I‘m not much 
impressed by Stern‘s discussion of Cappelen and Lepore‘s tests. 
My and Stern‘s clash of intuitions in the Nixon case actually brings up a deeper 
objection to Cappelen and Lepore‘s (as well as Stern‘s) preferred method for adjudicating 
debates over semantic content. According to this method, those of us who are interested 
in issues of sentence meaning can determine what expressions are semantically context 
sensitive by applying certain tests. But, Cappelen and Lepore‘s tests both require us to 
assess semantic differences for expressions between contexts. Thus, Cappelen and 
Lepore‘s tests are circular. They are tests of semantic value that appeal to our 
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understanding of semantic value! It is unsurprising then that interested parties have 
different intuitions about the relevant cases. Stern would intuit that the semantic content 
of Tip‘s sentence shifts between context. I do not. Cappelen and Lepore intuit that ―tall‖ 
fails the CDB test (103), though by my lights it doesn‘t follow that, because, ―Mt. Everest 
is tall,‖ in one context, and, ―Michael Jordan is tall,‖ in another, there has to be a single 
context in which, ―Mt. Everest and Michael Jordan are both tall,‖ is true.58 So, these 
purported tests for semantic context sensitivity are largely irrelevant.  
Now, Stern‘s entire case for his metaphorical sentence meaning view does not rest on 
tests for semantic sensitivity (though it does in large part, see his Metaphors in Context, 
2000, for the most considered case). Camp (2005) offers a more thoroughgoing and very 
compelling discussion of the shortcomings of Stern‘s arguments in favor of his view. But, 
I will not spend more time discussing those arguments here since, even if these fail, that 
could at most show that there is no positive reason to accept the view. What I want to do 
instead is offer two reasons to reject the view, which will first require a very short 
summary of the main feature of the view.  
Stern‘s account of metaphor is equivalent to Kaplan‘s (1978) account of 
demonstratives. It is an LCC account of metaphorical sentence meanings which posits a 
metaphor operator at the level of logical form. When this ‗Mthat‘ operator is attached to 
any ordinary expression Ф it transforms Ф into a context sensitive expression, according 
to the following rule: 
For every context c and for every expression Φ, an occurrence of ‗Mthat [Φ]‘ in a 
sentence S (=…Mthat [Φ]…) in c (directly) expresses a set of properties P 
                                                        
58 And see the work of Chris Kennedy (1999), who actually develops a theory of the semantic, context 
sensitivity of gradable adjectives that appeals to more than just the intuitions of an interested party about a 
single case. 
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presupposed to be m-associated with Φ in c such that the proposition <…P….> is 
either true or false in the circumstance of c (115). 
 
So, the sentence, ―Red is a pig,‖ uttered metaphorically in c, has the logical form, Red is 
Mthat [a pig]. Mthat [a pig] contributes to sentence meaning whatever properties are 
metaphorically associated with it in this context, such as, for instance, is dirty, smelly, 
ungroomed, etc.
59
 So the meaning of, ―Red is a pig,‖ in the relevant context of utterance 
will amount to, Red is dirty, smelly, ungroomed, etc.  
Stern‘s view of metaphorical sentence meaning suffers from at least four problems. 
First, note that other theories which posit hidden context sensitive arguments, such as 
Stanley and Szabo‘s (2000) account of quantifier domain restriction, claim that such 
arguments are present or absent in the logical form for every occurrence of a given 
sentence. Stern‘s view of the Mthat operator differs from these other theories in that the 
operators blink in and out of existence in morphologically equivalent pronouncements 
depending on the context of use. This has three bad consequences for the view. First, as 
Camp (2005) has noticed, it posits two logical forms for each sentence, so it semantically 
extravagant. In fact, since every expression which composes a sentence as well as the 
sentence as a whole can each be given a figurative interpretation, there are multiple 
logical forms associated with a single sentence, which is quite semantically extravagant. 
Second, since the Mthat operator is not univocally associated with a given sentence, or 
even a given part of whatever sentence it happens to be associated with, the presence and 
position in logical form of an Mthat operator will have to be deduced from reflection on 
context. And, since context alone cannot determine whether or not a metaphorical 
                                                        
59 Stern thinks that the conditions for m-association are quite diverse and, unlike Searle (1977), he doesn‘t 
think it is the job of the philosopher of language to give necessary and sufficient conditions for m-
association.  
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interpretation is required irrespective of consideration of the specific sentence at hand, 
reflection on whether or not context designates an Mthat operator will have to be 
determined through some reflection on the sentence. Thus, Stern‘s view would seem to 
necessitate the following sort of interpretive strategy for metaphor: 
1. Partially decode the sentence. 
2. Compare the partially decoded sentence to context to see if the speaker intends a 
metaphorical interpretation (and for what expression). 
 
3. Fully decode the logical form of the sentence (with the Mthat operator in place). 
4. Consult context to specify the semantic contribution of Mthat [Φ] and thus the 
sentence meaning. 
 
But this process is more procedurally extravagant than pragmatic accounts—either those 
which equate metaphorical meaning to implications (since calculation of implications is 
necessary in either case) or to utterance meanings (since those in effect skip the first two 
steps, as we shall see directly). Third, while Stern‘s view does attribute a difference 
between metaphorical and non-metaphorical sentences in context, and could thus explain 
the folk capacity to distinguish different utterances in use, people also consider particular 
sentences figurative or non-figurative independent of an associated context. It is unclear 
how Stern would explain this capacity. Finally, even if Stern‘s view could in principle 
explain the folk capacity to group sentences independently of context, it lacks the 
resources to explain folk applications of the concept ―metaphor‖ to non-linguistic entities, 
such as images. For, clearly, these lack a linguistic form in which to embed a logical 
operator.
60
   
                                                        
60 Of course, this is a defeasable consideration, since a unified linguistic/non-linguistic account of 
figuration may ultimately be untenable. 
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The most well developed account of metaphorical sentence meanings, Stern‘s 
account, which embraces the LCC, suffers from serious problems. Given the previous 
problems with a non-cognitivist account of metaphor understanding and an implication 
account of metaphorical meaning, our only remaining option would seem to be an 
utterance meaning view of figurative language. In the remainder of this section, I will 
discuss such a view. I think this is the most promising view for metaphorical meanings. 
However, it will not ultimately ground the folk notion of figuration.   
3. Utterance Meanings 
Let us step back from the notion of figurative language for a moment: In ordinary 
instances of communication—both figurative and literal—propositional contents are 
intuitively grasped as the meanings of utterances and contribute to the calculation of 
conversational implicatures. Often these intuitive utterance meanings differ from contents 
derivable via composition and linguistically mandated contextual specification of 
pronounced expressions. There are two primary responses to this divergence between 
utterance and pronounced expression meanings. Indexicalists, such as King and Stanley 
(2005), Stanley (2002, 2005), and Stanley and Szabo (2000), contend that utterance 
meanings are compositional from pronounced expressions and unpronounced (or covert) 
variables represented in the logical forms of sentences. According to indexicalists, 
context is relevant to utterance meaning calculation insofar as it is necessary for 
disambiguation and specification of pronounced and covert indexical expressions. But 
Linguistic Contextualists, such as Bezuidenhout (2002, 2006), Carston (2002, 2004), 
Recanati (2004), Sperber (1994), and Sperber and Wilson (1995), deny extensive covert 
structure, instead holding that utterance meanings are partially determined by pragmatic 
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processes that operate on pronounced expressions, but are not linguistically mandated.
61
 
Contextualism allows for simpler syntax and semantics. Assuming the principles and 
processes necessary to calculate utterance meanings are independently necessary for 
implicature calculation, it delivers simplicity without the burden of additional theoretical 
posits. And given our discussion so far contextualist utterance meanings would seem to 
provide the best place to house metaphorical meanings. In this section, I will introduce 
the contextualist account of utterance meanings in general. In the next section, I will 
broaden this to figurative utterance meanings and explain how contextualism suffers from 
the differentiation problem. In the final substantive section, I‘ll discuss some 
contextualist responses to the problem. 
Here are some utterances (constituted by expressions and the contexts in which they 
are spoken), followed by intuitive utterance meanings: 
(1) a. The furniture set? [Uttered in an interrogative tone as a delivery truck drives away]  
 b. WAS THE NEW FURNITURE SET JUST DELIVERED? 
 
(2) a. The noodles are on the table. [Spoken deep in a forest, with only a large stone 
nearby.] 
 b. THE NOODLES ARE ON THE NEARBY, TABLE-LIKE THING. 
 
(3) a. There is a philosopher. [Said at a crowded APA meeting of a deservedly admired   
scholar] 
 b. THERE IS A VERY SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHER. 
 
Contextualists contend (and I will assume) that the best characterization of such intuitive 
utterance meanings is not as sentence meanings or implications. Correspondingly, 
                                                        
61 I call these theorists ―linguistic contextualists‖ (though I will refer to them simply as ―contextualists‖ 
henceforth) to distinguish them from contextualists within epistemology. Linguistic contextualism concerns 
the relation between sentence types, contexts, and intuitive meanings, whereas epistemic contextualism 
constitutes a family of claims concerning the context sensitivity of specific epistemic concepts. Linguistic 
contextualists defend certain claims about linguistic processing and the nature of sentences, about which 
epistemic contextualists are largely silent. See DeRose (1992) for a seminal instance of epistemic 
contextualism.  
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Contextualists deny (and I will stipulatively deny) that derivation of such meanings is 
explained in terms of working out covert indexical expressions or in terms of rational 
implicature calculation.
62
 How then is derivation of these meanings explained according 
to contextualists? What processes of modification and principles for constraining 
utterance interpretation do contextualists propose? 
We can draw various distinctions between 1-3. The processes contextualists posit to 
explain how utterance meanings are derived from expressions and contexts will vary 
across these distinctions. Utterances such as 1 are what Stainton (2004) calls ‗non-
sentential speech‘—cases in which speakers, ―utter things that are, both syntactically and 
semantically, subsentential, but...nevertheless manage to perform genuine speech acts 
(e.g. asserting) in so speaking‖ (284).63 According to a familiar account of speech acts,64 
illocutionary acts, such as asserting or questioning, when felicitous, consist of 
propositional content (constituted by a reference and a predication) and illocutionary 
force. With the propositional content the furniture set [reference] was delivered 
[predication], one might perform a speech act with the illocutionary force of an assertion, 
a question, or so on. But without propositional content, one fails to perform a genuine 
speech act. In the case of non-sentential speech, speakers succeed in performing genuine 
speech acts, though the pronounced expressions are insufficient to determine the 
                                                        
62 Jennifer Saul (2002) argues that, in distinguishing between what is said and what is implicated, Grice 
was concerned with what rational speakers, grasping conventional meanings and operating according to 
certain general principles of cooperative behavior, would interpret sentences and speakers to mean. Such 
rational interpretations, Saul points out, may lack psychological reality. Whether or not such unreal 
interpretations were Grice‘s actual target, they are orthogonal to the interpretations of interest to 
contextualists. Instead, we are here concerned with how utterances are actually interpreted in real instances 
of human communication.  
 
63 Given my technical specification of the notion of sentence in chapter 1, incomplete sentence is more 
appropriate. 
 
64 See Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Bach and Harnish (1979). 
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necessary reference or predication. Contextualists allege that such cases involve the non-
mandated Addition of conceptual material to sub-propositional expression meanings.
65
  
Utterances such as 2 and 3 behave differently. Although such pronounced expressions 
arguably determine a propositional content without modification, the proposition so 
determined differs from the intuitive utterance meaning. Contextualists treat instances 
similar to 2 and 3 as instances involving the non-mandated Adjustment of encoded 
meanings. Concepts are decoded, their extensions are pragmatically adjusted, and the 
adjusted extensions contribute to utterance meanings.
66
 We can further distinguish 
between instances of adjustment like 2 and instances like 3. In 2, we first decode the 
extension of ‗table‘—an extension (let‘s suppose) including all and only pieces of 
furniture consisting of a flat top and some means of support—and then Loosen that 
extension to include non-furniture that can serve salient table functions. In 3, we decode 
the extension of ‗philosopher‘—including all and only those who practice philosophy—
then Tighten that extension to exclude those not highly skilled in such practice. 
Given the powerful resources of addition and adjustment, how do contextualists 
explain why any particular interpretation—that the noodles are on the nearby table-like 
thing, for instance—is arrived at and constitutes the meaning of the utterance, rather than 
some other interpretation in which the relevant concepts are either tighter or looser or the 
                                                        
 
65 Bach (1994) divides what I am calling addition into two distinct processes. Completion, which most 
closely corresponds to what I have described, is the process whereby one transforms a non-propositional 
sentence meaning into a propositional utterance meaning via the addition of further conceptual material. 
Expansion is the process whereby one transforms an inaccurate, though propositional, sentence meaning to 
a more precise utterance meaning through the addition of further conceptual material. I will describe a 
different process for rendering inaccurate sentence meanings precise through the shaping of lexically 
encoded extensions, rather than the addition of conceptual material. There is debate over which process 
best describes what is going on in the case of inaccurate sentence meanings, as there is throughout the 
contextualist literature about what to call the various processes to which theorists appeal. 
 
66 I characterize adjustment of conceptual meaning externalistically, as adjustment of a concepts extension. 
But there is an internalist analogue in terms of adjustment of a concept‘s prototypical features list. 
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pronounced contributions are expanded through the addition of more conceptual 
material?
67
 Contextualists constrain non-mandated processes of modification in two 
different ways. First, they claim these processes are at least logically posterior to the 
deductive process of decoding a pronounced expression. For instance, contextualists 
require that utterance meanings respect the syntax of expressions and that modification 
processes operate only on sub-propositional portions of expression meaning. Second, 
contextualists constrain utterance meanings by reference to the contexts in which 
expressions are uttered. As I will explain, they specifically claim that utterance 
interpretations are contextually constrained relative to general principles of 
communication and to general beliefs about one‘s conversational partners.  
As an example of a general principle that some contextualists contend constrains 
interpretation relative to context, consider Sperber and Wilson‘s (1995) claim that 
―human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance‖ (260). Relevance 
is a property of beliefs—of which utterance meanings are a subset. A belief is relevant to 
the extent that it yields positive cognitive effects—that is, to the extent it strengthens or 
defeats existing beliefs or combines with existing beliefs to yield some new 
implications—and ―to the extent that the effort required to achieve these positive 
cognitive effects is small‖ (266). According to Relevance Theory (RT), communication is 
essentially a variety of cognition, so utterance interpretation and meaningful uttering are 
relevance maximizing.
68
 For a basic example of how such relevance maximization serves 
                                                        
 
67 The constraints on utterance meaning to be proposed should be understood as explaining not only why 
certain propositions are arrived at in an instance of interpretation, but also as specifying which of the 
propositions actually understood as being meant by a speaker is the utterance meaning, as opposed to an 
implicature, presupposition, or other implication of the utterance.   
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to constrain utterance interpretation, consider how a hearer, in the context of a crowded 
session at an APA meeting, interprets 3 above. Such a hearer is disinclined to take the 
pronounced expression at face value, as there is someone who practices philosophy, or to 
loosen the encoded meanings and interpret the utterance as there is someone, because 
either interpretation would derive the speakers utterance of adequate relevance in a 
crowded room of random philosophers.  
Given contextualist principles of communication (such as the maxim of relevance), 
context can also serve to constrain utterance interpretation relative to general beliefs 
about one‘s conversational partners. Communicators will tacitly recognize, for instance, 
that they are similarly situated and constituted. So assessments of their own beliefs‘ 
salience will allow them to make more or less accurate predictions about what beliefs are 
salient from their communicative partners‘ points of view. Speakers can exploit such 
information to produce minimal utterances that convey relevant ideas. Hearers can 
exploit such information to accurately interpret such minimal utterances. In cases such as 
1, in which certain beliefs (a delivery was just made) are particularly salient to a speaker, 
she might minimize effort by pronouncing a non-sentential expression. She can 
reasonably expect that the belief she finds salient is relatively salient to her similarly-
located audience, and that based on the mutually recognized common salience of that 
belief, the highly relevant interpretation she intends (Was the new furniture set just 
delivered?) will be derived rather than some distinct interpretation (Did you sell the old 
furniture set?), to which the pronouncement might otherwise have been expanded. A 
                                                                                                                                                                     
68 Importantly, in any instance of interpretation RT holds that the utterance meaning one settles on is not 
necessarily the most relevant belief. Rather, it is a belief that fairly closely matches a presumption of 
relevance for a given utterance—a presumption conveyed by verbal cues and other aspects of the 
communicative act.  
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presumption of shared-belief is, however, defeasible, and the defeaters of that 
presumption can also inform communication. Even if the hearer in 2 can see what the 
speaker cannot—an actual picnic table, down a trail visible from just this angle—he will 
be likely to interpret the speaker as meaning the noodles are on the nearby table-like 
thing, rather than the noodles are on the actual table, having constrained his presumption 
of shared-belief through a recognition that the belief, there‟s a table further down the 
trail, is available only from his perspective.  
Contextualists posit a model according to which linguistic stimuli—sentences, with 
their correspondent meanings—are unconsciously modified via linguistically mandated 
processes (such as indexical specification) and non-mandated processes (such as addition 
and adjustment) to achieve utterance meanings—the first deliverances of the linguistic 
system consciously available to hearers—which then contribute to the inferential 
calculation of implicatures.
69
 In the next section, I will suggest that these tools for 
deriving and constraining literal utterance meanings also allow for the derivation of 
figurative meanings from intuitively figurative utterances. Thus contextualism identifies 
figurative meanings—in addition to literal meanings—with utterance meanings. But 
given this identification, how are figurative and literal utterances distinct? 
4. Contextualism and the Differentiation Problem: 
Here are some utterances, followed by their intuitive, figurative meanings in the 
suggested contexts:
70
 
                                                        
69 Such a model is not unlike the model of the visual system offered by cognitive scientists. See Recanati 
(2004). 
 
70 As I will argue in this section, contextualists should classify such figurative meanings as utterance 
meanings. 
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(4) a. Businessmen are ogres. [Having just seen a CEO lay off hundreds of workers for 
personal gain]  
 b. BUSINESSMEN ARE CRUEL BEINGS. 
 
(5) a. He is not a tiger. [Said of the crestfallen circus tiger at the end of a rusty chain] 
 b. HE IS NOT ONE EXHIBITING THE STEREOTYPICAL PROPETIES OF 
TIGERHOOD. 
 
Unlike 2 and 3 above, 4 and 5 would ordinarily be classed as figurative utterances—or, 
more commonly (if loosely), as metaphors. Importantly, this is an ordinary classification. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, Philosophers and linguists sometimes refer to any utterance 
involving loose use as a figurative utterance. According to that term-of-art, 2-5 all 
constitute figurative utterances, as would these utterances: ―I‘ve got to catch a cab. My 
plane leaves at five p.m.‖ But we wouldn‘t intuitively classify such utterances as 
figurative utterances. As should be clear now, the criteria the ordinary classification of 
figurative language rests upon is not obvious. Presently, it is important to note only that 
there is such a distinction.
71
  
 Though 4 and 5 are intuitively figurative utterances, like 2 and 3 they are instances in 
which the predication decoded from the pronounced expressions makes for a proposition 
different from that grasped by hearers. So 4 and 5 appear to involve adjustment of 
encoded extensions. Four can be analyzed in terms of loosening. It is plausibly a case in 
which the extension of ‗ogre‘—an extension including all and only mythical, cruel, oafish 
beings (we may suppose)—is decoded, loosened and tightened to include all and only 
cruel beings. Five is plausibly an instance in which hearers decode the extension of 
‗tiger‘—including all and only black-striped, tawny, large cats whose habitat is the Indian 
                                                        
71 Further support for an intuitive distinction different from loose use comes from unpublished experimental 
results by Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols (personal communication), who found that subjects, after being 
given an example of the figurative/literal distinction, rated utterances such as, ―Einstein was an egghead,‖ 
as figuratively true, but utterances such as, ―George W. Bush is President of the United State,‖ as literally 
true. Importantly, the loose utterance, ―The stock market collapsed in the 1920‘s,‖ was also considered 
literally true. 
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jungle—and tighten it to exclude those who are not sufficiently fierce, proud or otherwise 
tiger-like.  
The intuitive meanings of 4 and 5 are derivable via contextualist processes of 
adjustment. What‘s more, these figurative meanings do not appear to outrun the bounds 
of constraint imposed by contextualists. The figurative meanings in 4 and 5 respect 
syntax and involve adjustment of only sub-propositional contributions of the expressions. 
Furthermore, these meanings apparently respect considerations of context. The speaker of 
4 has good reason to suppose the perceptual evidence regarding businessmen which is 
salient to her is salient to her similarly located hearer. Because it is salient, the hearer can 
derive the intended extension without much effort, so relatively effortlessly derive the 
requisitely relevant interpretation. For the average person, a tiger—even a crestfallen 
one—is perceptually salient. So the speaker of 5 can reasonably suppose his hearer has 
noticed the tiger qua tiger. The hearer easily interprets 5 as the suitably relevant, he is not 
a tiger exhibiting the stereotypical properties of tigerhood, while the speaker saves 
himself the effort of saying all that. The contextualist constraints on utterance meaning do 
not then suggest any reason to rule out these figurative meanings as utterance meanings.  
The processes contextualists allege deliver literal utterance meanings, also deliver 
intuitive figurative meanings. Nor are these figurative meanings beyond the bounds of 
constraint delineated by contextualists. Therefore figurative meanings apparently 
assimilate with literal utterance meanings, according to contextualist criteria. But if 
contextualists assimilate figurative and literal utterance meanings, how do they account 
for the ordinary distinction between figurative and literal utterances? This is the 
Differentiation Problem for contextualism.  
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5. Contextualist Responses to the Differentiation Problem 
Tacit (if not explicit) recognition of the differentiation problem is discernable in 
recent contextualist works that take up figurative language. I will discuss some responses 
to the problem suggested in the work of prominent contextualists. 
5.a. Figuration as Multiplicity of Interpretation 
In place of a distinction of kind between figurative and literal utterances, Sperber and 
Wilson (1995) suggest a difference of degree. Recall that the relevance of an 
interpretation is measured in terms of the beliefs it, in combination with other beliefs, 
yields, strengthens, or defeats. Roughly, Sperber and Wilson allege that an utterance is 
figurative insofar as its speaker expects and intends relevance to be achieved through 
effects on numerous beliefs, following from numerous interpretations, perhaps no one of 
which is essential. According to this view, 2 is fully literal, because the beliefs which 
contribute to relevance follow from a single interpretation, the noodles are on the nearby, 
table-like thing, which the speaker strongly anticipates and intends the hearer to grasp. 
But, Flaubert‘s comment on the poet Leconte de Lisle, ―His ink is pale‖ (237), which 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) discuss, achieves relevance because Flaubert weakly expects 
and intends his audience to fix on a great many interpretations and implications of those 
interpretations, no one of which may be necessary. Such thoughts might include, ―that 
there is something weak about his poetry, that his writings will not last, that he does not 
put his whole heart into his work, and so on‖ (237). The variety of and weak intention 
behind these interpretations make for a highly figurative utterance, according to Sperber 
and Wilson‘s graded view of figuration.    
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While Sperber and Wilson are right to emphasize both speakers‘ intentions and that 
more than one proposition is at play in figurative utterances, their graded account is 
untenable. Utterance 4 is intuitively as much a figurative utterance as any other. Yet a 
speaker may intend and anticipate only a single, crucial interpretation of that utterance to 
yield, strengthen, or defeat various other beliefs. If the conversational partners observing 
the CEO lay off hundreds of workers were vigilantes with a standing agreement to rob, 
kill, and redistribute the wealth of anyone either of them deems cruel, then, in saying 
what she says, the speaker might intend only the grim belief, that businessmen are cruel 
beings, to contribute to the many new beliefs she expects her partner to form—beliefs 
such as, if X is a businessman, we will rob X; if X is a businessman, we will kill X; and so 
on. By speaking figuratively, she intentionally rolls out a gruesome plan with a single, 
epistemic contribution. She needs, then, no other interpretation to yield, strengthen and 
defeat other beliefs, in order to achieve relevance. Thus, while Sperber and Wilson‘s 
proposal may draw a vague boundary between two classes of utterances, it is not the 
common boundary between figurative and literal utterances.  
5.b. Figuration as Transparent Departure from the Norm 
François Recanati (2004) acknowledges two versions of the literal/figurative 
distinction. One is the technical distinction I attributed to linguists and philosophers at the 
beginning of section II, according to which any utterance involving loose use is 
figurative. According to Recanati‘s account of the ordinary distinction, figurative 
utterances are those in which utterance interpretation, ―involves a form of deviance or 
departure from the norm; a form...which must be transparent to the language users‖ (81). 
Recanati cashes ‗the norm‘ in terms of frequency. Because he views adjustment of 
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concepts as a ubiquitous aspect of utterance interpretation, adjustment is not sufficient for 
departure from the norm, so not sufficient for figuration.
72
 However, Recanati claims that 
inference from utterance meaning to conversational implicature does involve departure 
from the norm, since it ―takes place only when the speaker conveys something indirectly‖ 
(71), which is not always the case. According to Recanati, such inferences constitute 
genuine implicatures only insofar as a hearer recognizes the primary meaning of the 
utterance and that the implicature follows from it. Therefore, according to Recanati‘s 
taxonomy, genuine implicatures are by definition transparent to language users, so they 
are figurative utterances. But cases involving two-stage processes of interpretation are not 
the only figurative utterances. Though adjustment in general is ubiquitous, Recanati holds 
that particular adjustments are significant enough to constitute departures from the norm 
of interpretation and to be transparent to language users.
73
 In such cases, utterances 
involving only a single stage of interpretation are figurative. 
Recanati‘s account of figuration as transparent departure from the norm faces at least 
two problems. In the first place, many implicature-conveying utterances are not 
intuitively figurative utterances. If, in response to the question of whether the furniture 
set was delivered, one says, ―The bedside table arrived,‖ meaning to implicate that, of the 
furniture set, only the bedside table was delivered, one does not, according to the 
ordinary conception, speak figuratively. This is the case even if the hearer recognizes the 
speaker‘s intent, his primary meaning, and that the implicature follows from it—so, even 
if the departure is transparent to the hearer. In the second place, Recanati‘s explanation is 
under-described. Specifically, what makes an adjustment significant enough to be noticed 
                                                        
72 As I have likewise argued above that adjustment is not sufficient for figuration.  
73 In fact, Recanati characterizes such adjustment as ‗sense extension,‘ not loosening of a concept‘s 
reference class. But this is just the internalist analogue of the externalist idea I have presented in the paper.  
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by language users? Adjustments are purportedly significant insofar as they, ―generate a 
feeling of discrepancy‖ (77), between the encoded meaning and the adjusted, person-
level meaning. But it hardly clarifies matters to say that departures are significant enough 
to be noticed by language users insofar as they are felt by language users. What‘s more, 
the criterion seems to have the consequence that as one becomes more aware of the 
discrepancy between the ordinary use of terms and their purported lexical meanings (as 
one‘s training as a philosopher increases, for instance) the ordinary account of figurative 
language will be subsumed by the technical one. But this is not the case. A philosopher 
can still recognize that an utterance is not figurative in the ordinary sense of the term, 
even if the inexact use of language it involves irks her. One might try to defend the 
proposal by saying an adjustment is significant if it is from a relatively small extension to 
a relatively large one (or vice versa, in the case of tightening). But if I figuratively utter, 
―Barack Obama is a dictator,‖ it‘s not at all obvious that the extension of ‗dictator‘ gets 
loosened more than that of ‗table‘ in 2 above. It seems unlikely that Recanati could 
identify a level of adjustment that would serve to distinguish figurative and literal 
utterances as people ordinarily do. Until such a proposal is put forward, we should 
discard Recanati‘s account. 
5.c. Figurative Eliminativism  
Some contextualists have responded to the assimilation of figurative and literal 
utterance meanings by denying any significant distinction between figurative and literal 
utterances whatsoever. Wilson and Carston (2006), for instance, write that the derivation 
of even the very ad hoc concepts required in understanding certain metaphors involves, 
―no special interpretive mechanisms not required for the interpretation of ordinary, literal 
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utterances‖ (abstract). Sperber and Wilson (2006) have also pushed us to take their 
eliminativism about metaphorical meaning as an eliminativism about metaphor broadly:  
In our view, metaphorical interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as 
these other interpretations. There is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no 
interesting generalisation that applies only to them. In other terms, linguistic 
metaphors are not a natural kind, and ―metaphor‖ is not a theoretically important 
notion in the study of verbal communication (2). 
 
 ―Relevance Theory‘s account of metaphor,‖ they assert, ―is on the lean side, and is 
bound to disappoint those who feel that verbal metaphor deserves a full-fledged theory of 
its own‖ (2). In fact, contextualist accounts—such as Relevance Theory‘s account—of 
metaphorical interpretations are not bound to disappoint those of us who long for the 
full-fledged theory, though such broad pronouncements about the end of metaphor are 
certainly unwarranted. Relevance Theory, like other varieties of contextualism, is 
concerned primarily with the propositional contents asserted in instances of metaphorical 
speech and grasped in instances of metaphorical understanding. Even if it is right (as I 
tend to think it is broadly right) to identify such propositional contents with those 
expressed by literal utterances, we cannot generalize from the fact that metaphorical 
meanings are not a natural kind to the conclusion that metaphors are not a natural kind. 
There is much more to metaphor, as we shall see in the next two chapters, than the 
propositional contents we assert in speaking metaphorically.    
I disagree with those who, in the face of the differentiation problem, think we should 
give up on the ordinary notion of metaphor, with its attendant distinction between 
figurative and literal language. I think this would be a mistake. I agree with David Hills 
(1997) that: 
Whatever its theoretical origins, ‗metaphor‘ has long been a term of ordinary 
language, one of the words we live with and live by…a member in good standing of 
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the ‗common stock of words‘ articulate people use to mark distinctions of recurrent 
practical importance, whatever their individual interests and concerns (135). 
 
And with Austin (1979), who Hills also quotes favorably:  
If a distinction works well enough for practical purposes, in ordinary life (no mean 
feat, since ordinary life is full of hard cases), then there is sure to be something in it, it 
will not mark nothing…Ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can 
everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it 
is the first word (185). 
Eliminativism of a purported folk distinction—such as that between figurative and 
literal utterances—can be warranted. We may come to realize, for example, that what we 
took as a cultural universal was really just an inculcated term-of-art. That seems unlikely 
in the case of figurative language since, as discussed in chapter 1, there is empirical 
support for the universality of such a folk distinction. Alternatively, even if people do 
quite generally draw a distinction between two classes of things, we may argue for 
elimination. Once we clarify the basis of the distinction it may become clear that the 
distinction is irrelevant (or at least irrelevant to a particular theory). Suppose it was 
discovered that a distinction people were apt to draw between two races was based on 
nothing more than recognizable differences in skin pigment. In that case, it could make 
sense to judge the distinction between those races irrelevant and to, so far as possible, try 
to limit its use. But if we do not know what allows us to draw a distinction, then (barring 
other evidence) we do not know whether the distinction is relevant to closely related 
theories, or useful in general. I have argued that existing contextualist explanations of the 
folk distinction between literal and figurative utterances fail. But if contextualist 
explanations of the distinction fail while contextualism is generally correct, then (barring 
other evidence) we are in no position to know whether the distinction is irrelevant.  
6. Conclusion 
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In this chapter we considered two final views which try to locate the distinction 
between metaphorical and figurative language in different sorts of meaning. The sentence 
meaning view suffered from many problems independent of its failure to locate a distinct 
kind of figurative meaning. Whereas the contextualist utterance meaning view of 
figurative meanings, while a promising account, failed to adequately distinguish the two 
kinds of utterances. In the next chapter I offer an account that largely captures the 
intuitive distinction between figurative and literal utterances and is available to 
contextualists. The advent of such an account will put us in a better position to ascertain 
the relevance of the ordinary distinction. If the account I develop largely respects our 
intuitive convictions, explains where and why we have contradictory convictions, and at 
the same time defines an important role for figurative language, we may decide that we 
have not yet heard the last word on the first word—the word of ordinary language—on 
figurative language.  
 
  
 
Chapter 6: 
The Perlocutionary View of Figurative Language 
Sally and Sid have worked together for a while, and Sally knows Sid to be a hard 
worker. She might make this point about him by asserting, ―Sid is a hard worker.‖ Or, she 
might make it by asserting, ―Sid is a Sherman tank.‖ We all recognize that there is some 
distinction between the first assertion, in which Sally is speaking literally, and the second, 
in which she is speaking figuratively. But philosophers have seldom directly addressed 
this distinction. Those who have discussed metaphors have been mostly concerned to 
explain the nature of purported metaphorical meanings. Perhaps they suppose that, by 
appealing to a special kind of meaning metaphors allegedly express, we can in time 
explain the difference between speaking literally and speaking metaphorically. The 
discussion of the last four chapters renders such a supposition untenable. In those 
chapters, I argued by process of elimination in favor of contextualist views of figurative 
utterance meanings. But, while some contextualist views try to preserve a limited notion 
of figurative language, the tendency to equate what‘s distinctive about metaphor with a 
distinct kind of meaning has led many contextualists to abandon a robust notion of 
figurative language in light of their recognition that there is no stable distinction between 
the meanings of metaphors and the meanings of other, literal utterances. I think the move 
to abandon a robust notion is premature.  
In this chapter I argue that the fundamental distinction between the figurative and the 
literal rests in a speaker‘s uses of these utterances. By saying, "Sid is a Sherman tank," 
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Sally might mean to convey, for example, that Sid is one who cannot be deterred from 
achieving his goals. She might also mean to amuse her audience with the thought that Sid 
is an armored assault vehicle. In rough approximation of the account I will offer, if she 
means to do both of those things, Sally speaks metaphorically.  
1. A Partial Catalogue of the Uses of Language 
Attempting to explain metaphorical meaning is not the best way to explain the 
ordinary distinction between figurative and literal utterances. We should altogether 
abandon the idea that an utterance is figurative only insofar as it has a special kind of 
content. I will offer an account of metaphors which employs simply truth-conditional 
contents in general. I allege that we can discover what differentiates metaphors from 
literal utterances by asking: What are a speaker‘s distinctive aims in speaking 
metaphorically? Since this approach to constructing a theory of figurative language 
requires that we draw distinctions between the acts we perform in and by speaking, 
before I address that question directly, I will offer a partial catalogue of speech acts in 
this section. 
In speaking one utters a sentence (or at least some words) with a particular 
linguistically mandated meaning.
74
 In so far as those sentences contain indexical 
expressions, one utters words that must be saturated through context by hearers. In so far 
as they contain ambiguous expressions, one utters words that require contextual 
disambiguation. Thus, there are linguistically mandated pragmatic processes which 
specify sentence meaning. But even taking disambiguation and saturation into account, 
contextualists contend that speakers often mean something more or different than what 
the sentences they speak mean (where such additional meanings are not equivalent to 
                                                        
74 Or so I am assuming here, but see Recanati (2004) chapter 9 for a different proposal I also find attractive. 
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implications). Contextualists allege that hearers use the non-mandated primary pragmatic 
processes of addition and adjustment to arrive at these non-implicative speaker meanings. 
Disambiguated and saturated sentence meanings are subjected to the primary pragmatic 
processes of addition and adjustment to deliver primary propositions, the propositions 
hearers grasp as the meanings of utterances, which contribute to implicature calculation. 
When communication is successful (as most of the following examples will assume) 
these will be the same propositions intended by speakers. In such cases, we can refer 
unambiguously to what I have been calling utterance meanings.
75
  
Aside from speaking a sentence or expressing an utterance meaning, a speaker might 
perform other acts in and by speaking. A speaker can cause effects in or occasion 
reactions from her audience and a speaker can perform still other actions which are not eo 
ipso acts of producing such effects (though they might be tightly connected with them). 
We can distinguish these further actions by considering an example of communication. 
Suppose Bob has just informed his dramatic teenage daughter, Tammy, that she cannot 
borrow the car on Saturday. Then Tammy says to Bob, ―I hope you die.‖ In so speaking, 
Tammy utters a sentence with a particular content, that she hopes her father dies; and 
Tammy intends to express the more specific utterance meaning, that she hopes her father 
dies very soon. But Tammy may also intend to assert that she hopes her father dies very 
soon, which is an act distinct from the mere act of expressing that content. Tammy would 
                                                        
75 Relevance theorists, such as Carston (2004) and Sperber and Wilson (1995), refer to what I have been 
calling an utterance meaning as an Explicature. Bach (1994), on the other hand, calls it an Impliciture. And 
Recanati (2004) refers to it simply as ―what is said,‖ which can include implications in the traditional sense 
but also meanings derived via primary pragmatic processes. In any case, since a speaker may often mean 
something different than what a hearer interprets the speaker to mean, it would be more accurate to refer to 
hearer‘s meaning and speaker‘s meaning than utterance meaning. Up to now, I have ignored such 
complications in this dissertation and spoken only of an idealized utterance meaning. I will reflect on the 
distinction between speaker and hearer assessments of utterance meaning later. (See McFarlane 2005 for a 
related distinction between a context of use and a context of assessment.) 
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have expressed the same proposition in conjecturing that she hopes her father dies very 
soon, though in that case she may not have asserted it (at least, according to Searle‘s, 
1969, theory of speech acts she could have). Now Tammy‘s act of asserting is eo ipso not 
an act of affecting anyone. She could have asserted the same proposition had no one been 
present and had she herself already been in whatever state such an assertion might 
normally be supposed to effect. But in addition to such non-effect-producing acts, there 
are also acts of affecting one‘s audience. For example, Tammy not only means to convey 
her belief that she hopes her father dies very soon, we may suppose that she also intends 
her utterance to cause Bob to believe that she believes that she hopes he dies very soon. 
And Tammy certainly intends to hurt Bob by saying what she says. I will borrow 
Austin‘s (1962) terminology and call the first kind of speech act (in this case, the act of 
asserting) an illocutionary act, and the second kind of act (here acts of causing to believe 
and of hurting) a perlocutionary act. If Tammy produces her intended effects, she will 
have successfully performed two Perlocutionary Acts—the act of making Bob believe 
that she believes the proposition she conveys and the act of hurting Bob by saying what 
she says. 
We can draw certain distinctions between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. 
Primarily, these focus on a speaker‘s characteristic aims in performing each kind of act. 
The aim of a perlocutionary act, Austin (1962) writes, is to effect certain extra-linguistic, 
psychological (or behavioral) responses on the part of a hearer:  
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects 
upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other 
persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them; 
and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has performed…[a 
perlocutionary]…act (101). 
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To be hurt is to have an emotional response. So, in the case of performing the 
perlocutionary act of hurting, a speaker aims to affect her hearer‘s feelings. To come to 
believe is to have a psychological, non-emotional response. So in causing her speaker to 
believe, a speaker aims to effect a specific psychological, but non-emotional response in 
her hearer. Though perlocutionary and illocutionary acts are tightly related and generally 
concomitant, on at least the present characterization one performs an illocutionary act 
only if one‘s aim in so acting is not to affect the feelings, thoughts, or actions of persons.  
But aside from simply not being acts of producing effects in or responses from ones 
audience, are there positive characteristics of illocutions? According to Searle (1969), 
Bach and Harnish (1979), and Bach (2003), most illocutionary acts express psychological 
attitudes and can be distinguished from one another according to the attitudes they 
express. An act of assertion expresses a psychological attitude of belief; an act of apology 
expresses an attitude of regret; an act of asking expresses a desire to know something; 
etc.
76
 The aim of a felicitous act of asserting, for example, is to state something one 
believes true, not to cause others to draw inferences from that which is stated as true—
though a hearer is certainly justified in drawing inferences from what is asserted, and a 
speaker may well intend that she does (and thereby perform certain additional 
perlocutionary acts in speaking). Perlocutionary and illocutionary acts are both distinct 
from Austin's (1962) locutionary acts, in which one simply aims to make a sound, utter a 
                                                        
76 Austin attempted to differentiate illocutionary acts according to purported conventions to which they 
conform. Strawson (1964) offered a powerful, early criticism of that view. But Bach and Harnish (1979) 
irenically contend that two classes of illocutionary acts exist, one set distinguishable according to speaker 
attitudes and the other—conventional illocutionary acts—according to social conventions. The latter, they 
claim, were the model for Austin‘s original theory. 
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word or sentence, or, I would add, express a proposition.
77
 Clearly, we must slice actions 
quite finely. 
Previously, I mentioned the illocutionary act of expressing something one believes 
true. This alludes to the fact that illocutionary, but not perlocutionary, acts sometimes 
require endorsement of propositional contents for their felicitous performance. In making 
this claim, I mean to be following Searle (1969), who noted that there are certain 
sincerity conditions on the felicitous performance of many illocutions. Non-defective 
assertion requires belief. One non-defectively requests only if one actually wants the 
requested satisfaction conditions fulfilled. But Searle also noted that certain illocutions, 
such as greeting, appear to have no sincerity conditions. The situation with locutions and 
perlocutions is quite different than with illocutions. I may non-defectively utter a 
sentence and express a proposition without endorsing the content, as I do when I lie.  In 
that case, the infelicity has to do with the illocutionary act of asserting, not the 
concomitant acts of uttering and expressing. Nor is an act of insulting—qua act of 
insulting—defective for being untrue. No locutionary nor perlocutionary act is 
infelicitous in virtue of my failure to endorse some proposition. Some illocutionary acts 
are infelicitous precisely in virtue of some such failure on my part. Thus, if a speech act 
requires endorsement of an expressed proposition for felicitous performance, it is an 
illocution.
78
 Besides asserting, illocutions include acts of asking, denying, warning, 
                                                        
 
77 Or, if we follow Searle (1968) in rejecting the distinction between locutions and illocutions, we might, 
with Searle (1969), distinguish illocutions and perlocutions from propositional acts—acts of referring and 
predicating. 
78 Teaching may be thought to present a counter-example to this claim, since teaching is a speech act aimed 
at affecting hearer‘sxxxx psychologically, but also arguably one felicitously performed only if the teacher 
endorses the propositions she intends to teach. I prefer to treat teaching as a hybrid speech act. The 
psychological effect sought in teaching is getting someone to believe, and one need not endorse a 
135 
 
promising, advising, sentencing, and many more. Hurting, frightening, surprising, 
amusing, insulting, convincing, inspiring, inciting and many others are perlocutionary 
acts.
79
 
Let us return finally to the example of Tammy and Bob. Notice that Tammy‘s 
utterance could have hurt Bob in any of several different ways. If Bob was gullible 
enough to believe everything that came out of his teenage daughter‘s mouth, then he 
might have believed that she believes that she hopes he dies very soon, which would have 
caused him pain. More likely is a situation in which Bob recognizes the intended 
illocutionary force behind Tammy‘s assertion, does not assent to it, but is still hurt by it. 
In that case, the recognition that Tammy is attempting to convey an attitude of belief 
toward the proposition that she hopes her father dies very soon (an attitude she actually 
lacks, thus rendering her assertion infelicitous) would be the vehicle effecting Bob‘s pain. 
(One can imagine Bob‘s post-hoc justification of such a reaction: ―If she really wants me 
to think that she hopes I‘ll soon die, her concern for my feelings must be very 
insignificant indeed!‖) Bob could have been hurt by the illocutionary force of Tammy‘s 
utterance—either because he accepts that it expresses a certain psychological attitude or 
merely recognizes the psychological attitude it attempts to express—but, as I will explain, 
Bob might also have been hurt by the mere recognition of the propositional content of 
Tammy‘s utterance. To see that propositional content apart from associated illocutionary 
force can affect one‘s audience, consider a situation in which Tammy had not asserted 
                                                                                                                                                                     
proposition to felicitously make someone believe it. It‘s just that, in the case of felicitous teaching, one gets 
others to believe what one believes true.  
79 Austin stresses that there may be speech acts for which we do not have verbs, and that certain verbs may 
serve double duty, naming an illocution or a perlocution depending on context. Some of the illocutionary 
acts I have isolated here may also have perlocutionary senses, or vice versa. Nonetheless, it seems to me 
that there exists a sense of each that names an act of the type I have suggested. But nothing much hangs on 
this particular list of acts. 
136 
 
but merely joked that she hopes her father dies very soon. Perhaps she joshingly remarks, 
―I wish you would kick the bucket, so I could just have the car.‖ What Tammy said may 
still have hurt her father, though she would not then have actually expressed or intended 
to convey a belief that she hopes her father dies very soon. Bob‘s reaction would not then 
have been due to a recognition of Tammy‘s expressed attitude, nor, assuming Bob‘s not 
very paranoid, would it be reasonable to attribute the reaction to Bob‘s coming to believe 
his daughter actually holds such a belief on the basis of her willingness to make such a 
joke. It is most reasonable to suppose that Bob is hurt by the bare propositional content 
of Tammy‘s utterance. The very ideas expressed by a speaker can affect us, independent 
of any illocutionary force with which the speaker‘s utterance is imbued. Moreover, a 
speaker can intend to achieve such perlocutionary effects through a hearer‘s recognition 
of an utterance meaning. Cutting jokes can be examples of this phenomenon, but so, I 
believe, are figurative utterances. 
2. The Distinctive Aims of Figurative Communication 
Having toured part of the territory of speech act theory, let us return to our central 
question: What are the typical aims of speaker‘s in speaking metaphorically? Several 
stand out. To begin with, note that in numerous, clear and central instances of 
metaphorical speech, speakers aim to make claims or assertions (or requests, or 
commands, or to ask questions, as the case may be). In such cases, the asserted 
propositions (or the propositions which convey one‘s request, etc.) are at least apparently 
endorsed by speakers. In the case of assertions, one endorses (or appears to endorse) the 
truth of a proposition conveyed by an utterance. In the case of requests, one actually 
requests (or appears to request) that certain satisfaction conditions be met. These are, 
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then, clearly illocutionary acts.  Speakers intend these illocuted propositional contents to 
directly contribute to the calculation of other supposedly true (or otherwise endorsed) 
propositions on the part of hearers—and they generally do. (Note that therefore, these 
illocuted contents are the proper targets of relevance judgments, in the technical sense of 
the last chapter, so are constrained by this and related contextualist processes of 
interpretation constraint.) But, obviously, metaphorical utterances do not differ from 
literal utterances in respect to their capacity to be used to make assertions, issue requests, 
or perform other illocutionary acts. I may literally declare, ―The cat is on the mat,‖ or 
request that you, ―Close the window.‖ So to intend to make an assertion, a request, or 
perform other illocutionary acts, is not to have an aim distinctive of speaking figuratively.  
Alternatively, one might point out that in many of these same clear and central 
instances, a speaker‘s aims in speaking figuratively include those of producing certain 
psychological effects in her audience, so performing perlocutionary acts. Salient 
instances of metaphorical language—such as the great bulk of those appearing in creative 
writing—are clearly intended to occasion effects of amusement, anger, sadness, or 
aesthetic effects in general. As shorthand, I will refer to such perlocutionary effects 
(which are central to the view of figurative language to follow) as ways of striking one‘s 
audience. Such effects are not positive cognitive effects in the RT sense, as they do not 
generally and are not intended to contribute very directly to the calculation of beliefs. But 
notice: such psychological effects do sometimes relate to other truth-evaluable (though 
not actually believed) contents. We can pretend the very ideas which strike us were 
endorsed assumptions and draw out the would-be implications; this is part of what poets 
do when they extend metaphors. But that speakers aim to produce psychological effects 
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in hearers by speaking metaphorically is insufficient to distinguish metaphors from literal 
utterances. I may attempt to elicit anger by conveying that the election was unfair by 
means of a literal utterance. So, literal utterances too are intended to produce the relevant 
psychological effects. 
In the case of both metaphorical and literal utterances, speakers intend to make 
assertions and to affect their hearers psychologically, that is, they intend to perform 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. But we can begin to see what a speaker‘s 
distinctive aims in speaking metaphorically are if we consider how speakers achieve these 
aims in the case of figurative as opposed to literal utterances. Suppose I utter, ―The 
election was unfair,‖ and, in addition to endorsing what I believe true, I also want to 
make you angry. For many such literal utterances, it will be the case that what I mean to 
endorse is the same propositional interpretation with which I mean to strike you—in this 
case, that the election was unfair. Furthermore, my endorsement matters to whether or 
not my intended, psychological effects are brought off. If you are made angry at the 
assertion that the election was unfair, you are made angry because you believe this claim 
to be true, and you believe it to be true on the basis of my successful illocution of my 
belief in the target proposition. My purported endorsement of this claim—together with 
other background assumptions, including assumptions about my trustworthiness and 
accuracy as an informant—plays a crucial role in your acceptance of its truth. But in 
speaking figuratively, a speaker also intends to endorse a particular propositional 
interpretation with which she means to strike her audience. For example, by saying, "Sid 
is a Sherman tank," Sally might mean to assert and for her audience to grasp the idea that 
Sid is something that cannot be deterred from achieving its goals. But what distinguishes 
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metaphors from literal utterances is that, in the case of a metaphor, a speaker also means 
to affect her audience with a particular, intended, and distinct propositional interpretation 
of her utterance which she does not generally also mean to endorse. For instance, Sally 
might also intentionally amuse her audience with the idea that Sid is an armored assault 
vehicle, though she does not mean to endorse this idea. According to the view I will put 
forward, figurative utterances are not distinctive because they have a distinct kind of 
meaning, rather they are distinctive because speakers, in uttering these, attempt to 
achieve their ends in a distinctive way—one involving two different propositional 
interpretations of their utterance, each of which they (in a loose sense) convey by uttering 
what they utter in the context in which they utter it. 
Both of the propositions a metaphor speaker intends are interpretations, it is important 
to note, not, for example, implicatures, of the speaker‘s utterance. These are dual 
utterance meanings. As I have previously alluded to, and will explain later, one of these 
interpretations does not fit the technical notion of relevance we have previously 
discussed, so is not constrained by at least some of the more prominent contextualist 
methods of utterance constraint. But by expanding the notion of relevance in fairly 
intuitive and independently motivated ways both can be seen as constrained by 
contextualist principles, so as contextualist interpretations of the speaker‘s utterance. 
Moreover, at least one of the interpretations of any metaphorical utterance will be arrived 
at on the part of the audience by loosening or tightening lexically encoded concepts. In 
the case of Sally‘s utterance of, ―Sid is a Sherman tank,‖ the concept of a Sherman tank is 
loosened to achieve at least one of the two relevant interpretations. Because we think of 
tanks in general as unstoppable, if Sally speaks truly and her audience knows something 
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of Sid, the ad hoc concept of something that cannot be deterred from achieving its goals, 
will quickly and unconsciously be arrived at, and will contribute to the propositional 
interpretation which Sally is understood to assert. Additionally, her audience may reach 
the striking idea that Sid is an armored assault vehicle by loosening the lexical concept 
associated with ‗Sherman tank‘ in different ways to generate the more generic concept. 
Of course, since most people have a fairly weak and non-specific conception of a 
Sherman tank, thinking of Sid as kind of assault vehicle may be the default interpretation 
for the sentence. So, in this case, only the illocuting content may require the intervention 
of primary pragmatic processes. (I will offer another case momentarily that is a clearer 
example of dual divergence from encoded meaning.) 
We are now in a position to explicitly formulate the folk conception of figurative 
language. Although this view will come in for some modification in the next section, it 
captures the majority of metaphors as I will presently state it. According to what I will 
call the Perlocutionary View (PV), in speaking metaphorically one aims to perform 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts by means of a particular, intended truth-conditional 
interpretation of one‘s utterance, while intending to perform a perlocutionary (but no 
illocutionary) act by means of a particular, intended, and distinct truth-conditional 
interpretation of the same utterance. In the case of literal utterances, insofar as one aims 
to perform both illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, the truth-conditional interpretation 
with which one performs illocutionary acts is the same as that with which one performs 
perlocutionary acts. People ordinarily class utterances as figurative or literal in virtue of 
their (sometimes mistaken) apprehension of one or the other pattern of a speaker‘s 
intentions. 
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In assessing whether a particular utterance is figurative according to the current view, 
we will have to ask ourselves if, in uttering it, the speaker meant to express two 
contents—one used to perform illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, the other to perform 
only perlocutionary ones. To determine this, we must attend to the differences between 
illocutions and perlocutions. Though we are very good intuitive psychologists—so very 
good at reading the intentions of our conspecifics—we lack an infallible window into 
others‘ minds. Therefore, the fact that some illocutions may, like all perlocutions, lack 
sincerity conditions, will be particularly important to bear in mind when assessing an 
utterance. To determine if a given propositional interpretation of a speaker‘s utterance 
was used to perform only perlocutionary acts, we can ask ourselves: With that content 
does the speaker aim to achieve some effect that can be understood apart from any hearer 
whatsoever? Though I can utter something amusing without an audience, I can never 
amuse without the benefit of one. On the other hand, I can assert, promise, accuse, advise 
or so on without any audience.
80
  
To recall some examples from the last chapter (five), when you assert and convey to 
me that businessmen are cruel beings, by saying, ―Businessmen are ogres,‖ I may be 
amused at the idea that businessmen are mythical oafs. According to PV, if you 
intentionally assert and convey to me the one proposition while amusing me with but not 
asserting (or illocuting in some other way) the other proposition, in uttering, 
―Businessmen are ogres,‖ you utter a metaphor. The hiker, on the other hand, speaks 
literally when he says, ―Look on the table,‖ because he means to make a suggestion and 
                                                        
80 I do not mean that the establishment of the conventions required for promising (etc.) does not require 
interactions between speakers and audiences. Even so qualified, in the case of certain illocutions, such as 
advising or warning, the claim may seem incorrect. But consider an absent minded hearer, coming to attend 
to the words you have just spoken. He might sensibly ask, ―Were you warning me?‖ It would be awkward, 
to say the least, for the hearer to ask, ―Were you frightening me?‖ I take it, then, that we can warn (though 
not frighten) even absent an audience.  
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to influence his fellow‘s behavior by means of the single content, look on something 
table-like, while not perlocuting by means of some other, non-illocuted interpretation of 
his utterance.  
We can perform lots of illocutionary acts; and we sometimes perform these in making 
a metaphor. One can produce a metaphorical question. John Donne might have done this 
had he asked (instead of stated) ―Is any man an island?‖ An island is a thing that exists in 
isolation and in a wide range of contexts the concept would be loosened to include all 
things that exist in isolation. The endorsed question would be is any man among the 
things capable of existing apart from others of its kind? While entertaining the utterance, 
we may be struck by a distinct question: Is any man an insignificant land mass 
completely surrounded by water? If in uttering the sentence, Donne had meant both to 
ask and cause us to wonder about the first content but to only strike us with the second, 
he would have uttered a metaphor. A judge may pass sentence figuratively. Saying, 
―Your ass will fry,‖ the interpretation related to the sentencing, which no doubt saddens 
the hearer, is you will be put to death. But with the unendorsed interpretation, you will be 
cooked in oil, she aims to effect a further emotional toll.  
In the previous examples the interpretations to which speakers‘ illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts relate were generated by loosening the concepts constitutive of an 
encoded logical form. But this is not essential. Less often the interpretations involved are 
reached by a process of tightening. Consider, a metaphorical utterance of, ―He‘s no 
tiger,‖ said of the crestfallen circus tiger at the end of a rusty chain. A concept conveyed 
in the logical form of this utterance, that of a particular kind of great cat, is restricted to 
generate what the speaker claims. She is claiming, that particular tiger is not fierce, 
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proud, or otherwise tiger-like. But the proposition which the speaker does not endorse, 
but uses to affect a subtle reaction of perplexed surprise, is that particular tiger is not a 
tiger.  
Finally, in each of the above cases, the perlocuting content is so closely related to the 
expressed sentence, that it is arguably the sentence‘s meaning.81 But there are cases of 
figurative utterance in which neither the perlocuting nor the illocuting and perlocuting 
content is arguably the sentence‘s meaning. Suppose Carl owns a department store and, 
after considering several potential suppliers, decides to contract with a mannequin 
wholesaler who looks something like Vincent Price. Carl‘s wife might say to a friend 
who knows of the situation, ―Carl gave his business to Vincent Price‘s House of Wax.‖ If 
Carl‘s wife means thereby to assert and inform the friend that Carl contracted with such-
and-such particular wholesaler, but to amuse the friend with the idea that Carl 
contracted with the House of Wax owner Vincent Price portrayed in the movie, then 
according to PV Carl‘s wife speaks figuratively. But in that case, neither interpretation is 
arguably the meaning of the spoken sentence, for both involve adjustment of the 
compositional meanings of ―gave his business to‖ and ―Vincent Price‘s House of Wax‖.  
PV solves the differentiation problem, not by positing a distinctive kind of 
metaphorical meaning, but rather by identifying a distinctive way in which speakers 
perform the actions they perform in speaking metaphorically. Although it solves that 
                                                        
81 When a proposition expressed by an utterance is distinct from the pronounced sentence‘s meaning, then, 
if the sentence itself determines a propositional content, the speaker expresses two propositional contents. 
But according to standard contextualism, hearers are only conscious of utterance meaning (and its 
antecedent implications), so (setting aside cases of miscommunication, experts, etc.) they are only 
conscious of sentence meaning in so far as it is meant by a speaker. I want to depart from the standard view 
and suggest that, in the case of some figurative utterances, it may be that speakers can express saturated and 
disambiguated sentence meanings as well as distinct propositional content derived via addition and 
adjustment of such sentence meaning. In any case, my proposal commits me to the idea that speakers 
sometimes intentionally convey two propositional contents by means of a single utterance (though I believe 
they generally only endorse one of these).  
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problem, it may be thought to have problems of its own. In the next section, I will discuss 
certain cases that may be thought to constitute counter-examples to the view. In fact, one 
of these does constitute a genuine counter-example to the view as previously stated, and 
will occasion revisions. I will also explain how the current view allows for the possibility 
of distinguishing different figurative tropes. With PV as an account of figurative 
language generally, we can distinguish various figurative tropes—in so far as we can 
distinguish figurative tropes at all—using various resources from rhetoric theory and 
psychology, some of which I will discuss. In the final sections of this chapter, I will offer 
some resources for explaining cases in which intuitions diverge as to whether or not a 
particular utterance is figurative, discuss how my theory of figurative use can 
accommodate folk tendencies to identify certain figurative sentences independent of 
context, and more.  
3. Some Potential Problems for the Perlocutionary View 
Many potential counter-examples to PV fit into two important types: There are 
utterances we would intuitively class as literal which may appear to be classed as 
figurative utterances according to PV, and there are utterances intuitively striking us as 
figurative utterances which PV may be thought to leave out.  
In fact, I think that careful consideration will reveal that the clearly literal utterances 
thought to be classed as metaphors according to PV are generally correctly classed after 
all. Consider Fred Thompson‘s utterance at the 2008 RNC concerning the governor of 
Alaska, ―She can field dress a moose.‖ Here Thompson means to assert and to inform his 
audience that Sarah Palin can gut a moose. His audience may infer, from their 
knowledge of the relative similarity of moose and human anatomy, that Palin could gut 
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Joe Biden. In context, this inference may call to mind the idea, that Palin will gut Joe 
Biden, and Thompson may intend to amuse his audience with this idea, though he does 
not endorse it. Here Thompson intends to illocute and perlocute by means of one 
proposition while perlocuting but not illocuting by means of another. Does he not then 
speak metaphorically according to PV? Thompson speaks literally according to the view, 
because the merely perlocuted proposition is inferred from the single interpretation, that 
Sarah Palin can gut a moose, and is therefore an implication of, and not an interpretation 
of, the utterance. In assessing PV, we must be sure the propositions doing the distinctive 
work it requires are interpretations of the utterance, not, for example, implications of 
interpretations. 
Rather than being too permissive, PV may be thought too restrictive. Consider the 
prominent role the view accords perlocutionary and illocutionary acts. I follow Austin 
(1962) in conceiving these as felicitously performed only insofar as they are intentionally 
performed. Thus, according to PV, there are no unintentional metaphors. But this is no 
significant problem for the view. Importantly, PV does not require that, in speaking 
metaphorically, we intend to speak metaphorically. In speaking metaphorically, one may 
be completely ignorant that one is doing so. What about the fact that we unconsciously 
formulate metaphors? Does this support the conclusion that there are many cases of 
metaphors in which one does not intend illocutionary or perlocutionary effects of the 
requisite sort? I do not believe it does. An unconscious act is not necessarily an 
unintentional one. I may intentionally but unconsciously grab a toothpick while leaving a 
restaurant. Finally, insofar as the view does leave out certain unintentional utterances that 
would ordinarily be considered metaphors, the damage is mitigated since a highly 
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plausible error theory is available: A non-metaphorical utterance will be judged 
metaphorical if it lends itself in the context to two interpretations, which could easily be 
used in the ways PV requires. We will reflect on this possibility more (as well as the 
possibility of figurative sentences) in the following section. 
The previous two objections do not occasion modification of PV as it is previously 
stated. But now consider cases of twice-true metaphors, such as, "Rome wasn't built in a 
day," or Donne's, "No man is an island." According to the previous formulation of PV, 
one speaks metaphorically only if one aims to perform illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts by means of a particular, intended truth-conditional interpretation of her utterance, 
while intending to perform a perlocutionary act (but no illocutionary one) by means of a 
particular, intended, and distinct truth-conditional interpretation of the same utterance. In 
introducing PV, I pointed out that the interpretations of metaphors with which we are 
struck—that Sid is an armored assault vehicle, for example—are not generally true, so 
not generally endorsed by speakers in ways distinctive of many illocutions. But this 
generality fails in the case of metaphors in which the perlocuting interpretation is also 
true. Though Donne meant primarily to perlocute with his utterance's largely 
compositional interpretation that no man is an insignificant land mass completely 
surrounded by water, this interpretation is true and Donne presumably believed it. So, 
Donne might have endorsed it, and he could have intended to illocute with it. So twice-
true metaphors may occasionally be twice-illocuted metaphors, which would not fit the 
previous formulation of PV.  
Fortunately, PV can be modified to handle possible instances of twice-illocuted 
metaphors. Consider the two contents I allege Donne expresses in speaking 
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metaphorically: that no man is among the things capable of existing apart from others of 
its kind, and that no man is an insignificant land mass completely surrounded by water. 
According to PV, Donne intends to perlocute with both interpretations. However, each 
interpretation works its perlocutionary magic in different ways. If we are struck by the 
proposition, that no man is among the things capable of existing apart from others of its 
kind, we are struck through coming to believe that it might be true. Thus the 
perlocutionary effect of this interpretation of Donne's utterance—its capacity to cause us 
to look at things differently—depends upon its illocutionary force as a purportedly true 
assertion. But, though it may as a matter of fact be true, and may in rare cases serve as a 
dual assertion, the perlocutionary effect of the other interpretation of Donne's utterance, 
that no man is an insignificant land mass completely surrounded by water, does not 
depend on its illocutionary force. This interpretation would not cease to amuse were it no 
candidate for plausible endorsement at all—if, for example, it was common knowledge 
that a sleeping man was once carried out by high tide, became covered in sediment, and 
was sustained for several years by a seafaring people who thought him an island god. 
Thus we may account for twice-illocuted metaphors by reformulating PV as the view 
that: One speaks figuratively if and only if one aims to perform an illocutionary act, and 
thereby a perlocutionary act, by means of a particular, intended truth-conditional 
interpretation of her utterance, while intending to perform a perlocutionary act by means 
of a particular, intended, and distinct truth-conditional interpretation of the same 
utterance (where it's possible to perlocute by means of the second interpretation with or 
without illocuting by means of it or any other interpretation). This reformulation 
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encompasses the central cases of figurative utterances and leaves out those of literal 
utterances.  
Turning away from the two types of objections to PV mentioned above—those that 
have to do with PV potentially including or excluding target utterances—we can 
challenge PV by asking whether, as other views fail to differentiate metaphorical and 
literal utterances, PV fails to differentiate the various figurative tropes?
82
 In fact, 
independent of other resources, PV does fail to differentiate these. Speakers mean to 
express two contents with metonymies, similes, metaphors (in the restricted sense), and 
other utterances which are typically lumped amongst the ―metaphorical‖ or figurative 
utterances. In each case, one content is used to perform illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts, while the other is used primarily to perform perlocutionary ones. Thus, independent 
of other resources PV does fail to distinguish the various figurative tropes, though this is 
not a problem for the current theory. The folk distinction which I set out to explain is 
between literal utterances and a class of figurative utterances that is broader than any 
trope. And what is more, while we must recognize PV as an account of figures of speech 
in general, I will demonstrate how once that distinction is in place we have independent 
resources for differentiatiating figurative tropes from one another in virtue of their 
surface structure, relations between the referents of their terms, or certain other intuitive 
features.  
Metonymy—or substitution of a word with a closely associated one—sometimes 
qualifies as figurative language according to PV. If Mia says, ―The king‘s hand stopped 
the executioner‘s axe,‖ meaning to assert and inform that the king‟s decree stopped the 
                                                        
82 Henry Peacham, for example, enumerated 184 different figurative tropes in his The Garden of Eloquence 
(1577). 
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execution from taking place, while impressing her audience with the heroic interpretation, 
that the king used his actual hand to stop the executioner‟s axe mid-swing, she speaks 
figuratively.
83
 In this regard, there is no difference between metaphors and metonymies. 
Still, we can differentiate the two by turning to Jakobson (1990). He contends that 
metaphors and metonymies are affected by different aphasias, and goes on to offer a 
distinction between these based on features of linguistic processing. Metaphors involve 
attention to similarities between the lexical concept and the ad hoc concept constitutive of 
the illocuted interpretation. To understand what‘s asserted by, "Businessmen are ogres," 
we must focus on the cruelty distinctive of businessmen and ogres. Metonymies work 
simply by contiguity. We need not understand features distinctive of kings' hands (other 
than their connection to kings) to understand Mia's metonymy.
84
  
Similes deserve attention because of the prominent role they have played in 
theorizing about metaphors. According to the Reductive Simile View (RSV),
85
 
metaphorical statements are similes in which the word, ‗like,‘ is elided. RSV also denies 
a distinction between similes and literal comparisons, thereby reducing both metaphors 
and similes to literal utterances. However, this reduction seems entirely unpromising. A 
fundamental difference exists between what Governor Palin (nearly) uttered at the 2008 
RNC, ―Hockey moms are like pit-bulls with lipstick,‖ and what the mechanic says to his 
                                                        
83 Synecdoche, which was previously discussed in chapter 5, is often considered a subset of metonymy in 
which a part of the thing takes the place of the whole thing. So, in this sentence, the reference to the king‘s 
hand is also an instance of synecdoche. 
 
84 The Perlocutionary View holds that figuration is fundamentally a matter of speakers‘ aims. So not all 
instances in which we work out an illocuted interpretation by contiguity relations constitute figurative 
utterances. A reporter does not speak figuratively if she says, ―Moscow is upset with the White House over 
its recognition of Kosovo,‖ and means only to briefly convey that Russian officials disapprove of the 
President‟s recognition of Kosovo‟s independence.  
 
85 See Tirrell (1991) for a careful and illuminating discussion. 
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dimwitted assistant, ―The 3/8ths wrench is like the ½ inch but smaller.‖ PV explains this 
difference: Like metaphors, similes, but not literal comparisons, are utterances in which 
speakers primarily perlocute by means of one interpretion while illocuting and 
perlocuting with another. But how do similes and metaphors differ? Like RSV, PV 
locates the difference in comparative words. A simile, but not a metaphor, has the surface 
structure of a comparison using ‗like‘ or ‗as,‘ but the difference also goes deeper. 
Suppose Palin had said, ―Hockey moms are like pit-bulls with lipstick.‖ According to PV, 
Palin means to illocute and thereby perlocute with one interpretation of this utterance. 
Perhaps she intends us to tighten the lexical notion of ‗pit-bull‘ and interpret her as 
claiming that hockey moms, like pit-bulls, are tough. Regardless of her intended 
illocutionary aims, the interpretation by which we are struck seems to be the pretended 
classification of hockey moms as pit-bulls. It is amusing to think that hockey moms just 
are pit-bulls with lipstick. We may go on to consider them yapping alongside the ice rink, 
or viciously attacking the opposing players. This holds for many similes, so we can assert 
as a general rule that similes strike us by means of a perlocuted classification. Therefore, 
regardless of what other loosenings and tightenings are involved, similes always involve 
restricting the broad class of similarities to the relatively narrow class of classifications, 
and perlocuting by means of the latter rather than by means of the former. Thus, the 
current view subverts RSV. Metaphors are not similes in which the word ‗like‘ is elided, 
rather, focusing on their perlocuting contents, similes are metaphors in which the word, 
‗like,‘ is added.  
There are other kinds of utterances that, though closely related, are not, according to 
PV, generally figurative in nature. For instance, there are puns, in which we intend an 
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ambiguity between two possible meanings. Examples include ―Keep off the grass‖ (on a 
sign in front of a drug rehab center), or, ―The cross-eyed teacher can‘t control his pupils.‖ 
In such cases a speaker intends an ambiguity between two possible interpretations—that 
the cross-eyed teacher can't control his students, for example, and that the cross-eyed 
teacher can't control the direction of his eyes. Generally, however, the perlocutionary 
aim in these cases is to amuse the audience at the ambiguity in the utterance, or, possibly, 
to amuse the audience with the idea that the utterance admits of an ambiguity. Either 
way, the audience is not generally amused by an interpretation of a pun. So puns are not 
generally figurative utterances.
86
  
Lastly, let us turn from this discussion of PV and the various figurative tropes to a 
final concern regarding PV, which has to do with the crucial role relevance plays in 
constraining contextualist utterance interpretations. Recall that according to relevance 
theorists (and by analogous principles, most other contextualists) a proposition is an 
interpretation of an utterance if it is an enrichment of the logical form of the pronounced 
words which contributes to optimal relevance. But a proposition is relevant only insofar 
as it strengthens or defeats existing beliefs or combines with existing beliefs to yield 
some new beliefs. However, since a belief is a belief that some proposition is true, the 
propositional interpretations which only affect psychological responses to metaphors—
propositions such as businessmen are mythical oafs—are not often beliefs, since they are 
not often assumed to be true. Therefore, propositions which merely affect psychological 
responses on the part of hearers and which, according to PV, speakers use to perform 
                                                        
86 But a pun might be a figurative utterance, as might, ―The cross-eyed teacher can‘t control his pupils,‖ if 
the context allowed and the speaker intended to claim that the cross-eyed teacher can't control the direction 
of his eyes, while intending to amuse with the idea that the cross-eyed teacher can't control his students, or 
vice-versa.  
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only perlocutionary acts in the case of metaphorical utterances often do not enter into the 
truth-functional calculations according to which relevance is judged, so do not satisfy the 
traditional notion of relevance.  
I think that this inapplicability of the traditional account of relevance to unendorsed 
thoughts is not so much a problem for PV as a fundamental limitation of RT and related 
contextualist views. Austin (1962) pointed out that theorists were often 
disproportionately concerned with fact-stating language, convinced that, ―the business of 
a ‗statement‘ can only be to ‗describe‘ some state of affairs‖ (1). When contextualists 
such as Sperber and Wilson (1995), claim that, ―The function of a cognitive system is to 
deliver knowledge‖ (263), they make the same mistake to which Austin is alluding, just 
in the updated terminology of evolutionary psychology. They fail to make room for 
creativity, which is also the business of a human cognitive system. Fortunately, this 
oversight admits of a remedy. We can see how the needed rehabilitation of relevance 
would go if we pay attention to our perlocutionary aims in speaking metaphorically. If in 
saying, ―Businessmen are ogres,‖ you intend me to be struck by a proposition other than 
that you assert, then the most perlocutionarily relevant interpretation of your utterance is 
that which has optimal perlocutionary effect in the context, minus the resources required 
to achieve it. If I believe that mythical oafs have green skin and befriend talking donkeys, 
then the interpretation that businessmen are mythical oafs, will give rise to the pretended 
assumption that businessmen have green skin and befriend talking donkeys. As the 
epistemic value of a truth-apt inference counts in favor of the interpretation from which it 
follows on the traditional relevance picture, the perlocutionary value of the pretended 
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inference will accrue to the considered interpretation, thus redounding to its 
perlocutionary relevance. 
I have responded to some purported counter-examples to PV and discussed how it is 
best construed as an account of figurative utterances generally, which is compatible with 
various ways of individuating figurative tropes. With the PV account of figurative 
utterances in place, I suggest that we characterize metaphors (in the narrow sense) as 
figurative comparisons that work by similarity. We can distinguish these from 
metonymies (figurative utterances that work by contiguity), similes (figurative 
comparisons), hyperboles (figurative overstatements), and other figurative utterances 
through close attention to distinctive features of these tropes.
87
  
4. Disagreements Over Figurative Use 
 
In the first chapter, I alluded to the following case in order to illustrate the point that 
people routinely disagree about whether a particular utterance is literal or figurative: 
On March 25
th
, 2010, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on military 
installments on Guam, Georgia Representative Hank Johnson quizzed U.S. Navy 
Pacific Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, about the size of the island territory. He 
then explained his questions, saying, ―My fear is that the whole island will become so 
overly populated that it will tip over and capsize.‖ Many people took Johnson to be 
voicing an actual fear that the island would sink. Video of his interrogation of the 
Admiral became something of an internet sensation, prompting Johnson to issue a 
statement claiming that, ―The subtle humor of this obviously metaphorical reference 
to a ship capsizing illustrated my concern about the impact of the planned military 
buildup on this small tropical island.‖  
 
                                                        
87 Regarding ironic utterances, I reject the view that these are cases in which we say one thing and mean its 
opposite. Instead, I embrace Glucksberg‘s (1995) allusional-pretense model, which holds that ironic 
utterances are those in which we allude to some expectation or norm and pretend to be (but are not) bound 
by the felicity conditions of the linguistically signified illocutionary act. So, for example, if Hope says 
sarcastically of her friend, Hal, who has betrayed her, ―Hal is a fine person,‖ she alludes to the expectation 
that we think our friends fine people, and pretends to be bound by the felicity condition that assertions 
should be true. It‘s clear to everyone that this is what is going on because of the ironic form of intonation, 
first noted by Cutler (1976). Thus, irony involves only one interpretation and manipulation of the felicity 
conditions of its attendant illocutionary act, so is not plausibly figurative on PV. Though it is an empirical 
conjecture, I believe that this accords with general folk use of the term, ―metaphor‖. 
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I will now use this case in order to explain various ways in which people can disagree 
over whether a particular utterance is literal or figurative. First, note that if PV captures 
the folk distinction between figurative and literal language, what must be going on here is 
that A) many observers of Rep. Johnson‘s comments did not understand him as 
expressing dual interpretations with his utterance, one of which was associated with 
perlocutionary and illocutionary acts while the other was associated with only 
perlocutionary acts, whereas B) many observers and Rep. Johnson himself did understand 
him to be expressing dual interpretations with his utterance, one of which—the island 
will become so overly populated that negative environmental results will ensue—was the 
conduit for perlocutionary and illocutionary acts, while the other—the island will become 
so overly populated that it will overturn and sink—was the conduit for only 
perlocutionary acts. Each explanation of the disagreement will thus amount to an 
explanation of how it could come to pass that the different parties could understand Rep. 
Johnson‘s comments in the relevantly different ways. Of course, as Chomsky (1965) 
points out, there are the usual ways in which the content of utterances can be 
misunderstood as the result of, ―memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and 
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying...knowledge of the language in 
actual performance‖ (3). But here I will focus on explanations of disagreement that are 
unique to a psycho-linguistic, folk theory such as PV.  
1. Hearer‘s Context vs. Speaker‘s Context and Intentions: 
According to PV, when successful figurative communication occurs, a speaker not only 
intends to express two contents by means of his utterance and intends with these contents 
to perform the relevant acts, it is also the case that hearers apprehend a speaker‘s 
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intentions. But what hearer‘s understand a speaker to express and how they interpret his 
intended speech acts is in part a matter of their background assumptions about the 
context. And a speaker calculates his utterance to affect the intended results based on his 
context of utterance. Insofar as there is disagreement about the background there will be 
divergent interpretations. In the case of the example, Rep. Johnson (and his colleagues in 
the House) are in a very different context than many of the viewers at home who 
understood him to be speaking literally. Viewers at home may fail to understand the 
background assumptions operant in the Congressional context. Thus they may fail to 
interpret Rep. Johnson‘s utterance to express his actually intended dual contents (which 
those in the chamber were in a better position to grasp). 
2. Hearer‘s Prejudice: 
Interpretation rests on background assumptions about a context, but a special subset of 
such assumptions are assumptions about the speaker. Thus misinterpretations of 
figurative utterances may be due to hearer prejudice against a speaker. For example, 
those who interpreted Rep. Johnson‘s utterance literally may have done so because they 
found it easy to assume that an African American, Democrat, or Congressman is too 
stupid to know that islands do not actually capsize. The hearer prejudices that inform 
specific misinterpretations may be due to general or more specific prejudices. And 
presumptions about a speaker which do not qualify as prejudices in a negative sense can 
also play this role.  
3. Cultural Differences: 
Though perhaps unlikely in this case, cultural differences can also explain disagreements 
over whether or not an utterance was figurative. Suppose Rep. Johnson was part of a 
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culture that practiced the turning and tilling of botched land. In that case, the idea of an 
island tipping over and capsizing would be closely associated with an environmentally 
botched island. The utterance could have been selected to cue this association on the 
mistaken assumption that others shared a similar cultural background. That others did not 
could then explain the disagreement. 
4. Speaker Prevarication: 
The disagreement could not consist in the moment, but rather it could be generated as a 
rearguard defense on the part of Rep. Johnson. That is, perhaps Rep. Johnson was too 
stupid to realize that islands do not actually capsize at the moment of utterance. In that 
case, his audience may have interpreted his utterance correctly, as a literal utterance. 
Later, in an effort to save face, Rep. Johnson may have attempted to defend himself by 
insisting that he was in the first instance speaking literally. Speaker prevarication may be 
quite sophisticated. Rep. Johnson could misremember his intentions and lie even to 
himself! 
5. Figurative Utterances vs. Figurative Sentences 
Finally, disagreement over the literal/figurative distinction may consist in different 
targets of assessment. Notice that in his subsequent statement Rep. Johnson referred to, 
―this obviously metaphorical reference to a ship capsizing.‖ Indeed, the sentence itself 
independent of context does seem to be figurative. How is this possible if figuration 
consists in use? Importantly, PV does not rule out the possibility of a figurative sentence. 
It simply explains figurative sentences by reference to figurative utterances. A figurative 
sentence is one that in salient contexts would be interpreted figuratively or that easily 
lends itself to figurative use. In large part, this will have to do with our ordinary 
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assumptions about the actual state of affairs. Thus, because islands do not in the actual 
world capsize, a sentence claiming that an island will capsize is a good candidate for 
figurative utterance. It‘s surface meaning cannot be endorsed, so if any interpretation of 
an utterance of the sentence is to be endorsed, it would have to be a primary proposition 
that departs from sentence meaning. Given that most communication has an informative 
aim, there would in the most easily imaginable cases of communicative utterance of this 
sentence be two propositional interpretations available (the sentence meaning and the 
primary proposition enriched by addition and adjustment). Thus, the sentence lends itself 
to metaphorical expression. If Rep. Johnson is prevaricating about the figurative nature of 
his utterance, his original sentence choice puts him in good stead, since it is a figurative 
sentence.  
These are some of the possible explanations of literal/figurative disagreement 
available on the PV view. In each case of such disagreement, through careful 
consideration of the entire situation, we may agree that one explanation or another is the 
most plausible.  
6. Conclusion: A Genuinely Troubling Counter-Example 
 
PV has resources to explain disagreement and it can accommodate many initially 
plausible instances of counter-example. However, there is one example of figurative 
language we have discussed that is genuinely troubling for the view. That is the case of 
the head monk‘s statement about Tokusan, discussed in chapter four. Recall that, in that 
chapter, I interpreted the first part of the head monk‘s utterance about Tokusan—―He 
soon turned his back on the Dharma hall, put on his straw sandals and went away. One 
day he will build a grass hut upon a lonely peak and scold the buddhas and abuse the 
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patriarchs‖—as a figurative utterance with the asserted content: Tokusan chose to ignore 
organized spirituality. If it is a legitimate figurative utterance, and this is its essentially 
illocuted content, than what is its perlocuted content? Presumably it is something very 
near to the sentence meaning of the head monk‘s utterance. It is plausible that the head 
monk wanted to get Isan to believe this true statement along with his deeper statement 
about spirituality. But notice, the interpretation of the head monk‘s utterance that runs, he 
soon turned his back on the Dharma hall, put on his straw sandals and went away, is true 
and presumably asserted by the head monk as well. What is more, Isan‘s coming to 
believe this proposition is presumably attached in a non-negligible way to Tokusan‘s 
asserting it. How then are we to reconcile this intuitively figurative utterance with PV?  
There seem to be three unsatisfying strategies. First, we can look for another 
interpretation of the utterance which is plausibly intended by the head monk and 
available to his audience, and intentionally perlocuted in a way distinct from any 
illocutionary force attached to it, but no such interpretation seems to be forthcoming. 
Second, we could amend the perlocutionary view yet again. Perhaps we could rule out 
non-affective perlocutionary acts such as believing from the class of relevant, 
independent perlocutions. In that case, we could maintain that the interpretation, he soon 
turned his back on the Dharma hall, put on his straw sandals and went away, is 
affectively perlocuted independently of illocutionary force, since it is a rather striking 
image. Such a move may be justified on independent grounds, but it is no solution to this 
counter example since the relevant content would still be asserted and attached to the 
perlocution of making Isan believe. Finally, third, and perhaps best out of the three 
options, we could deny the intuitive force of the example. And, indeed, this utterance 
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would not seem to be among the class of substantial and significant crucial cases on 
which descriptive adequacy rests. (Nor would denying the intuition impugn my case 
against the implication view, since there would still be its failure to differentiate literal 
and figurative utterances.) Nonetheless, the utterance does strike me as figurative, so I 
would like to avoid even this third strategy. What then are we to do? 
In the face of this counter-example, I believe we must acknowledge that no theory of 
a folk category is likely to be perfect. There will be counter-examples. However, so long 
as those are not crucial cases, and insofar as the theory can accommodate the crucial 
cases, and has additional explanatory benefits besides, we should still accept it. In this 
chapter, I have introduced PV and discussed how it accommodates the crucial cases. In 
the next and final chapter, I will detail its other explanatory benefits. 
  
 
Chapter 7 
Perlocutionary View Payoffs  
According to the Perlocutionary View of figurative language, one speaks figuratively 
if and only if one aims to perform an illocutionary act, and thereby a perlocutionary act, 
by means of a particular, intended truth-conditional interpretation of her utterance, while 
intending to perform a perlocutionary act by means of a particular, intended, and distinct 
truth-conditional interpretation of the same utterance (where it's possible to perlocute by 
means of the second interpretation with or without illocuting by means of it or any other 
interpretation). Though not without exceptions, this view captures the most important 
central instances of figurative use, and can be expanded to offer a plausible account of 
figurative sentences. However, aside from its classificatory achievements, PV also has 
other benefits, which I will discuss in this final chapter.  
1. Differences in Processing and Differences in Use 
Recent cognitive linguistic work on the topic of figurative language has focused on 
differences in processing speed for literal and figurative utterances. On the assumption 
that implicature calculation involves comprehension of two truth-conditional contents, 
one inferred from the other, and therefore takes longer than non-implicative, literal 
sentence comprehension, these studies have been thought to help adjudicate between 
implicature and standard contextualist views of metaphorical meanings. However, as 
Camp (2006) points out, if metaphor and literal utterance processing were on a par, this 
would not clearly tell against a Gricean view, since: 
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Grice and Searle intended their theories as rational reconstructions, aimed at 
explaining how utterances could in principle enable successful communication. They 
were not concerned with how utterances were actually processed, let alone with the 
conscious experience of linguistic interpretation (157).
88
 
 
A contextualist could also explain slower processing speeds for figurative meanings 
compared to some literal meanings. After all, some literal meanings are close to lexically 
encoded meaning, whereas figurative utterance meanings universally depart from 
encoded meaning in requiring enrichment through primary pragmatic processes.  
As Camp notes, the results of processing time studies are fairly mixed. On one hand, 
Gibbs found no difference over the course of several studies (1990, 1994). And in one 
important study Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) found that participants took 
longer to judge whether a sentence was ―literally‖ true when it admitted of a salient 
metaphorical interpretation, even when they had been told to pay attention to only literal 
meanings. One might not expect this result if metaphor processing required literal 
interpretation—however, it could also be that the salience of the figurative meaning 
distracted participants, even if its calculation was in some sense optional and ancillary. 
On the other hand, as Camp discusses: 
Various studies (e.g. Blasko and Connine 1993, Gentner and Wolff 1997, Bowdle and 
Gentner 2005, Giora 1997, 2002) have found that unfamiliar and novel metaphors 
take significantly longer to process than either literal sentences or familiar metaphors 
(159). 
 
This might be a surprising result from the standard contextualist point of view, but it is 
not entirely inexplicable. Familiar figurative utterances, but not literal ones, are likely to 
work by way of well-established cognitive associations. But unlike these standard 
                                                        
88 This is a common enough refrain when it comes to Grice‘s theory. I actually think it‘s rather suspect 
when applied to Searle‘s account of metaphor. He does not say other than, and it seems fairly clear, that he 
is concerned with an actual processing model when he writes that, ―in order to understand the metaphorical 
utterance, the hearer requires something more...‖ (85).  
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contextualist and implicature accounts, which must be finessed to accommodate the 
timing study results, PV positively predicts differences in processing speed based on use. 
Attention to the notion of perlocutionary relevance allows us to offer a nuanced and 
novel explanation of how we understand the asserted (or otherwise illocuted) 
propositional content of metaphors in different contexts. Notice again that the implicature 
account and contextualism hold differing views of the order in which these contents were 
grasped. Insofar as it is not merely a rational reconstruction, IV holds that such contents 
are reached via a process of implicature calculation. When Sally utters, ―Sid is a Sherman 
tank,‖ hearers first fix upon the obviously false, largely compositional, and amusing 
sentence meaning and work through it, the maxim of quality, and other pragmatic 
processes to arrive second at the claim actually endorsed, that Sid is something that 
cannot be deterred from achieving its goals. Thus, IV holds that, in the case of 
metaphors, the asserted content is arrived at later than in the case of literal utterances, for 
which the asserted content is generally the compositional meaning of the uttered 
sentence. On the other hand, contextualism emphasizes that, to achieve the illocuted 
content of figurative utterances, one sometimes needs to loosen or tighten the extensions 
of lexically encoded concepts. But this has to be done in most cases anyway, irrespective 
of whether the utterance is figurative or not. Thus, contextualism holds that the asserted 
contents of figurative utterances are arrived at in the same order as they are in the case of 
literal utterances.  
PV builds on contextualism but, in recognizing the distinction between illocutions 
and perlocutions, is able to give a more nuanced view of the order in which we grasp the 
illocuted interpretations of figurative utterances. Whether or not we grasp these before 
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the perlocuted contents depends upon the speaker‘s aims and the hearer‘s interests in an 
instance of metaphorical communication. In the case of the work-a-day metaphors that 
often enter into ordinary conversation, a speaker‘s primary aim is often illocutionary in 
nature. One aims, primarily, to ask questions, or to make claims or requests. In such 
contexts hearers also are primarily concerned with speakers‘ illocutionary aims, and to a 
lesser extent with the relatively unimportant aesthetic effects speakers are nonetheless 
intending to produce in speaking metaphorically. So, when Sally utters, ―Sid is a 
Sherman tank,‖ in an ordinary conversational context, hearers generally arrive at the 
asserted content, that Sid is something that cannot be deterred from achieving its goals, 
first, as contextualism suggests. In such contexts, IV is turned on its head, since the 
asserted content is grasped first, and the amusing content, that Sid is an armored assault 
vehicle, is then fully worked out only if the situation allows and the hearer expends the 
additional effort.  
The situation is just the opposite for many of the artistic metaphors appearing in 
poetry and other sorts of creative writing. Authors of these figurative utterances have a 
primary interest in producing aesthetic effects in the minds of their readers, and their 
readers are well situated to experience such effects. Therefore, the illocutionary contents 
such authors are intending to produce in speaking figuratively are often more difficult to 
tease out, as they are in the fifth stanza of Wallace Stevens‘ poem, ―Sunday Morning,‖ 
(reprinted in Stevens, 1978): 
She says, ―But in contentment I still feel 
The need of some imperishable bliss.‖ 
Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her, 
Alone, shall come fulfillment to our dreams 
And our desires. Although she strews the leaves 
Of sure obliteration on our paths, 
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The path sick sorrow took, the many paths 
Where triumph rang its brassy phrase, or love 
Whispered a little out of tenderness, 
She makes the willow shiver in the sun 
For maidens who were wont to sit and gaze 
Upon the grass, relinquished to their feet. 
She causes boys to pile new plums and pears 
On disregarded plate. The maidens taste 
And stray impassioned in the littering leaves (68-69). 
 
Who would argue that the imagistic language of this poem is not specifically chosen for 
its aesthetic effects? Take the line, ―She causes boys to pile new plums and pears on 
disregarded plate.‖ Here one is struck by the idea that death orders the young to pile new 
fruit on a neglected platter. One sees the perlocutionary relevance of this straightforward 
interpretation of the uttered line and comes to entertain other ideas presupposed or 
suggested by this and previous ideas. One imagines mother death issuing the order and 
ponders her motive. The perlocutionary potency of this line distracts from Steven‘s 
illocutionary aim. But illocutionary aim there is, and one which fits well with the overall 
theme of the poem: No beauty without death. Stevens lay clear his illocutionary aim in a 
letter to his editor, Harriet Monroe, on June 23
rd
, 1915: 
The words "On disregarded plate" in No. 5 are, apparently, obscure. Plate is used in 
the sense of so-called family plate. Disregarded refers to the disuse into which things 
fall that have been possessed for a long time. I mean, therefore, that death releases 
and renews. What the old have come to disregard, the young inherit and make use of 
(183).
89
 
 
Through the saturation of indexicals and various loosenings and tightenings of lexical 
items, the uttered line, ―She causes boys to pile new plums and pears on disregarded 
plate,‖ is enriched with effort to Stevens‘ intended illocutionary interpretation, that death 
allows young people to contribute new art and invention to the neglected inherited 
culture. In the case of artistic metaphors, the illocutionary content of a metaphor is 
                                                        
89 The letter is reprinted in Stevens (1996).  
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worked out as IV suggests, and contrary to the standard contextualist picture, only after 
the perlocuted and often wildly false content is grasped.  
The predicted processing difference accords well with the experimental findings. 
Figurative language requires a context to be understood, yet figurative sentences can be 
understood apart from any supplied, relevant context. Thus, hearers must impute a 
context to figurative sentences. Since we saw in chapter five that the contextual 
assumptions required to understand metaphor are often assumptions about a speaker‘s 
intentions, it should come as no surprise if intentions about the speaker‘s conversational 
or artistic intentions were also constitutive of this context. Novel metaphors relatively 
easily engender perlocutionary effects, since they are new and more surprising than 
familiar metaphors, so novel metaphors should be more often understood as being issued 
with artistic intentions than familiar metaphors. Thus, in the case of novel metaphors, 
hearers focus more and earlier on the perlocutionary content, causing processing time for 
asserted contents to slow.  
2. Why Metaphor? Some Potential Uses 
As I pointed out in chapter four, one of the shortcomings of many articulated theories 
of figurative language is that they fail to explain why we use metaphor at all. Unlike all 
the other previously discussed views, PV suggests two interpretations of a metaphor,  
both of which are entertained by hearers in specific ways. Importantly, the non-endorsed 
content of a metaphor is not a mere gateway to the truly significant idea. It is often a fully 
individual content which must be worked out according to the same processes of 
comprehension as the illocuted interpretation. This increases the explanatory burden of 
the current view. If in many cases the essentially perlocuting content of the metaphor is 
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not a necessary way-station on the road to endorsed content, why do hearers waste the 
resources to process it? Why do speakers express it? But it also suggests a plausible 
account of some important uses of figurative language. 
First, let us consider what might be the default explanation for why metaphor 
speakers force hearers to make the circuitous route through non-endorsed content: They 
do it to entertain their audience. I am, of course, sympathetic to this idea. Indeed, on my 
view the presence of perlocutionary intentions for the unendorsed content is constitutive 
of figurative language. But  many existing accounts of metaphor are poorly suited to this 
explanation. Stern‘s sentence meaning account and the standard contextualist view 
provide good illustrations. For the bulk of figurative utterances, both accounts fail to 
posit any propositional interpretation apart from that which is endorsed or illocuted by 
the speaker. For Stern, lexically specified pragmatic processes lead us to interpret a sub-
sentential component as expressing a set of contextually associated presuppositions, 
which contribute to the meaning of the sentence. For the contextualists, non-mandated 
processes cause us to attribute ad hoc meanings to words, which contribute to the primary 
propositional content of the utterance, ―what is said‖. For neither account is there 
ordinarily any potentially entertaining idea other than the endorsed metaphorical 
meaning. But then metaphor is on a par with literal utterance, and we have no account for 
why we use metaphors. The implicature view, though perhaps more amenable, does not 
lend itself to this explanation either, since, though propositional, the unendorsed, 
compositional ―what is said‖ is only a conduit to the communicatively significant ―what 
is meant‖. Of the cognitive views, only PV deems the non-endorsed content of a 
metaphor an independently relevant content of thought. And only on PV does non-
167 
 
endorsed content have a non-instrumental value. The non-endorsed content is an object of 
fancy that the hearer must often devote independent resources to grasp. Why then does 
the hearer bother? Because, as Bloom (2010) discusses, pleasure is one of the central 
goals of human cognition and it is often facilitated by imagination: 
Our main leisure activity is, by a long shot, participating in experiences that we know 
are not real. When we are free to do whatever we want, we retreat to the 
imagination—to worlds created by others, as with books, movies, video games, and 
television (over four hours a day for the average American), or to worlds we 
ourselves create, as when daydreaming and fantasizing (190). 
 
Entertaining an unendorsed, perlocuted content provides a small pleasure even in 
information driven communication. Since people are independently motivated towards 
pleasure, we need not posit a mediate role for the content in order to explain why it is 
grasped.  
Even if hearers bother working out non-endorsed, figurative interpretations for the 
end of pleasure, this fails to explain why speakers bother using metaphors. The effort 
might in part  be explained by a prosocial sentiment, or it could stem from the same 
source as story-telling or other creative linguistic pursuits. However, I want to suggest 
another use for figurative language: Figurative language has an argumentative function 
for speakers. It motivates hearers to accept the cogency of speakers‘ endorsed ideas in 
several important ways. 
One argumentative value of metaphor has been discussed ad naseum by Lakoff 
(2002, 2004, 2006). Lakoff‘s (1987, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) cognitive semantic 
theory of metaphor, posits a cognitive model for every concept. Each model is constituted 
by mental images, embodied experiential information, and mappings between the target 
and other concepts established through metaphorical and metonymic imaginative 
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capacities. In communication, interactions between the metaphorical models of 
referenced concepts establish an implicit framework for each utterance. For instance, the 
concept of ―relief‖ implies a painful burden—the target of relief. So, when people speak 
of ―tax relief‖ they automatically frame taxes as a burden from which people must be 
emancipated, rather than, say, as a fee people pay to help maintain and contribute to the 
national resources they use. Such conceptual mappings implicitly frame debates, 
according to Lakoff. And framing a debate correctly can be an important argumentative 
advantage. (Though this argumentative benefit is not specific to the notion of linguistic 
metaphor of primary interest to us.)
90
  
The next two argumentative benefits of figurative language are focused more 
specifically on the current theory and developed from reflection on Petty and Wegener‘s 
(1998) work on persuasion. In particular, these have to do with their discussion of the 
factors that affect, ―how motivated and able people are to assess the central merits of a 
person, issue or a position‖  (328). The first of these has to do with the effects of 
cognitive load on reasoning. As Petty et al (1976) demonstrated, distraction affects one‘s 
capacity to process issue relevant counter-evidence. Thus metaphor may have a positive 
argumentative value for a speaker insofar as his audience is inclined to entertain the 
perlocuted content of his utterance. If one‘s attention is partially focused on the false, but 
vivid, idea that an iron curtain has descended on Eastern Europe, or that when a 
government collapses it can physically knock over a neighboring government, one may 
                                                        
90 I have not discussed Lakoff‘s cognitive semantic theory of metaphor in any detail in this dissertation. 
This is because I am inclined to think of the view as orthogonal to linguistic metaphor. In fact, many of 
Lakoff‘s claims about conceptual structure seem correct to me. But since Lakoff views metaphorical 
connections as a perfectly ubiquitous feature of conceptualization, his view could not possibly explain the 
intuitive distinction between the figurative and the literal. Thus, much of what I said about standard 
contextualism applies to the view, if it is construed as also supplying a view of linguistic metaphor. And if 
it is not, then I‘m more or less inclined to accept it.  
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be less inclined to critically challenge the asserted worldview and its associated political 
implications. 
A third argumentative value of figurative language bears on the role of positive affect 
in decreasing people‘s motivation to distrust an interlocutor. Affective attitude towards an 
individual helps determine how likely one will be to trust the individual as an information 
source (Petty and Wegener, 1998).  Thus, if people are entertained by a metaphor‘s 
perlocuted content, they may be more inclined to think favorably of the speaker, so more 
inclined to trust what he says. Indeed, a connection between figurative language and 
positive appraisal of a speaker seems to be borne out by Mio et al (2005), who found that 
the presidents people rated as having high charisma, ―used nearly twice as many 
metaphors (adjusted for speech length) than non-charismatic presidents‖ (287). 
Finally, in a recent series of studies, Ackerman et al (2010) found evidence, ―that 
experiences with specific object-related tactile qualities...triggers the application of 
associated concepts...even to unrelated people and situations‖ (1713). For instance, male 
participants in one study were significantly more likely to agree that more money should 
be allocated to social issues when a survey was attached to a heavy clipboard than a light 
one. (Women were close to ceiling on social spending in both conditions.) And 
participants were less flexible in negotiations when seated in a hard chair than a soft one. 
Heaviness is metaphorically associated with importance, whereas hardness is associated 
with personal inflexibility; so the studies give some indication that metaphorical structure 
may affect how one approaches a situation. In the case of consonant metaphors—those 
for which the endorsed proposition accords with the metaphorical associations triggered 
by the perlocuted content—the perlocuted content may help turn one‘s perspective in a 
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direction that accords with the speakers claim. Cal may be inclined to accept Doug‘s 
claim, that his father is stubborn, because he likes and trusts him, but the way Cal makes 
the claim, by saying, ―Dad is an unyielding calcification,‖ might not hurt either. 
The argumentative use of figurative language that I have discussed is essentially 
related to the pernicious attitude many philosophers have held towards figurative 
language. Effects of the perlocuted content of a figurative utterance lead hearers to 
attribute more credence to the endorsed content than rational processing would 
recommend. If we must ban figurative language from the republic, we should not do so 
because it is loose. Loose use is ubiquitous (and useful, after all). If we are to ban 
figurative language from rational discourse, we should do so because we side with Locke 
(1690, Bk. 3, ch. 10), when he writes that: 
…all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are 
for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead 
the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or 
allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addressees, they are 
certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; 
and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, 
either of the Language or Person that makes use of them. 
 
3. Non-linguistic Figuration 
PV  allows for the assimilation of verbal metaphor to other forms of non-verbal 
figuration. This is an important criterion for any folk theory of figuration since, as 
pointed out in chapter one, the folk concept is not restricted to language. Suppose, as you 
are sitting through a boring lecture, a friend catches your attention. With his ring and 
pinky fingers folded down and his other digits extended, your friend mimics a gun with 
his hand and, putting the ‗barrel‘ to his temple, brings down his thumb like a hammer, 
pantomiming his own suicide. Why does your friend do this? It seems clear that he aims 
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to achieve the following ends with this gesture: to point out and convey that he finds this 
talk incredibly boring and to strike you with the idea that this talk is driving him to 
suicide. Minus loosenings and tightenings of lexically encoded concepts, this is 
essentially the same account I have suggested for verbal metaphor.  
The monolith scenes in 2001: A Space Odyssey will be understood metaphorically if 
they are thought to intentionally capture our imagination with the idea that there exists a 
superior alien intelligence, while they symbolize and remind us that evolution of the 
species can occur instantaneously. If these (or similar) were the aims of Arthur C. Clarke 
and Stanley Kubrick, then the monolith scenes actually constitute figurative film. An 
image of a labyrinth can be understood as an instance of non-linguistic figuration. When 
we see the picture we think of a maze, but we take the picture to symbolize the confusing 
nature of life‘s journey, on which the labyrinth leads us to meditate. To understand the 
labyrinth as a figurative image or artifact, we need not attribute  intentions to one specific 
author. There can be cultural icons which are figurative because they occupy a certain 
position relative to the intentions of a group or tradition. Such metaphorical icons may 
resist death so long as the tradition continues—in fact, they may gain more significance 
over time for new initiates through their connection to a long tradition. This is not the 
case with most metaphors, which over time lose their potential to strike us as they 
become more and more familiar. A metaphor dies when hearers come to see it only as an 
attenuated representation, not a tool to affect unaffiliated psychological states.  
Though PV does offer an account of non-linguistic figuration—of which there are 
legitimate instances—it is important to bear in mind that not everything we call a 
metaphor is a metaphor, or even really understood as a metaphor. Consider as one 
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possible example: the British Petroleum oil spill. People refer to the oil spill as a 
―metaphor‖ for big oil‘s instrumentalist perspective on the natural environment, the 
incompetency of the Obama presidency, and the excesses of capitalism, among others. 
But on the current theory, if people really understand this as a metaphor, then they must 
(at least unconsciously) attribute the appropriate intentional framework to some author of 
the oil spill. I have no doubt that people do sometimes attribute intentional states to 
supernatural agents.
91
 In some situations this may provide the appropriate framework for 
natural and cataclysmic metaphors. But we should also remember the contextualist 
mantra, that loose use is ubiquitous. The folk concept of figuration can also be used 
loosely to refer to things to which it does not strictly apply. Some purported instances of 
non-linguistic figuration may be nothing more than instances of loose use. 
In any case, it is important to note how unique PV is in offering a theory of non-
verbal figuration. None of the views of figurative language we considered in earlier 
chapters offered such a view. It would have been impossible to expand most of these 
theories beyond the realm of the linguistic. Implicatures and covert arguments are 
language-specific phenomena. 
4. A Testable Hypothesis 
Often theories of figurative language seem virtually unfalsifiable. In the face of 
findings that figurative processing does not accord with online implicature calculation, 
implicature theorists can emphasize that their view was only intended as a rational 
reconstruction. Non-cognitivists characterize metaphor understanding as requiring a 
vague sort of ―seeing as‖ that we cannot say anything very specific about, so cannot test. 
PV refreshingly makes empirically testable predictions. It is a substantive theory which is 
                                                        
91 See Mandelbaum and Ripley (ms), and Gray and Wegner (2010). 
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open to falsification. Here are three classes of predictions drawn from the discussion of 
this chapter: 
1. Processing speed for endorsed content comprehension will change with a hearer‘s 
understanding of a speakers intentions. If the speaker is understood to be  primarily 
interested in producing aesthetic effects, endorsed content comprehension will take 
longer than if the speaker is understood to be mainly interested in conveying 
information. This hypothesis can be tested by measuring processing speed for 
identical utterances relative to otherwise equivalent poetic vs. conversational 
contexts. 
2. According to the current theory, hearers process the perlocuted contents of metaphors 
because they have an inherent cognitive interest in the pleasurable experiences these 
perlocuted contents effect, and speakers speak metaphorically because expressing an 
independent, perlocuting content has argumentative value. These hypothesis suggest a 
number of testable predictions. For the explanation of why hearers process the 
perlocuted content to obtain, it must be that fully processing a figurative utterance is a 
pleasurable experience, in which case it would raise general affect. Increases in affect 
are associated with various effects, including (as mentioned above) a tendency to 
judge others more favorably. So the conditions required for the target explanation of 
why hearers process metaphors are readily testable. Relatedly, if a primary 
explanation for why speakers speak metaphorically is the argumentative benefit of the 
figurative utterance, then we should see a decrease in metaphorical language when 
speakers are in contexts in which argumentative benefit is unimportant or obviated. 
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When speakers are addressing those who share their beliefs, they should use fewer 
metaphors, all else being equal.  
3. When an addressee regards an action as figurative she apprehends it as symbolizing 
two ideas, one which is endorsed and one which is meant to affect a psychological 
reaction. Actions which are regarded as figurative should lend themselves to such 
dual interpretation. What‘s more, we should be able to elicit differences in response 
for figurative actions if we ask study participants to write a sentence that ―captures 
the idea that your counterpart means to get you to believe‖ with a figurative action, 
verses ―the idea with which your counterpart is trying to entertain you.‖ 
There are other testable upshots of the current view, and this redounds in its favor when 
compared with existing accounts of figurative language.  
5. Flexibility of the Account 
Although I have cast the Perlocutionary View from the bronze of linguistic 
contextualism, the view might have been cast from other metal. That PV does not stand 
or fall with linguistic contextualism is a further strength of the view. For instance, 
linguistic indexicalism (of the variety endorsed by Stanley and his co-authors and 
discussed in chapter five) and contextualism are competing explanations of instances in 
which the context invariant meanings of pronounced words do not determine truth-
conditional contents essential to communication. Both views assume that context plays a 
large role in determining the sub-propositional meanings which are contributed to truth 
conditions in instances of use. As long as a view allows such a role for context—and also 
that utterances can express two contents (which consideration of certain non-figurative 
utterances such as puns suggests any view must)—the view is compatible with my theory 
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of figurative language. So PV can survive the triumph of indexicalism over 
contextualism, should it come to pass, and versions of the view can be articulated for 
other theories of communication as well. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that although the old theories of metaphorical 
meaning did not supply a successful account of the concept of figurative utterance, 
accounts of figurative understanding and meaning do fall out of the Perlocutionary View. 
To fully understand any figure of speech is to grasp both intended contents, as well as a 
speaker's intentional acts in expressing these.
92
 One may identify a speaker‘s 
metaphorical meaning with both propositional contents the speaker uses to achieve her 
illocutionary and perlocutionary aims. Or, since we typically think of the, for example, 
asserted contents of utterances as their meanings, one may prefer to think only of the 
content a speaker uses to achieve her illocutionary aims as the meaning of a metaphor. 
5. Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have criticized theories that attempt to explain figurative 
language in terms of a distinctive class of figurative meaning or (in the case of non-
cognitive views) understanding. These fail to identify a distinctive kind of figurative 
meaning, so fail to differentiate figurative and literal language, and many fail for other, 
independent reasons as well. I offered the Perlocutionary View of figurative language, 
according to which one speaks figuratively if and only if one aims to perform an 
illocutionary act, and thereby a perlocutionary act, by means of a particular, intended 
truth-conditional interpretation of her utterance, while intending to perform a 
                                                        
92 Although, in the case of an unsuccessful metaphor, a speaker‘s perlocutionary aims, though perhaps 
understood, may fail to be successfully brought off. In fact, understanding a speaker‘s perlocutionary aims 
(and so fully understanding a figurative utterance) may hamper the success of those aims (and that 
utterance), as, for example, in cases in which one aims to flatter or mislead.  
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perlocutionary act by means of a particular, intended, and distinct truth-conditional 
interpretation of the same utterance (where it's possible to perlocute by means of the 
second interpretation with or without illocuting by means of it).
93
 This view accords with 
our intuitive assessments of clear and central cases of figurative language. It 
accommodates a range of figurative utterances and allows us to distinguish subclasses of 
these using various resources. As I have discussed in this chapter, it offers a nuanced 
treatment of the differences between poetic and conversational metaphors, but does not 
abandon a unified account of figurative language in general. It offers a theory of why we 
use and process metaphors. And it has application beyond the bounds of language to 
images, actions, and events. Unlike other views of figurative language, this 
Perlocutionary View lays legitimate claim to the title of Figuration of the Folk.  
 
                                                        
93 Among the works that have, in certain ways, prefigured my own theory of metaphor and figurative 
language, two deserve special mention. Cohen (1975) precedes me in explaining figurative language 
generally in terms of interactions between illocutionary, perlocutionary, and other aspects of the total 
speech situation (in Austin‘s xxxxResidue of some discussion of C ohen? phrase). He maps various kinds 
of figuration onto a model of speech acts, according to which each sentence has a linguistically determined 
meaning and force. Ordinarily, these meanings (at least) partially determine locutionary content (or, ‗what 
is said‘). Each force has associated with it a particular illocutionary act, which, ―when the circumstances of 
the utterance are altogether ‗normal‘‖ (676), is executed. And each illocution has an associated 
perlocutionary effect. Cohen holds that, ―in all cases of figuration something prevents...[these various 
elements]...from fitting together.‖ So, for example, in some cases of verbal metaphor, such as, ―Rio is 
cold,‖ the associated illocutionary act is one of assertion. But a felicity condition on assertions is that what 
is said should be (at least apparently) true, and it is obviously false that Rio is cold. So the locution and 
illocution do not fit together, and this causes us to reinterpret the locution. Cohen also suggests that there 
are cases of figurative illocutions. Suppose that the perlocutionary effect of causing to acquiesce is 
associated with the illocution of begging. Then if I say, ―I beg you to get better,‖ to someone not standing 
in the way of her own recovery, whatever effect my utterance has it cannot be the perlocutionary effect 
associated with begging. Her own recovery is something she cannot acquiesce to. In this case of a 
figurative speech act, Cohen thinks the linguistically determined force of my utterance is transfigured to 
produce some uncatalogued illocution. I also consider Hills (1997) a forerunner to my own view. In the 
closing pages of that paper, Hills claims that in the, ―case of a routine freestanding metaphorical assertion, 
we take the same set of words to express two different thoughts ,‖ one of these, he goes on, ―is entertained 
in a spirit of assertion,‖ while the other, ―is entertained in a spirit of pretense‖ (153). This suggestion is 
very similar to my view as far as it goes, and though I disagree with Hills on some points (for example, the 
open-endedness of metaphorical paraphrase,) one could perhaps view my theory as a further working out of 
his basic idea.  
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